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Personality and the
Christian ideal

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PERSONALITY AND THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL

PERSONALITY

AND THE

CHRISTIAN IDEAL

A DISCUSSION OF PERSONALITY IN
THE LIGHT OF CHRISTIANITY

BY

JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM

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By John Wright Buckham

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THE MEMORY OF MY BROTHER

JAMES BUCKHAM

POET, NATURE-LOVER, COMRADE

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"Soul, nerve thyself to such as these
Deep problems, sacred destinies!
It matters not what fate may give;
The best is thine — to nobly live."

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PREFACE

THE paths of philosophy, psychology, ethics, and theology which have been diverging more and more since the middle of the nineteenth century are once more converging — at the point of personality. To help to a further understanding of personality, especially in the wealth of its meaning in and for Christianity, is the purpose of this volume. The discussion of the subject is very incomplete, particularly as respects Christian theism, but I hope to supplement it in that direction, along the line indicated in chapters xvi and xvii. The chapters which seem to the author cardinal and contributive are chapters iii, v, ix, x, xiii, xiv, xv, and xvi.

The author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to the invisible company of great thinkers of the past and present, the vital product of whose thought alone has made possible this leaf upon the tree of knowledge. Those who have fallen most

within my purview, the following pages will themselves disclose. If I were to name a single living thinker to whose profound and virile thought I owe most along the line of the theme of the volume it would be Professor G. H. Howison, much as I find myself obliged to dissent from him in some respects. Although the volume was practically completed before the appearance of Professor Bowne's *Personalism* I wish to express my sense of the exceeding value of this, the most important recent contribution to the philosophy of personality. The discussions of the Philosophical Union of the University of California — a society which has few equals in the country in its free and intelligent consideration of vital and difficult problems — have been full of stimulus. I have been greatly aided also by the earnest interest of the students of my own classroom before whom a considerable part of the contents of the volume has been given in the form of lectures. Acknowledgment with thanks is extended to the publishers of the *Homiletic Review* for permission to use the article which constitutes the Introduction.

Special thanks are given to Dr. George A.

Gordon, who generously read the manuscript, for most valuable suggestions and criticism as well as for that cordial appreciation which is so characteristic of him. The consonance of the theme with his own point of view is indicated in these words from a letter which he has permitted me to quote: "I have been prepared for the appreciation of the value of your essay by the fact that for many years Personality has been to me the key of our world and our universe. It is the key or there is none."

Fault will be found with the volume, probably, because it is neither pure theory nor pure application. Some readers would doubtless prefer less preaching, others less theorizing. But, whether rightly or wrongly, the author is so convinced of the vital union of the two that he finds it difficult to separate them.

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PERSONALITY AND THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL

I. INTRODUCTION

I

Robert Louis Stevenson's *Will o' the Mill*, who, as a lad, so longed to leave the narrow valley and see the great world, yet never went, used in later life to say to those who tried in vain to tempt him down to the plain and the great cities, "When I was a boy I was a bit puzzled and hardly knew whether it was myself or the world that was curious and worth looking into. Now, I know it is myself, and stick to that." Not without pertinence might these words be put into the mouth of humanity. In its childhood and youth it seemed to our restless race that the thing best worth looking into was the external world. Unlike Will o' the Mill, men left the valley for the plain, the plain for the sea, and the sea for the farther shore, in search of the rich and rare. Youthful mankind, in the lust of strength and the love of conquest, eager, insatiate, subdued the earth, explored, ransacked, exploited, lost in wonder and the love of action. Wiser now and wearier,

humanity turns the eye inward and finds something far more curious and worth looking into, and begins to realize that it is the *self* that holds all wonders within itself and fain would stick to that.

To exchange the outward glamor for the inward gleam, the world of plunder and merchandise and sensuous values for the world of truth and personal values — that is a momentous step. But it is as certain that humanity will take it, is even now taking it, as that progress is the law of life. Can the tinsel long entice, while the true gold shines? Can the lesser wonder hold while the greater calls? Can nature long compete for supremacy of interest with nature's lord?

> "A ruddy drop of manly blood
> The surging sea outweighs,
> The world uncertain comes and goes,
> The lover rooted stays."

It is not turning away from nature to turn to personality, but turning toward that without which nature has no meaning or worth or beauty.

Personality is the key to the meaning of man, of nature, and of God. Without it we seek in vain to unlock the mysteries of existence. It is not only, as Höffding calls it, "one of the most fertile principles that has ever been able to establish itself,"[1] it is the

[1] Harold Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, § 101.

master principle. Humanity has been half unconsciously pursuing personality, pondering it, cherishing it, living by it, ever since reason awoke. Now men are becoming conscious of the pursuit and of the prize. The gain is infinite. We begin to understand dimly what it is all about — this concentrating star-dust, this travailing nature, this struggling, developing human nature. It is all a drama of personality. We see from far the fifth act, and light breaks upon the whole. Is it not all for the sake of personality? — "Personality which supports even Science, and which impresses its seal on all things." [1]

II

Indirectly all philosophies, sciences, arts, industries have to do with personality. Whatever touches humanity touches personality. For philosophy, ethics, and theology it is the main issue. Indeed, it is the common interest which unites these three studies, hitherto too far sundered. Each, however winding its road, comes to personality and stops. What is it; whence is it; what does it signify? It is only as these three unite to sound the meaning of personality that we can hope for an adequate answer.

The true place and sphere of *theology*, which seems for some time to have been lost,

[1] Harold Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, § 102.

will be regained only as, in closest harmony with philosophy and ethics, she pursues this central, human-divine problem of personality. Some of its aspects belong distinctively to her. Religion, which has come to be recognized as occupying the very center of human values, consists in *personal relationships,* the highest, purest, and most enduring; what else?[1] And theology, the interpreter and assistant of religion, has as her task to define and describe these relationships. Yet she can no more accomplish this task alone, without philosophy and ethics, than they in turn can accomplish theirs without her.

Nor can personality be intelligently studied without the aid of psychology, — the connecting link between the pure and empirical sciences. A determined effort has been made on the part of some of the representatives of the *new psychology* to obliterate personality, to banish the Self altogether as a troublesome and useless interloper. Theoretically it is quite reasonable and thoroughly scientific for psychology to leave out of account altogether the existence of a self, as belonging to the

[1] "That the unities which we call personalities are superior to all the manifoldness and diversity of the world, that they are not fleeting, fortuitous formations among the many to which evolution is always giving rise and breaking down again but that they are the aim and meaning of all existence, and that as such they are above the common lot of all that has only a transient meaning and a temporal worth — to inquire into all this and to affirm it is religion itself." Rudolf Otto, *Naturalism and Religion,* p. 337.

realm of metaphysics; and yet the self refuses to be banished. If it is thrown out at the door it comes in at the window. The new psychology, when it speaks through its more comprehensive representatives, recognizes this and pays ample tribute to the reality and priority of the self. Professor Münsterberg in his *Psychology and Life* — one of the most conclusive utterances which has ever been made by psychology upon the relation of the psychical to the real — writes: "Psychology may dissolve our will and our personality and our freedom, and it is constrained by duty to do so, but it must not forget that it speaks only of that will and that personality which are by metamorphosis substituted for the personality and the will of real life, and that it is this real personality and its free will which create psychology in the service of its ends and aims and ideals." [1]

To the aid of these four major investigations, for their assistance in the task of verification and application, come all the sciences

[1] Hugo Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life*, p. 23. No less positive testimony to the reality of personality is given by Professors Ladd, Stout, Stratton, Scripture, Angell, and others. Professor Ladd declares that "the unity of a self-conscious life is the highest and realest of all conceivable unities." (*Physiological Psychology*, p. 23.) Professor Stratton affirms that so far from disappearing the soul "is the most active thing with which we have any direct acquaintance" (*Experimental Psychology and Culture*, p. 302), while Professor James R. Angell asserts that "the feeling of selfhood is the very core of our psychical being." (*Psychology*, p. 396.) None of these psychologists holds any brief for the defence of personality. Their consensus of judgment is that only of impartial study.

and the arts, theoretical and practical, pure and applied. Whatever has to do with human life has to do with personality. It is vain to attempt to divorce personality from any human interest or pursuit. In that new science of sociology, for instance, newest and noblest, how unavoidable and illuminating is the emergence of the personal equation! "The pathos and dignity of the labor movement," well says Professor Peabody, "are to be found in the reiteration of the teaching of Jesus, that economic schemes are to be estimated by their contribution to personality. The economic order is an instrument for the making of man." [1]

III

It is not without significance that the terms *person* and *personality* are coming so largely to supersede the older term, *soul*. The fact registers a subtle change, a new stage of development, in the conception of the inner life. The primitive notion of the soul was that of a *ghost* or *spirit*, a sort of ethereal substance more or less closely connected with the body. The form of this tenant was variously conceived — oftenest as a miniature double of the man himself, sometimes as a bird ready to take flight.[2]

[1] *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, p. 282.
[2] J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, Vol. I, Chap. 2, § 2.

As reflection grew, this primitive notion of the soul was followed by a more rational conception. Instead of a material ghost or soul, there grew up the idea of an *entity* or *principle* more vitally and organically connected with the body.[1] Theories were formed locating the soul in the blood or the breath, or both, and, after physiology arose, in the brain or the pineal gland. Psychology, in its earlier history, regarded the soul as an immaterial substance in which faculties inhere; and this has been the general conception up to the present time. But with the breaking up of the *Faculty Psychology* this notion, too, has been consigned to the limbo of outworn ideas. The soul as a static *substratum* or thing no longer satisfies advancing thought. The more dynamic and spiritual conception of *personality* is coming to take its place, — not so much a possession as a *potency*.[2]

Not that personality denies or excludes the essential content of the older conception of the *soul*.[3] Rather does it take up into itself

[1] "The first clear perception of an immaterial principle is probably to be ascribed to Plato." Stout, *Psychology*, p. 559.

[2] "Our contention is that the soul is not an unchangeable, rigid, absolutely persistent little point of reality, which existing in and for itself acts as a support for powers and processes, but the unity of psychical activity, the sum of the correlated conscious and sub-conscious inner states themselves." Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 358.

[3] As Lôtze has said, "The living intelligence of all nations has in the name of *Soul* expressed the conviction that an element of peculiar nature, differently constituted from the materials of the

and conserve the truth contained in the earlier idea; but it gives that truth far more satisfying form. No longer can we think, with any sense of adequacy, of the body as having a soul, but rather of the soul as having a body. Or, better still, we think of a *person* finding expression and communication through a physical medium. Furthermore, the term personality expresses a uniqueness, a distinctness of characteristic quality, which does not attach to the idea of soul. The term *soul* conveys the impression that one soul is precisely like every other, but *personality* suggests uniqueness as well as universality.

Not only, therefore, as indicating the dynamic and potential nature of the self, but as expressing *uniqueness*, is personality the superior and superseding conception.[1] It seems a comparatively simple reality, but, like Browning's star, as we stand at gaze before it, it opens a world on us. Within this inexhaustible world of personality is found a wealth of meanings and values which well repays patient and persistent search.

frame, lies at the base of the world of sensations, of volitions, of emotions, and by its own unity binds them into the whole of a rounded-off development." *Microcosmos*, Book II, Chapter I.

[1] In the *Philosophical Review* of May, 1908, Professor Mary Whiton Calkins has an article entitled *Self and Soul* in which a comparison not unlike the above — though appearing after it was written — is drawn. "The conception of soul differs from that of self," concludes Professor Calkins, "first, in that it is, in one sense or another, subordinated to that of body; second, in that it is needlessly empty and abstract."

IV

The search for the ultimate meaning of personality is a difficult one. The pathways are not easy nor unobstructed. The very entrance is beset with a forbidding form — the specter of *subjectivity*. "The world we can know, or at least we can handle it — the self we cannot. The objective is the healthful, the understandable, the attainable; it keeps us in the open air, and in contact with things that we can see and handle. Let us sail the seas and explore the poles, let us experiment and investigate and apply and prosper and let alone the obscure and unprofitable problems of the self; your subjective, introspective idealist is pale and puzzled; give us the warm, red blood, the stir and the zest of the objective life, free from problems, untroubled by ideals."

Such is the cry, if not the creed, of a large and aggressive element in modern civilization. And there is enough of reason in it to give it force. In many respects the objective pursuits are the normal ones. They help to develop that very personality which we are seeking to evaluate and understand. We are in a world of sense, creatures of flesh and blood as well as spirits, and we must adapt ourselves to our environment. But there comes a time in the development of the race, as in that of the individual, when it is wrong

and reactionary to ignore the claims of self-knowledge. When the individual has once passed the period of childish unconsciousness and become self-conscious it is impossible for him to go back to the old self-ignorance. For better, for worse, he has passed into conscious selfhood. His only salvation lies in pressing forward, through the pains and perplexities of self-consciousness to self-knowledge and self-command. Humanity has become introspective; it must become introspective enough to become self-possessed. We have begun the search into the hidden things of selfhood; we must persevere until we have found. There is no going back to the flesh-pots of Egypt; we must press on to the promised land.

Excessive introspection atrophies action; but true introspection stimulates it and leads to normal and harmonious living. "There is one art," said Coleridge, "of which every man should be master, the art of reflection. If you are not a thinking man to what purpose are you a man at all? In like manner there is one knowledge which it is every man's interest and duty to acquire, namely, self-knowledge."[1] These words may well be apologetic as well as inspirational for our task. If nature is absorbing, humanity is vastly more absorbing. If the cosmos is interesting, the microcosmos is engrossing.

[1] *Aids to Reflection*, Preface.

"So take thy quest through nature,
It through thousand natures ply;
Ask on, thou clothed eternity;
Time is the false reply." [1]

But we are not inviting the reader to an academic discussion — a mere quest for knowledge. Our purpose is practical as well as theoretical. We seek to understand personality in order to relate it to the vital life-ideal presented in Christianity. Too long has Christianity been isolated from philosophy, psychology, and ethics. It is through the study of personality that the underlying unity appears.

[1] Emerson, *The Sphinx*.

II. WHAT IS PERSONALITY?

I

It will be wise to disclaim at the outset any attempt at an exact and complete definition of personality. It may be doubted if such a definition has ever been formulated of anything in the heavens above or the earth beneath. Certainly none such can be given of that deep, mysterious potency, — human personality. And yet we are not dealing with a will-o'-the-wisp, a fiction, an abstraction, but with the very central and supreme reality of our existence, — of all existence.

Without attempting, therefore, a scientific analysis of personality — for who can dissect a soul? — we may reach the truest conception of it by asking what are its constituent elements or factors? To begin with, we may affirm that personality is *self-conscious*, — a subject-object. Self-consciousness, or the "quality in a subject of being consciously an object to itself," [1] is clearly the property of a person and of none but a person. Self-consciousness is to be distinguished from simple or single consciousness. Single conscious-

[1] T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 182.

ness involves a continuous subject but not a subject-object. In self-consciousness we know ourselves as well as our sensations and reflections, "apprehending ourselves along with our states in the same indivisible moment of time."[1] Self-consciousness varies greatly in intensity in different persons and at different times in the same person, but it is a fundamental and essential constituent of selfhood.[2]

Self-consciousness is not to be confounded with that self-sensitiveness, that acute and abnormal sense of one's own external advantages or defects, which so commonly goes by the name of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness in that sense we all instinctively condemn; true self-consciousness we approve. One is most self-conscious, in the true sense, not when he is conscious of his hands or his feet, his appearance or his manner, or anything that has to do with his external and extrinsic self, but rather when he is least conscious of these things and most conscious of his rational and moral selfhood, of his power to know and choose and act. It is then that he feels himself an *I*, a self, a person. In this sense every one is more or less self-conscious, aware that, in his thinking, himself thinks, that, in his acting, him-

[1] Momerie, *Personality*, fifth ed., p. 62.

[2] "The self-conscious subject is the one reality which in possessing its world of objects holds itself apart from it." Henry Jones, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1907.

self acts.[1] In a word, he beholds himself in the mirror of his own selfhood; he knows that he is an ego.

II

A second constitutive principle of personality is *unity*. The power of unifying experience is essential to knowledge, even if it is not a complete account of knowledge. The rudimentary mind of the higher animal possesses the power of unifying experience to a limited degree, and thus the animal is a subject. But the *knowing* of a *person* organizes not only sense impressions but a wide and diverse realm of thought and action, of past and present, into an ordered and unitary whole. In this process it knows itself as the unifying agent.[2]

The reality of such a unifying agent, fundamental as it is, has been vigorously denied by the associationist school. "The Ego is a pure fiction, coined from non-entity," declared Bain. Hume, the arch-critic of the accepted, in a classic passage wrote: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or

[1] "That which is subject and object of itself is *personal*." William T. Harris, *Hegel's Logic*, second ed., p. 109.

[2] "The mind would never conceive the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its ideas, if it did not perceive the identity of the action by which it subjects this manifoldness to unity." Kant, quoted by John Dewey, *Mind*, Vol. XV, p. 64.

cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed at any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist. . . . If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of *himself*, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. . . . But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are *nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions*, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." [1]

But why a "bundle" or "collection" if there is no "real connection" between these perceptions? There must be something to hold them together. John Stuart Mill was obliged to recognize this "inexplicable tie" as a "permanent" one, but of it, he says, we can "affirm nothing." [2] Such concessions Professor James well pronounces "the definitive bankruptcy of the associationist description." [3]

[1] See James' *Psychology*, I, p. 351.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 359. Professor James, however, does not afford a very satisfactory substitute for associationism. "What positive meaning has the soul when scrutinized," he asks, "but the *ground* of *possibility* of the thought?" (p. 345). "We ought certainly to admit that there is more than the bare fact of coexistence of a

Clearly, Hume made too much of the fact that he could never catch himself without a perception in arguing that therefore he was never conscious of himself. Why should he have required to be conscious of himself *without a perception?* You can never catch a brook that is not running, nor a self that is not perceiving; yet the brook is not the running, nor the self the perceiving. It is not simply the perception that one is conscious of, but also of himself as having it. "All knowledge," as Professor John Dewey has said, "is knowledge of and through self. In knowing anything whatever, we know some activity of self, and, therefore, all knowledge is an intuition of self, just as it is an intuition of the world." [1]

Thus in the act of synthesis by which the knower organizes the manifold of sense-impression, interprets it, relates it to his past experience, there is clearly manifest the unifying activity of a *self*. In the "unity of ap-

passing thought with a passing brain state. But we do not answer the question, 'What is that more?' when we say that it is a soul which the brain still affects. This kind of *more* explains nothing; and when once we are trying metaphysical explanations we are foolish not to go as far as we can. For my own part I confess that the moment I become metaphysical and try to define the *more* I find the notion of some sort of an *anima mundi* thinking in all of us to be a more promising hypothesis, in spite of all its difficulties, than that of a lot of absolutely individual souls. Meanwhile, as *psychologists*, we need not be metaphysical at all. The passing Thought itself is the only *verifiable* thinker, and its empirical connection with the brain process is the ultimate known law." *Ibid.*, p. 346.

[1] *Psychology*, third ed., p. 243.

perception" there is more than an automatic reaction to sense-impressions, or a mere succession of states of consciousness. If the Ego were only the "Passing Thought," it could not thus interpret present experience by past. Granted that consciousness is, as Professor James describes it, a "stream of thought," it is a stream and not a flood. It has the unity of a stream, is confined within banks, has a source and continuity of its own. "The pure Ego, or personality, is not a series, for a disconnected series cannot possibly make a unity, a person." [1]

With the unity of the self there is necessarily involved *self-identity*. To be a real unity, the self must have a certain degree of continuity, so that the perceptions of a given instant may be correlated to past perceptions. The mere transference of the perceptions of one moment on to the next would not constitute such a unity but only a continually dying and reviving thought-series. The very span of memory — a span in which the intensity of early impressions often increases rather than diminishes with its length — disproves a discontinuous selfhood. As Bishop Butler succinctly stated, "By reflecting upon that which is myself now and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self." [2]

[1] Boris Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 194.
[2] Sermon: *Personal Identity*.

This unity is not, indeed, a static unity. Progress, development, hence change, belong to the very nature of human selfhood. But it is *identity in change alone that makes development possible.* The mere fact of the complete renovation of the molecules that make up the human body, once in so often, does not destroy the identity of the body; it remains the same in constitution and characteristics. Nor does the fact that the person may change his habits, beliefs, tastes, and purposes in the course of his development affect his personal identity. He knows he is the same person, even when he wonders most at himself; so do his friends. If he were not to-day the identical self that he always was, the very significance of the *change* would be lost. It is not *memory* that preserves the identity of self in its various stages. Memory exists because the self is identical. Or rather, the persistent mental images are understood and interpreted only by the perduring self.

III

Freedom is the third essential property of personality. Only as free can personality exist. This freedom is twofold. In the first place it is the freedom of *self-activity*, of autonomy. The person, the self, is not a static being, a substance, but a self-active energy. Here, as William T. Harris points out, "is

the central point of the philosophy of Hegel, as well as of Plato and Aristotle. . . . Individuality, personality is an activity. When it acts it realizes its potentialities — just as any force manifests its nature or realizes itself by acting. What was in it as potential, now appears in the form of reality. Individuality is an energy which continually acts, and each act is a manifestation to it of its inner potentiality." [1] With this self-activity there goes, *ipso facto*, in the case of the person, the freedom of *choice* or selection, the liberty to elect and pursue ends, self-determination.[2] Arguments many, and apparently unanswerable, may be made to prove that we are not thus free, but they are bird-bolts against the Gibraltar of the consciousness of freedom. As Dr. Johnson said, "We know we're free and there's an end on 't." There is, it is true, a sphere of our existence in which we are not free, namely, the empirical order, the sphere of events and circumstances and happenings. That order is, for each of us, largely a fixed order, and we are in a degree the creatures of it. But the sphere of our real selfhood, the motherland

[1] *Hegel's Logic*, p. 30. Individuality is used here in the sense of *personality*.

[2] "In his purposes man comprehends his whole activity, his whole life into a unity, as it were, and chooses particular acts according to their relation to this principle. . . . Man rises above Nature and opposes it as a Self, he determines it and employs it, is not determined by it: man becomes a personality." Paulsen, *Ethics*, p. 468.

of personal life, in which we live our truest life — that is a land of freedom, of large and puissant liberty, where we move among the great issues of the moral and spiritual life as the free sons of God. The theory of the sovereignty of the strongest motive is plausible but specious. As Coleridge has said: "He needs only reflect on his own experience to be convinced that the man makes the motive and not the motive the man. What is a strong motive to one man is no motive at all to another." [1] Whatever convictions may be dislodged from our human holdings, this of freedom never will be, for it is close knit to the very consciousness of selfhood.[2]

IV

The crowning possession of personality, intimately connected with freedom, is virtue, or *worth*.[3] This includes the *discernment* of virtue or *moral reason*. The person is moral,

[1] *Aids to Reflection*, Burlington ed., p. 106. So also John Caird. "It is the mind that is moved which constitutes or gives their constraining power to the motives that are supposed to move it." *Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*, p. 115.

[2] "The possession of a free will is thus one of the elements which go to constitute man a moral and responsible agent. This truth is revealed to us by immediate consciousness, and is not to be set aside by any other truth whatever. It is a first truth, equal to the highest, to no one of which will it ever yield." McCosh, *Intuitions of the Mind*, Vol. IV, p. 308. Illingworth, *Personality*, p. 230.

[3] "Autonomy is thus the foundation of the moral value of man and of every other rational being." Kant, *The Metaphysic of Morality*.

and as such worthful. *Virtue,* as the word itself indicates, is the very constitutive secret of manhood, of personality. Quite apart from, and far below those fictitious and superficial self-estimates — growing out of conceit and vanity and self-posing — that vitiate us, there is in every man, so far as he comes to know himself truly, a deep and sacred sense of his value as a person. The very source and center of the conception of *values*, the significance of which has so illumined modern thought, lies in personality. "Our ultimate standard of worth," said Thomas Hill Green, "is an ideal of personal worth. All other values are relative to value of, for, or in a person."

Inestimable worth inheres in a person in that he is an end in himself. As Aristotle had it, he is an *entelechy*. To be sure he does not exist for himself alone, nor by himself. The person is a *socius*, and finds himself only in relation with other persons. Personality is in its very nature relatedness, and yet, uniqueness.

Self-consciousness, unity, freedom, worth, — such are the constituent elements or factors of personality. A person is a self-conscious, knowing, self-determining end in himself. As such he has a unique meaning and a unique worth, realized only in relations with his fellow persons, but pertaining to himself as a finality.

While this account of personality, which is, of course, in the main the generally accepted philosophical definition, assuredly strikes, with a certain confirmatory ring, the true structure of personality, let us not assume that it reproduces its real meaning and character in any exhaustive, or indeed adequate way. Just because personality is so vital and inclusive it is the despair of the definer and classifier. It exults in paradox. "Every man sees," as Emerson says, "that he is that middle point whereof everything may be affirmed and denied with equal reason." [1] If the psalmist, at the very fountain-head of the habit of introspection, before ethics or epistemology or psychology, with all their tattered problems, were born, exclaimed, "I am fearfully and wonderfully made . . . and that my soul knoweth right well," what must we say to-day!

V

It is this indefinability, this elusiveness of personality, this refusal to be caught and led to the dissecting table of the intellectual vivisectionist, that has led to one of the most noteworthy denials of the reality of personality in modern literature — that contained in Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, regarded by not a few as the consummate

[1] Essay, *Spiritual Laws*.

flower of contemporary philosophy. "Anything the meaning of which is inconsistent and unintelligent," says Bradley, "is appearance and not reality." Starting with this definition of reality it is clear from the outset that he will find the self unreal. It is easy work, bowling down the inconsistencies of selfhood with this definition. It is quite true, as Mr. Bradley shows, that the self cannot be found in the sectional self, or in the usual self, or in memory, or in the self as opposed to the not-self, or as mere feeling, or as force or will. And the reason is this: just because the self is all of these (and more) together, it cannot be any one of them in particular.

There is a note of convinced but unconvincing finality in Mr. Bradley's conclusion: "In whatever way the self is taken, it will prove to be appearance. It cannot, if finite, maintain itself against external relations. For this will enter its essence and so ruin its independency. And apart from this objection in the case of its finitude, the self is in any case unintelligible. For, in considering it, we are forced to transcend mere feeling, itself not satisfactory, and yet we cannot reach any defensible thought, any intellectual principle, by which it is possible to understand how diversity can be comprehended in unity. But if we cannot understand this, and if whatever way we have of thinking about

the self proves full of inconsistency, we should then accept what must follow. The self is, no doubt, the highest form of experience which we have, but for all that it is not a true form. It does not give us the facts as they are in reality; and as it gives them, they are appearance—appearance and error. . . . Our search has conducted us again, not to reality but to mere appearance." [1]

Thus does Mr. Bradley's extreme intellectualism lead him to doubt that self, the *reality of which can alone give reality to his doubt*. How is it possible, one is impelled to ask, to reason about the self or about anything, *unless there is a self to reason?* What conclusion can be reached when there is no self to reach it? Skepticism at this point is nihilistic. Must we renounce even Descartes' substrate, *cogito, ergo sum*, and go back of it in search of a reality which cannot exist except as the self that seeks it exists? Where is our *pou sto* if the self is not?

VI

"Personality," said Höffding, "is the last, perhaps insoluble, riddle." [2] No, not a riddle, for a riddle may not hold a sufficiently noble solution, but a mystery, a mystery full of ever-unfolding, never-exhausted meaning.

[1] Francis H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 119, 120.
[2] *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 102.

Into the study of such a worth-mystery we move with reverence but with confidence, assuréd that, as it is the secret heart of manhood, it is not only the "proper study of mankind," but, with all its difficulties, the most enriching and rewarding.

In marked contrast with this use of the term *personality* is the very common one which identifies personality with mere externals, characteristic traits and behavior. The term personality, as commonly used, often means nothing more than the smile or the frown habitual to a man's face, the cordiality or crustiness of his manner, the grace or unpleasantness of his voice and speech. To not a few of us, at times, and to some men, always, a person is no more than this human being who lives in a certain house, has a certain complexion and carriage, wears clothes of a given cut, is engaged in such and such an occupation, belongs to a certain party, goes (or does not go) to a certain church. Only this and nothing more. It is like taking the cover for the book, the shell for the nut, the cup for the wine, the house for the home. Of course all these details, even the slightest, are more or less intimately associated with personality. Nor can we reasonably ask to suppress this use of the term; but to allow this conception of personality to color and absorb one's thought of men is to debase and deny their real selfhood. It is to see men as trees walk-

ing. We may speak, not unfittingly, of a pleasing or repellent personality, with sole reference to looks and dress and behavior. But when we do so, let us not forget that this is but the husk of personality, that beneath all the external and accidental there is a world of potencies and values, a veritable *microcosmos* whose worths and wantages are infinitely significant. Man is a strange compound of majesty and meanness, sense and supersense, weakness and power, transiency and transcendence, "a groveler on the earth and a gazer at the sky," as Dr. Johnson characterized him; "a forked, straddling animal with bandy legs," as Swift called him; and yet, also, as Carlyle saw, "a spirit and unutterable Mystery of mysteries."[1] And perhaps there is no deeper definition of personality than this last.

[1] *Sartor Resartus*, Chap. VIII.

III. PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY

I

To determine where and how in the evolutionary process personality emerges is a difficult task. Is the dog a person? Is the anthropoid ape a person? Is the infant a person? These questions concerning the rims and edges, the preliminaries and presciences of personality, are baffling. And yet they are legitimate and must be faced.

We cannot intelligently meet the problem of the emergence of personality without first considering the kindred fact of *individuality*. What is an individual? What is the difference between a person and an individual? The Century Dictionary defines *individual* as "a single thing, a being, animate or inanimate, that is regarded as a unit." An individual, that is, may be similar to every other member of its class, "as like as two peas," or it may be distinguishable and unique. And yet—such is the elasticity of language—the term *individuality* has for its most common meaning "that quality or aggregate of qualities which distinguishes one person or thing

from another." [1] In a somewhat similar way the term *personality* has a double meaning. In the first place it connotes qualities or properties, such as have been indicated—self-consciousness, unity, self-determination — common to all persons, universal in character. It also serves to denote the separateness, the uniqueness, which characterizes each human being as a person distinguishable from every other.

As thus defined, it is evident that every human being is at once an individual and a person. That is, he is one of an external, visible class — a member of the *genus homo* — and also one of a universal, invisible order of spirits. He has both individuality and personality. Unlike the members of some classes of individuals, each man is clearly and readily distinguished from every other. He has also personality, in the sense not only of universal spiritual qualities, but also of spiritual uniqueness, — that ultimate uniqueness that we call *character* — so that neither as an individual nor as a person, neither in the body nor out of it, neither in appearance nor in character, can any human being be confounded with any other.

Individuality exists very low in the scale of being, perhaps in the molecule and the atom, as scientists have suggested,[2] possibly in the

[1] *Century Dictionary.*
[2] See *The Individual* by Nathaniel Shaler, Chap. I.

ion. As life ascends, the individual becomes more and more distinct and self-active. "A biological individual," says Herbert Spencer, "is any concrete whole having a structure which enables it, when placed in appropriate conditions, to continuously adjust its internal relations to external relations, so as to maintain the equilibrium of its functions."[1] When we reach the highest form of animal life, we have not only this ability to adjust internal to external relations, but a highly developed form of consciousness, a very complex unity of structure and functioning, and what comes very near being a certain nascent form of freedom or initiative. Is this highly developed individuality — such as is found in the horse or the dog — personality? Germinal personality it certainly is, but hardly actual personality. Such nascent personality is prophetic and preparatory of the true personality that we find in man, but no more.[2] That this potential personality will ever become actual personality in the individual animal, in some other state of existence, no one can

[1] *Principles of Biology*, § 74. See Century Dictionary, *Biology*.

[2] "The Ego has self-consciousness in the real sense, only as a historical being. We cannot ascribe such consciousness to animals; not even the most sagacious animal could tell the history of its life. The soul-life of animals is most likely that which we find in ourselves beneath self-conscious thought and feeling." Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 143.

"When we come to human society we find the basis for a social organization of life already laid in the animal nature." Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. I, p. 11.

absolutely affirm or deny. Enough that it is not, as yet, real personality. Noble as are many of the domestic animals and degraded as are many of the savage races of mankind, there is yet a dividing line between them which nothing can obliterate.[1] The *kind of capacity*, if nothing more, is different. It would be folly to send missionaries to the simian apes or establish industrial schools for the monkeys, or kindergartens for colts or puppies. Whatever training is given to animals is for our sakes, not for theirs.

It must be admitted, on the other hand, that in the lowest types of humanity it is difficult to find any trace of that regality we call personality; yet who doubts that it is there, if only it can be awakened and developed?[2] The upright posture of man is the outward sign and seal of his potential personality, a posture won, doubtless, at the cost of untold effort, in defiance rather than in conformity to environment, and maintained at the expense of discomfort and dis-ease, but testifying with striking eloquence to the power of rational will over the animal nature.

[1] "There is no reason to think that any animal except man can enunciate or apply general rules of conduct." Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. I, p. 1.

[2] "It is no longer doubtful that every race of man can be educated to know anything, from reading and writing to mathematics, philosophy, and political economy. In other words man is always and everywhere man, and infinitely distant in mind from every ape." Thomson, *Brain and Personality*, p. 115.

II

Strangely, secretly, intimately are these two—personality and individuality—bound together, mutually interweaving and interworking in our humanity. Marvelously does the higher power, personality, play upon, modify, transform the lower, individuality. Masterful are the endless variations which nature plays to the one tune of eyes, nose, and mouth, even among the backward races where personality is comparatively undeveloped. And increasingly wonderful is the result as the personal equation increasingly affects it. Humpty Dumpty failed to appreciate this when he complained to Alice in Looking-glass-Land that she was so like other people: "Your face is the same as everybody has — the two eyes so (marking their places in the air with his thumb), nose in the middle, mouth under. It is always the same. Now if you had the two eyes on the same side of the nose, for instance — or the mouth at the top — that would be some help." But Humpty Dumpty's complaint was hardly just. For, that, with this same invariable arrangement of features, no two people should look exactly alike is the astounding achievement of individuality, reinforced by personality.[1] For personality takes the fea-

[1] "As one's countenance has no exact duplicate the world over, so he feels sure, though he cannot prove it, that his spirit

tures of the individual, and by that subtle alchemy that produces what we call expression, transfigures them, thus making for itself almost an incarnation in the world of phenomena.[1] In moments of great spiritual intensity the face yields itself to personality as though translucent to the self within. And yet, with all its susceptibility to the imprint of the spirit, how inadequate still is the face to express the person! So, too, is the voice an imperfect personal instrument, yet through it, as though it were the breath of the spirit, one self moves and melts another as by magic. How can any one who has truly listened to the human voice conceive it to be merely a product of vocal chords and resonances and articulations? The self within subsidizes the outer man. Individuality is, as it were, the raw material out of which the person constructs — so far as the material permits — a fit and expressive dwelling.[2]

III

Individuality thus differentiates itself from personality as belonging to the natural order,

is destined to value all its experiences in its own peculiar way." E. M. Weyer, *International Journal of Ethics*, Jan., 1907.

[1] "There is indeed a strange fascination in the study of faces. No other objects in the world so deserve and command attention, yet there is none other in the visible world so completely neglected." Shaler, *The Individual*, p. 162.

[2] "The person is always an individual; his personality acts upon and constitutes itself out of his individuality." James Seth, *Principles of Ethics*.

a distinctively racial product, while personality belongs to the eternal order and is an intrinsic reality.[1] Individuality is the concentration of racial, indeed of cosmic life and acquisition in a single race unit. The instincts of self-preservation, self-satisfaction, harmony with environment, together with impulses, emotions, longings, connected with the physical life but reaching up into the social — all these gathered and focalized in a single unitary life through an inheritance that reaches back to the primordial attractions and repulsions of unorganized star-dust, — constitute that signal epitome of cosmic and vital forces, the human individual.

Being, as he is, only the product of a nature-process, the final link in a chain of cosmic succession, the individual as such has no freedom, in the highest sense, no power of recognition of other persons. He is only the segregated unit of a common racial life. Nor is he, strictly speaking, a moral being. He is neither moral nor immoral, but unmoral, like the animals below him. The bad man is infinitely worse than the most cruel animal, the good man infinitely better than the gentlest. The human individual is thus the crown and summit of the natural series, the con-

[1] It gives me pleasure to find since writing this chapter, practically the same distinction drawn by Dr. Paul Carus in *The Open Court* of March, 1908. "Man's personality is his character. Man's individuality is that which makes him a concrete, definite, and bodily being, an individual" (p. 145, note).

summation of the evolutionary process of individuation. As such he is most express and admirable, but this does not make him a person. Yet a mere human individual, uncompounded with personality, is not to be found. To the last man of us, we are, to a greater or less degree, not only individuals but also persons. And as such all our individual inheritances, propensities, endowments, are baptized by personality into the great kingdom of the moral. As persons we are moral, as persons we are free, as persons we have a meaning, a task, a value that lifts us into the realm of the spiritual and imperishable. Yet we cannot attain our freedom and fulfil our task save as we make conquest and capital of the individuality which clings so closely to our personality and which determines our place and field of action as respects the time order.

The highest quality and characteristic of individuality is the "natural endowment," which we call talent, gift, and at its greatest, genius. Through subtle laws of inheritance, genius, like fortune, falls without apparent reference to desert. Thus it may be unused or ill-used and yield little or no real values. Organized and put to usury by personality, genius fulfils its end and enriches humanity with secure and lasting benefits. It is sacrilege to call genius a species of insanity. It is impossible, as Charles Lamb said, to im-

agine a mad Shakespeare. And yet, genius that is not subservient to true personality is a riotous and dangerous possession that easily leads to insanity. But when held and directed to great ends by pure purpose and noble character, genius is priceless. Splendidly endowed men whose genius was wholly transmuted into noble personality — Zoroaster, Buddha, Plato, Paul, Dante, above all, Jesus — have been the benefactors and uplifters of the race.

IV

With this understanding of individuality comes a truer understanding of *individualism*. Individualism (in the bad sense) consists in the gratification of one's own desires or the cultivation of one's gifts or talents at the expense of others, and thus of his own personality as well. For example, here is a person who has a talent for music. He devotes himself assiduously, day and night, to the sole cultivation of this talent. Persistently he pursues this one end and thus becomes a skilful musician. As an individual he has achieved. Meanwhile, he makes those about him suffer that he may win. He thumps upon the nerves of the sick person in the room above without mercy, takes all his earnings to pay for his music lessons, ignores all obligations to his family, neglects all social duties, that he may accomplish this one

thing, forgetful that it is only by the aid of society — which clothes him, feeds him, furnishes him his music and his instrument, and listens to him — that he can become a musician at all. Thus he fattens his individuality and starves his personality. As a technical musician he will be the greater for this individualism, but as an interpreter of the soul of music, less. As an individual he will be completer; as a person, poorer.

There are times when one must choose between his personality and his individuality, between his character and his talent. Much of the tragedy of life lies in this choice. If one chooses the kingdom of the personal, often that of the individual also will be added unto him.

V

Personality is a potency; individuality is a possession. Our physical, intellectual, and esthetic traits and characteristics are largely involuntary and unalterable. They give to each of us his material and his tools and prescribe his limitations as well. It is his to exercise and cultivate, rather than to develop, his individuality. Has one a good memory? He may train but not enlarge or develop it. Has one a talent for music? It may be improved but not increased. Personality, on the other hand, is a possibility rather than a possession, a germ rather than a gift, a being

rather than a having. It calls for expansion rather than cultivation. Individuality is a time-product, a "life phenomenon;" personality is a supertemporal noumenon. The person is not susceptible to organic decay and disintegration. It is only as he admits disabling and destructive forces of his own spiritual order that he degenerates. Physical forces cannot directly affect the person. The intimate association of the self with the body and brain subjects personality to the appearance of disintegration and decay; but the disruption is only in the physical. The evolutionary cycle does not take place in the realm of the personal.

Just as after sleep the self takes up its thread of conscious life where it was dropped, so after the sleep of death there is good reason to believe that the spiritual self takes up its career anew and resumes its progress toward larger selfhood. The individual with his physical constitution and racial inheritances, is born, matures, decays, and dies. The face and form change, strength and skill fail, the power of the intellect gives way. But the person within the individual can neither be born nor grow old nor die. No outward event or accident can injure this *true* super-man, no disease can affect him, no physical dissolution obliterate him. He has eternal youth. Not that this self of self is inert, immobile, static. It develops con-

stantly either toward virtue or toward evil, but its progressive life or death is moral not physical. And its subjection to the physical order is but temporal, partial, apparent, not real. This is not mere roseate theorizing. How explain otherwise the noblest men and women about us? — valiant spirits who set at naught all the laws of physical deterioration, who are younger at eighty than many a youth at twenty, whose ardor and insight and accomplishment put to rout all the conventional adages and snivellings regarding the melancholy approach of weakness and senility.

"E'en in [their] ashes live their wonted fires."

It is time that humanity shook off the craven philosophy of the dominion of the physical over the spiritual and gave to personality its true rights and prerogatives. The individual man with his own singularity, his likes and dislikes, his tastes and talents, his capabilities and limitations, his gifts and idiosyncrasies, passes away; the wind passeth over him and he is gone. But the person who is in the individual, as the nucleus is within the cell, and who has done so much to fashion and mold the individual, who has looked out through his eyes and spoken through his voice and wrought through his deeds and often won through his failures and developed through his decay, is of that

word of God that endureth forever. He shall "fight on, fare ever, there as here," for he is of a world in which sense and time, birth and death are not, nor have ever been. "The man, the Animal Man, the Man of Organic Evolution, it is at least certain, will not go on. It is another Man who will go on, a Man within this Man; and that he may go on the first Man must stop." [1]

VI

It seems hardly necessary to point out that according to this interpretation, *God is a Person and not an Individual.* And yet, so persistently are personality and individuality confounded, especially in our ideas of God, that constant insistence upon the distinction is necessary. "I cannot think of God as a Person," says many a thoughtful man, "because it seems to me to make him too material, too commonplace, too man-like." Undoubtedly, and the reason is that he is thought of, not as a Person, but as an Individual, with the limitations of an individual existence. But externality and limitation have nothing to do with pure personality. There is nothing limiting in personality. It is in its very nature universal. All that we need to do is to take that in ourselves which is highest and most universal and free it of

[1] Henry Drummond, *The Ascent of Man*, p. 100.

its finitude, its imperfection, its bondage to the empirical, and we have the highest possible conception of God.

Perhaps no better service for theology could be performed by the pulpit than to have every minister the world around stand up and say: "*God is a Person; He is not an Individual. A Person is a free, self-conscious, moral Spirit.*" We are finite persons; God is Infinite Person. We are both persons and individuals; God is Pure Person, and not an individual; for an individual is one among others; God is one in and of Himself.

But if God is not an Individual, how is he to be distinguished? What gives him his nature, his uniqueness, his Selfhood? *The very fact that he is not an individual*, and the only Person who is not an individual. As Pure Person, he is Supreme Unity, Supreme Freedom, Supreme Worth.

IV. PERSONALITY AND SOCIETY

I

"PERSONALITY is the capacity for fellowship." Such is the definition of personality given by Wilfred Richmond in his essay entitled *Personality*. It is an ardent but not untrue assertion of the social nature of personality. "The thought of self always involves the thought of manifold and complex relations to other selves," wrote Thomas Hill Green.[1] "Every advance in one's knowledge of others is also an advance in his knowledge of himself, and conversely every advance in his knowledge of himself is an advance in his knowledge of others."[2] The *sociality* of humanity is no new truth. Plato recognized it when he wrote *The Republic*. Jesus embodied it in the ideal of the Kingdom of God. Paul perceived it when he wrote, "None of us liveth to himself." Various schools — political, social, religious — have magnified it. Even the individualistic philosophies have granted what Hobbes called the *appetitus societatis*.

[1] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 539.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 540.

Only, however, in recent thought has the full extent and meaning of the social character of personality come to adequate recognition. Psychology has caught sight of it from the point of view of development; ethics from that of sociology. "The self of any man comes to consciousness only in contact with other selves." [1] How literally true this is may be seen in the development of the child mind. Deeply interesting is it to watch the self-buddings of the "infant, new to earth and sky," as he begins to find himself in this "big, buzzing, blooming world of ours," as Professor James calls it. At first, when he begins to talk — as every one who has brought up children, with half an eye open, must have noticed — he does not use the personal pronoun, but alludes to himself by his name or epithet. "Baby wants this," or "Tommy wants that." This objectifying of self continues for some years. There is no lack of self-assertiveness in it, but it is the assertion of the objective self. Then follow glimpses of truer self-recognition. At length comes the conscious *I*, "the stem," as Carlyle puts it, "whereon all our day-dreams and night-dreams grow."

How does the infant come to conceive himself thus, at first as an object and then, gradually, more and more as a subject? The older idea was that he defines himself chiefly

[1] Josiah Royce, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 297.

by reference to the Not-self. Finding himself among objects that offer hardness to his touch and resistance to his will he comes to see "these are things, I am a self." But recent child psychology has made it quite clear that this reference to the Not-self is secondary and subordinate to that reference to other persons about him which most effectually calls out his own sense of selfhood.

Probably no one has done so much to elucidate what he calls "the dialectic of personality" in the mind of the child as Professor J. Mark Baldwin. His account of the rise and growth of the sense of personality in the child is so full of interest and suggestion that I will quote from it at some length:

"One of the most interesting tendencies of the very young child in its response to its environment is the tendency to recognize differences of personality. It responds to what have been called 'suggestions of personality.' As early as the second month it distinguishes its mother's or nurse's touch in the dark. It learns characteristic methods of holding, taking up, patting, and adapts itself to these personal variations. It is quite a different thing from the child's behavior toward things which are not persons. I think this is the child's very first step toward a sense of the qualities which distinguish persons. . . . Further observation of children shows that the instrument of transition from such a projective to a subjective sense of personality is the child's active bodily self, and

the method of it is the *function of imitation.* . . . Again it is easy to see what now happens. The child's subject sense goes out by a sort of return dialectic to illuminate the other persons. . . . The subjective becomes *ejective;* that is 'other people's bodies,' says the child to himself, 'have experiences *in them* such as mine has. . . . They are also *me's;* let them be assimilated to my me-copy.' . . . The ego and the alter are thus born together. Both are crude and unreflective, largely organic. . . . My sense of myself grows by imitation of you, and my sense of yourself grows in terms of my sense of myself. But *ego* and *alter* are thus essentially social; each is a *socius* and each is an imitative creation." [1]

The very large place thus assigned to imitation in the process of personal development indicates the magnetism which, from the start, other persons exercise over us in drawing out our own personality. To respond to some one — then to be *like* some one — that is the way in which we become selves. Thus by successive personal contacts, imitations, and resistances one grows into his own proper and distinct selfhood.

This dependence of the self upon other selves for its very selfhood which psychology recognizes from the genetic view-point, philosophy is coming more and more to recognize from the point of view of metaphysics. One

[1] James Mark Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations,* fourth ed., pp. 13–15. See also *The Story of the Mind,* by the same author.

of the most distinctive and valuable features of Professor Howison's philosophy is his lucid and forceful presentation of personality as a social, not a separate or isolated, entity. "For the very quality of personality is that a person is a being who recognizes others as having a reality as unquestionable as his own, and who thus sees himself as a member of a moral republic, standing to other persons in an immutable relationship of reciprocal duties and rights, himself endowed with dignity and acknowledging the dignity of all the rest."[1] The self which has its genetic development in the time-order, in somewhat of the manner described by Dr. Baldwin, thus has its counterpart and deeper existence in the eternal world, where, likewise, it gets its meaning and character only through its relation to other selves, without whom it could not be.

II

The physical structure of society requires contacts and relations so multiform, so intimate, and so varied as to serve, in a striking way, the furtherance of personality. From bottom to top, the social order necessitates the most radical dependences, mutualities, interchanges, cooperations. Begin with the relation of parent and child, which

[1] *The Limits of Evolution*, second ed., p. 7.

initiates and prepares the way for the whole series that follows. The period of helplessness, as John Fiske has shown, is greatly prolonged in the case of the human race, in order that the parent may impart to the child more of the accumulated store of inherited and acquired experience — thus furnishing the new and untried life with a rich fund with which to start. This parental bond involves a personal intimacy of such duration and depth that its effect is felt forever, both upon parent and child. "The creation of the Mammalia," wrote Henry Drummond, "established two schools in the world — the two oldest and best equipped schools of ethics that have ever been in it — the one for the child, who must now at least know its mother, the other for the mother, who must as certainly attend to the child." [1]

Deep calleth unto deep in the personal intimacy of parent and child, as it does likewise in that other profound intimacy by means of which personality is so unwittingly pressed on to its fulfilment — the sex relation —

> ". . . seeing either sex alone
> Is half itself, and in true marriage lies
> Nor equal, nor unequal: each fulfils
> Defect in each, and always, thought in thought,
> Purpose in purpose, will in will, they grow." [2]

[1] *Ascent of Man*, p. 281.
[2] Tennyson, *The Princess*.

One has but to think of the vital demands upon all the forces of personality which the sex relation makes — in the exercise of self-restraint, the sacrifice and devotion of love, the discipline of mutual service and faithfulness — to realize how it enriches and develops personality. A sexless humanity could not possibly have developed so high a type of personality. Sex will be transcended in a higher social order than this, but as a training-school of personality the sex relation is indispensable.

The monogamous family, flowering in the Christian home, with its sacredness, its sympathy, its purity, its unity in diversity, is at once the highest achievement of humanity and the richest gift to humanity. It is at the same time the product and the nursery of personality. Here all the strengths, the tendernesses, the graces, the sympathies, the joys, of personal intercourse are called into play. In the gradual development out of animalism of those refining experiences which attend true mating and marriage, we find an amazing instrument for the moulding of personality. The history of marriage is the history of the conquest of personality over animality, in which personality has laid hold of a simple physical relation and wrought out its true, intrinsic values. It has been a long and severe struggle of humanity for self-mastery. Not yet is the con-

quest completed. In its dastard desecrations of the home tie are found the deepest tragedy and shame of modern society. But the ground that has been gained will not be lost, and in a passionate defense of the home, in which he sees the very center and citadel of his attainment of personal values, man will hold fast to the best that he has won.[1]

III

And if the family is in its very structure and fiber a personality-fostering institution, so also, in another way, is the State. The need of political organization, of government, is itself a summons to the development of personality. In an unorganized political state it would be impossible for personality to reach normal development. The movement toward monarchy, and thence toward democracy, is in manifest conformity to the expanding needs of personal development. Only in a democracy can personality come to its own. With its venturesome but fruitful faith in the untried man, in man as man, democracy is a challenge and incentive to personality which, even in its partial success, has won the unquestioning allegiance of the human spirit. Democracy is no longer an

[1] "Let no man think himself released from the kind charities of relationship: these shall give him peace at last; these are the very foundation for every species of benevolence." Charles Lamb to Coleridge. See Henry Churchill King, *Rational Living*, p. 234.

experiment. It may require preparatory training on the part of unadvanced peoples, but its ultimate prevalence as the conservator of the highest civilization is assured.

IV

The Church, too, is a foster-mother of personality. Not only in the worship of the Supreme Person, which calls out human personality as the sun calls out the seed, but in the fellowship with one another on high levels, the "sitting together in heavenly places," as the New Testament has it, there is created an atmosphere of spiritual growth and fruitage. Many humble spirits, whose graces and goodnesses would otherwise never come into full play and recognition, has the Church lifted into their true place and light. And for that great company whom no man can number, who have been released from self-bondage and made true persons in Christ by the Christian Church, no lover of humanity can be less than grateful. Many by-products of insincerity and bigotry and vanity — worthless and worse than worthless — has the Church also produced; but these are insignificant beside the harvests of redeemed personality which she is ever reaping.

As for education — a duty which the very constitution of human society lays upon the Family, the Church, the State — it can be

translated in no other terms than that of the development of personality.[1] This is coming to be more and more recognized as the norm and test of all educational systems and methods. In proportion as it succeeds in bringing out the latent possibilities of character and service in children and youth — in helping to make them the true persons who alone can be true citizens — will education fulfil its true end.[2]

So it is of all the widening radiations of human society. The diversity of industrial, economic, social dependences, and contacts of all sorts makes subtly for personality. Every necessary and legitimate occupation which serves a real human need is a purveyor to humanity and thus to personality. Men and women do not yet see this, save here and there one. They regard themselves as forced, cramped into the narrow groove in which they live and work. And in that narrow groove, too often the free spirit chafes and frets and wears itself away. But some day the vision will dawn of the true nature and value of these multiform human relations and

[1] "All education goes on the principle that we are, or are to become, persons." T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 190.

[2] "The instruction forced upon the child's mind which does not correspond to its inner stage of development and its measure of power, robs him of his own original view of things, and, with it, of his greatest power and capacity to impress the stamp of his individuality upon his being. Hence arises departure from nature which leads to caricature." Froebel, quoted by Patterson Du Bois, *Points of Contact in Teaching*, p. 91.

services — of industry and household duty and business and commerce, as well as of literature and art and education and religion, and all the ways by which men are bound to each other — and then men and women will be no longer the slaves of their work and station, but will look up to find in them the avenues along which throng the greetings and inspirations of the great world of persons. And that will be the Kingdom of God. Already there are not a few sons and daughters of the Kingdom who find in each humble, humdrum duty and relationship of daily life a chord uniting them to their fellows, the right touch upon which will produce a sweeter than celestial music. There comes into my mind, as I write, a certain gentle housewife whose genuine personal interest in the washerwoman and the grocer-boy and the dressmaker and the children who play in the street, as well as the closer, dearer interests of her own family and friends, is such that her life is filled to overflowing with warm human currents and gracious helpfulness by means of the simple personal contacts which no life lacks. After all, are the more external and artificial forms of human culture as fine as this? The humble souls who looked out of the window in Thrums, or lived in the Glen of Drumtochty, could hardly be called men and women of the world, and yet their genuine, heartfelt interest in each lifted curtain

and smoking chimney, with its revelation of human joy and sorrow, their vital concern in each passing of the village doctor, each sermon of the village kirk, each triumph of the village school, gave them a truer, warmer touch with human life, as it is below the surface where the waters run deep, than the globe-trotter or even the social investigator has ever succeeded in winning.

V

The real worth and joy of life is in contact with persons. That is simple enough, but it takes many a young person years to learn it; and many a society man and woman has not yet found it out. The deep, sweet, wholesome human joy of sincere and appreciative intercourse with others — who shall measure its inherent and imperishable charm? To purify and perfect this intercourse is the task of the generations. The one persistent aim of the "best society," in the true sense, is to fill up the natural chasms and break down the artificial barriers that separate us from one another and "shut us from our kind." It is because the longing for this real social life is so strong in us all that the separations — whether superficial or sin-deep — that keep us lonely and apart are so galling and full of pain and bitterness.

It is because at times — how sadly rare! —

we reach and realize free and full companionship that the comparative poverty and froth of our customary intercourse with one another gives us so deep a discontent. If it is true, as Augustine said, that we are made for God and cannot rest until we rest in him, it is also true that we are made for one another and cannot rest until we find each other. When we meet on pure and worthy levels how graciously our like-mindedness irradiates our common interest! When we meet for low ends how abhorrent becomes our very commerce with one another! The secret disdain for self and distrust of others with which one returns from cooperation with his fellow men that runs on the lower level of our common nature witnesses to the inner imperative with which we are called to walk in the light that we may have fellowship one with another. Pushing through the crowd at a vaudeville or a bargain counter, how one despises his fellow men as well as himself! How cheap humanity seems! But as he emerges in the company of his fellow immortals, under the spell of a noble emotion, from some great patriotic or religious or musical assembly, where all hearts have been stirred by a holy enthusiasm, the soul glows with the sense of human dignity and human achievement and fellowship.

How essential we are to one another! A single human person would be sterile, im-

possible, absurd. We become persons, continue persons, expand as persons, in mutual dependence and stimulation. Even when we are alone, we think and feel with reference to others. Together we advance to larger measures and fuller realizations of personality. Nor is there any limit to this progress and the joy of it. Dante's vision of the perfect bliss of the seventh heaven is a vision of perfect personal communion. The great white rose of perfect beatitude is only an harmonious company of perfected spirits in perfect communion with God and with each other.

V. THE TRUE SELF

I

EVERY man has a more or less confused notion of what he means when he says, *Myself*. Most would include, even if they did not give it the chief place, the bodily self. So closely are our bodies, with their vivid sensations, knit to that in our experience which is most immediate and intensely real, that we easily come to regard them as if they were ourselves. But a little reflection shows how ill-founded and irrational this notion is. Nothing could more completely expose its fallacy than the keenness of the Socratic dialogue, and in Plato's *First Alcibiades* we have it done to perfection.

Socrates: We are agreed that he who uses a thing is always different from the thing he uses.

Alcibiades: That is agreed between us.

Socrates: So that the shoemaker and the harper are some other thing than the hands and eyes which they both use.

Alcibiades: That is plain.

Socrates: Man uses his body.

Alcibiades: Who doubts it?

Socrates: That which uses a thing is different from the thing which is used.

Alcibiades: Yes.

Socrates: Man then is a different thing from his body?

Alcibiades: I believe it.

Socrates: What is man, then?

Alcibiades: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot tell.

Socrates: You can at least tell me that man is that which uses the body.

Alcibiades: That is true.

Socrates: Is there anything that uses the body besides the soul?

Alcibiades: No, nothing else.

Socrates: It is that that governs.

Alcibiades: Most certainly.

Socrates: I believe there is no man but is forced to confess —

Alcibiades: What?

Socrates: That man is one of these three things, either the soul, or the body, or the compound of them both. Now are we agreed that man is that which commands the body.

Alcibiades: That we are.

Socrates: What is man, then? Does the body command itself? No. For we have said it is the man that commands that. So that the body is not the man.

Alcibiades: So it seems.

Socrates: Is it, then, the compound that commands the body? And shall this compound be the man?

Alcibiades: That may be.

Socrates: Nothing less. For since one of them

does not command, as we have already said, it is impossible that both should command together.

Alcibiades: It is very true.

Socrates: Seeing then neither the body nor the compound of soul and body are the man, it is absolutely necessary either that man be nothing at all, or that the soul alone be the man.

Thus proceeds this incomparable piece of self-analysis, culminating in the assertion, "For we can find nothing that is more properly and precisely ourselves than our souls."

And yet, significant as this is, as far as it goes, Plato does not exhaust the question of the nature of the self. Doubtless, as Aristotle urged, he exaggerated the independence of soul and body. For, while the body is certainly not the self nor a part of the self, it is not simply the instrument of the self, but also reacts upon it, intimately affects it, so that it is difficult to tell just where the body leaves off and the soul begins. Evidently, therefore, it is necessary for the modern student to take up the analysis where Plato left it, and inquire whether, among the diverse and variant states of the soul as related to physical conditions, there is any nucleus of selfhood that we may call the True Self.

II

Few things disturb and disconcert a sensitive soul more than to discover what a col-

ony of diverse and discordant selves flourish within the territory of his consciousness. The good self and the bad self, the genial self and the sinister self, the brave self and the cowardly self, the pure self and the impure self, the sympathetic self and the indifferent self, the hopeful self and the despairing self, the happy self and the unhappy self, the before-breakfast self and the after-dinner self, the in-the-woods self, and the evening-party self — how confusing and perplexing are these inharmonious and divergent selves that tenant the same individual! Each of these selves seems, at the time being, as genuine and regnant as possible, yet the next moment he has abdicated the throne and another taken his place. The causes for these frequent changes of administration are as trivial as those of a South American Republic. One seems to don and doff these selves with his very changes of clothing or company, or the aberrations of the weather. Doubtless the experience is keener with some than with others, but every introspective person has probably wondered more than once if he were not really a different individual at different times. Working in one's study or shop or kitchen, in one's customary habitat, he seems *one* self, rather prosaic and humdrum, but comprehensible and manageable; but at a football game or a revival meeting or alone on a mountain top that familiar self has fled

and a stranger taken his place. There is a sense almost of being another man.

Just when one thinks he has pretty well gauged his selfhood and knows about how he will feel and act under all circumstances and on all occasions, something occurs that entirely upsets his equilibrium. Another self seems to rise up within him from some unknown world, taking the helm in spite of him. In a sort of stupid paralysis he finds himself saying and doing things that he neither intends nor approves. The most significant factor in these experiences is that one stands outside himself, as it were, and surveys himself in a sort of pained surprise, asking: Who is this strange fellow who has suddenly dispossessed me and taken away my rights? Is he myself or is he a relative of myself, or is he quite an alien?[1]

Reflection helps to straighten out this tangle somewhat. Although it seems at times as though each of us were thus a collection, almost a museum, of varied selves, appearing and disappearing in the complex of experience, yet the persistent consciousness of self-identity convinces us that these are not, after all, different selves, but only phases or moods of one ill-organized, inconsistent, but fairly distinct individual, who,

[1] "There is always a tendency to refuse to recognize the self which is overcome by some sudden or exceptional impulse, or transformed by peculiar conditions, as one and the same with the normal self." Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 546.

even if he is a chameleon individual, is an individual still. The very fact that similar *stimuli* produce similar reactions is conclusive evidence of this identity.

III

Moreover, at the core of this disorganized, inchoate, total self, which takes its color from environment and passing circumstance, there is a True Self which has power to organize, inhibit, control, to an increasing degree, these changing selves, and thus give something of unity, coherence, and character to the inner life. What is this True Self?

When we come to examine this "Self of the selves," as Professor James terms it,[1] we find that it has these characteristics:

(1) It is, as we have seen, the judge, the discriminator, among the selves, pronouncing this self or state of self bad, and that good, this worthy and that unworthy, this becoming and that unbecoming. It is the angel with the measuring rod. "The ideal, potential self passes continual judgment on the present self."

(2) The True Self is the self that aspires, that moves toward attainment, that in its activity controls and organizes the self-states

[1] Professor James' account of this self in his own experience is peculiar. "The Self of selves," he says, "when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat." *Psychology*, I, Chap. X, p. 301.

and constantly lifts the total self to a higher level. This function of the True Self we shall consider more at length in a later chapter.

(3) The True Self is also the transcendent *Worth* of all existence. Within it centers that sense of worth which we have already found to be a constituent property of personality.[1] It is the standard and test of all values. Compared with it, sense-values shrivel; yet in the light of it the sensation world gets its only true and proper value. In defiance of the True Self, time-values become deceptive and falsifying; yet in right relation to it the web of time is shot through with threads of priceless meaning. It is when time-values and sense-values usurp the place and defy the primacy of the True Self that the self-treason occurs whose shame finds expression in that great awakening cry of Jesus, the echoes of which will never cease to ring: "What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?"

Here, as we shall see, lies the tragedy and the glory of human life. Will a man by the exercise of his will power enthrone his True Self? Will he sacrifice his empirical sense-self to his spiritual self? Will he have the self-satisfaction that belongs to the lower self or the love that belongs to the True Self?

[1] See p. 21.

"There grow in the garden of life
Two flowers our souls to prove —
The passionate rose of Self,
And the spotless lily of Love.

We never can have them both;
One flower for each of us blows.
We choose the lily for aye,
Or forever we choose the rose." [1]

(4) The True Self is the self that transcends experience, that partakes of the *universal*. In a word it is an *eternal self*. Under various aspects and conceptions, it has been known as the Moral Reason, Conscience, Rationality, the Spirit, the Spiritual Man, the Atman, the Logos, the Divine Light, the *Fünkelein*. For this Self of the selves, this True Self, in all great philosophies — Indian, Hebrew, Greek, Persian, Christian — has been recognized as the supreme significance of human existence, and as such, part of, or akin to, the Divine. Nothing in the wide range of human thought is more significant than this recognition of a Superself, a Somewhat that relates man to the Universal, the Transcendent, the Eternal.

(5) The True Self is the unselfish self, — the self that is greatest, and yet least individualistic. It is *me* yet not *mine*. The instant one attempts to monopolize his True

[1] James Buckham, *The Heart of Life*, p. 68.

Self, to make it his and his only, particular and possessed, it is gone. Only the empirical, individualistic self remains. For this True Self is universal. It is conscious of itself only as related to God and to other selves.[1]

That the True Self is the most real of all things, he who has come to understand himself cannot doubt. As compared with it, all outward things are but shadow.

> "These indeed 'seem,'
> For they are actions that a man might play;
> But I have that within which passeth show."

At times, it is true, the outer world thrusts itself before this ultimate reality and it seems not to exist. "There are leaden days when even the most convinced idealist seems to feel that his body and his furniture are as real as himself and members of a far more powerful reality."[2] But these days are the dead, forgotten days, not the great, living days.

[1] "I note, too, that in insisting upon my present, as against that of all others, my time-consciousness is valuing me as an isolated identity, apart from and exclusive of all other selves, and therefore wholly misvaluing the real one. I conclude, therefore, that the unique supremacy of interest that I have in my immediate present is a false supremacy because based upon false values; and so I proceed reflectively to correct the error by regarding my real self as not a vanishing present and not an isolated identity, but as effectually living through and even above all time and in all selves." Professor H. A. Overstreet, *Ground of Time-Illusion*, *Philosophical Review*, January, 1908, p. 20.

[2] Professor McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 75.

IV

The True Self, real as it is, is after all but the constructive potency of a yet incomplete person. It is a potential self. "When we ask," writes Professor Palmer, "whether at any moment we are fully persons, we must answer 'No.' . . . We cannot say, 'I am a person, but only I ought to be a person. I am seeking to be.' Personality is an affair of degree. We are moving toward it, but have not yet attained."[1] And if this is true of those whom Professor Palmer addresses, how much truer is it of the mass of human beings who have hardly yet begun to be persons, in any true sense, each of whom seems but a collection of shifting, inchoate, mutinous selves, without either unity or worth.

Potential personality — that is about all that can be found in the great majority of us. Yet how great a sacredness and splendor lie even in that! If it is true — and who would venture to deny it? — that every human, even the meanest, has the capacity of personality, the "Divine Seed" within him — which, though it lie dormant all his mortal life, has yet the power to break into bloom, sometime, somewhere — it invests him with regal dignity. With what reverence will one move among his fellow men,

[1] George Herbert Palmer, *Nature of Goodness*, p. 140.

even the worst of them, if he is persuaded that not one of them but possesses the power of becoming a true, noble, worthful person. The jewel may be in the head of a human toad, but it transfigures and may yet transform him. The ignorant man brushes the colorless chrysalis aside as a dead insignificance, but the trained naturalist sees in it the imprisoned form of a rare and wondrous creature with rainbow tints and flashing wings.

It is he only who looks upon humanity as a great, though disguised and disfigured, company of *persons-to-be* who can go among his fellows without heart-sickness and woe. To him the Image of his Maker — the Image of a Perfect Person — is upon every man. Humanity is no *massa perditionis*, as Calvin regarded it. It is no mass at all, but a host of distinct star-points, as Paul saw, each capable of differing from another in the glory of personal uniqueness and worth.

V

Deeply hidden and mysterious as the True Self is, lying within the heart of personality, it is not without its recognized expression and product — *character*. The True Self, so to speak, secretes goodness as a nautilus secretes its shell; and this secretion is character. Character is, as it were, the abiding

structure of personality — the dwelling not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens — which the soul constructs. Character is often used as a synonym of personality — as by Emerson in his essay on *Character* — and indeed the two are very close akin, but character is rather the permanent expression of personality than its very self. It is the aureole of the True Self, its habitual reaction, its Logos. It is very Self of very Self, begotten, not made, of one substance with the Self.

As such, character should be carefully distinguished from *disposition*, for which it is often mistaken. Disposition or temperament is the individual constitution which comes to one through inheritance. It is the racial-ancestral-parental bequest to the individual. It is his capital, or his insolvency, as the case may be. He may weld it into character; but as yet it is not character. It is an asset of his individuality, not of his personality. As such it is of no more credit to him than his talent or his inherited fortune. And yet a good disposition often passes for a fine character. A light-hearted, sunny boy or girl, to whom it is, as we say, "second nature" to be good-natured, wins approval on every side, while his naturally despondent, ill-tempered brother or sister, who by dint of sheer will-work at last succeeds in mastering his ill-temper to some

degree, gets but grudging recognition for his achievement. But the grains of the fine gold of character which he has won are worth tons of good nature; and what he has gained he will hold, for it is part of himself forever.

The struggle for character is the supreme struggle of life, — a struggle not with others, but within one's self. Say what men will of the struggle for bread, the struggle for wealth, the struggle for pleasure — the struggle for character is the most widespread, the most intense, the most absorbing, as well as the most worth while, of any human interest in this or in any age.

Slowly but certainly, with many forgettings and recoverings, with many disloyalties and re-devotions, men and women are coming more and more clearly to catch the vision of the True Self within, which is the center of all true judgments and appraisals, and to honor character which enshrines it. In our finer moments, our "seasons of calm weather," we feel the immortal youth of the True Self within and know that while we are leal to that no loss or defeat or death can come to us, but only immortal gain and progress.

In that profound religious epic, the *Zend-Avesta*, the indestructible character of the True Self and the immortal nature of the gains which it makes are thus beautifully

represented, in picturing the resurrection of the good man:

"Three days I watched
Hard by the spot whence weeping friends had borne
The demon-haunted frame that once was mine;
New light had dawned on all the earthly scenes
Where once I seemed to struggle all alone
Against the Lie, for myriad angel forms
Strengthened the weary warrior with their aid,
And joy whose like the world has never known
Bade me forget the tears that death had drawn
And death should dry.
Four glorious dawns had risen,
And with the wakening loveliness of day
Came breezes whispering from the southern sky,
Laden with fragrant sweetness. I beheld,
And floating lightly on the enamoured winds,
A Presence sped and hovered o'er me,
A maiden, roseate as the blush of morn,
Stately and pure as heaven, and on her face,
The freshness of a bloom untouched by Time.
Amazed I cried, 'Who art thou, maiden fair,
Fairer than aught on earth, these eyes have seen?'
And she in answer spake, 'I am Thyself,
Thy thoughts, thy words, thy actions, glorified
By every conquest over base desire,
By every offering of a holy prayer
To the wise Lord in Heaven, every deed
Of kindly help done to the good and pure,
By these I come thus lovely, come to guide
Thy steps to that dread Bridge, where waits for thee
The prophet, charged with judgment."[1]

[1] Yasht 22. Translated by James H. Moulton in *The Expository Times*, September, 1907.

VI. THE EMPIRICAL SELF

I

We have found reason to regard the shifting changes of selfhood through which we constantly pass, not as the successive rule of separate selves, but as empirical phases of the one total self, within which the True Self abides as a fixed center of calm and judgment and potential personality. It will help us to understand our inner life better if we regard this composite empirical self as in a measure distinct from, though in closest relation with, the True Self, and study it as such.

The empirical self is, first of all, a racial, and thus a cosmic, self. It is the self that comes by the evolutionary process, from the simple, primordial nature forms, through the pathway of animal and racial ascent, until in the individual man it appears as the crown and epitome of the whole long and wonderful process. As an empirical self each human being is a distinct race-product, individuated by the particular branch of the racial trunk of which he is the latest bud. The life of the whole tree, and of the soil

from which it springs, thus flows through each emerging selfhood.

This empirical self includes the *subliminal self*, of which so much has of late been made. Deep-rooted instincts, habits, unconscious and subconscious reactions that have been acquired and transmitted through long generations of adjustment to environment — these enable the individual to carry on his life functions easily, through the subtle operation of long-stored-up experience.

Below the threshold of consciousness, or outside its area (for we are forced to use spatial terms which have no real application to consciousness), there goes on a system of activities, either wholly unconscious or appearing more or less dimly upon the margin of consciousness, by means of which our physical life is maintained. This group of activities and functions is an inheritance. It is ours, yet ours only as race units. In a very real sense the race feels in each of us, thinks in each of us, acts in each of us. To a certain degree we are racial *automata*.

II

Largely as it works in the domain of the unconscious and subconscious, the empirical self is not confined to that domain. Much of its activity is in the full light of consciousness. Its most meaningful states are

conscious states. Its powers are the powers of individuality — understanding, feeling, conation — as over against the powers of personality, or reason, emotion, will. Thus its range of conscious activity is on the same plane with that of the higher animals. The practical understanding, or intelligence, by which man adjusts himself to external circumstance and wins his way over nature and his fellow men, is only a higher exercise of the same faculty exhibited by the intelligent animal. Feeling, too, which is the most prominent trait of the empirical self, is the reflex of sensation. Conation, or desire passing over into action, also grounds in the physical nature and may be called the empirical will.

The most characteristic feature of man as a physical being is his highly developed nervous organism. When this is sound his empirical self remains normal. But let this delicate part of the empirical self be disturbed and he is thrown into painful disintegration and distress. Irritability, discomfort, disease ensue — above all, apprehensiveness and fear. For Fear is the tyrant of the empirical self. The sensuous imagination becomes abnormally stimulated and the mind is haunted with images and apprehensions which weaken and paralyze all its powers. Humanity is burdened and harassed by an accumulation of these fears

and forebodings in the form of superstitions, portents, signs, which have come down from generation to generation, and which all the combined light of science, philosophy, and religion has not yet succeeded in dissipating.[1]

The empirical self is also the self of moods, the plaything of circumstance and environment. When the sun shines it basks and battens in the glow; when the skies are dark and the wind is chill it shivers and succumbs to the iron and gray of untoward conditions. In children and in childish grown-ups may be seen the play and movement of the empirical self, in its responses to circumstance and feeling. One can think of nothing so like it as the swift chasing of sun and shower, of light and shade, on an April day. Watch a sensitive child at play. When all goes smoothly, the wheels turn gaily, and the playthings stay where they are placed he is all smiles and sweetness; but let something go wrong, and quick as a flash come cloud and petulance, to be succeeded by contentment and serenity as soon as all goes well again. There is very little evidence of the presence of the True Self, with its steadying, restraining, rational governance. And yet, even in the child, there are not wanting signs and indications, not only

[1] See the interesting statistical study of Superstition entitled, *Superstition and Education*, by Professor Fletcher B. Dresslar, *University of California Publications*, Vol. V, No. 1.

of the need of the True Self, but also of its gradual and significant emergence, either to enthronement or rejection.

III

More and more, if development is normal, the empirical self — animal, racial, physical — retreats into the background, and the moral, rational self asserts its rightful sovereignty. And yet, the empirical self abides to the close of the day, however subdued, tranquilized, rationalized. There is no man but lives, much of his time — most men most of their time — in the back part of the house. *Corpus curare*, as De Quincey called it, demands its all-too-ample dole of attention; and physical instincts and needs can never be entirely ignored, however much they may be personalized. Epictetus spoke of himself as "an ethereal existence staggering under the burden of a corpse." Even when the corpse is most alive it requires constant attention.

There is a residue of animalism in us all which refuses to be refined and made meet for the uses of personality, as if to remind us that physically we are of the earth, earthy. The veriest saint, the most perfect gentleman, rises in the morning with dishevelled hair and inflamed eyes and would hardly be recognized until he has shaken the

drowsiness from his frame and made his toilet. Emperor and prelate, prince and priest, queen and nun are one physically with boor and beast. Nature is no respecter of persons. The call of the wild is strong upon us all and would be prevailing were it not that the call of the high and holy is stronger, and has availed to bring us thus far out of the wild. There is an almost ludicrous incongruity between the finer and coarser relations to nature which we sustain, — between the dining-room and the scullery, the clothes-press and the laundry, between the spiritual and the physical accompaniments of a refined sick-room. It is not that nature as a whole refuses to lend herself to spiritual ends and uses, but only a certain obtuse, unmanageable remainder. The best we can do in that obstinate quarter is to hide and ignore and thrust aside. When one comes forward who would hold up these deficiencies of our human nature and interpret the whole by them, the only thing to do is to thrust him aside, too, as an irrelevancy.

Dust and dirt and decay are as indubitable facts of nature as are life and growth and restoration. Yet, in the light of personality, the latter are seen to be positive and central and significant, and the former incidental and insignificant. In individuals and in peoples whose sense of personality is weak it is the decadent, defeated, futile, cycle aspect

of nature that is uppermost, issuing in fatalistic religions and flowing philosophies and personal pessimisms. But where the moral, personal side of human life is in the ascendant, it is the virile, recuperative, progressive aspect of nature that is emphasized, as it appeals to the higher imagination and stimulates the struggle for personality.

IV

In ascribing "feeling" to the empirical self, rather than to the True Self, it is not meant that the True Self is cold and impassive, a mere truth-discovering, duty-demanding Self. The True Self, on the contrary, has the purest, deepest, most intense interest in its objectives. Truth is attended by inspiration, duty by happiness, love by emotion. If one chooses to call this "feeling," the True Self is preeminently the feeling self; but this is something higher than feeling. Feeling, properly speaking, takes its rise from sensation; it is from without rather than from within. But inspiration, happiness, love, are personal, not sensuous, emotions. They are aroused in association with persons, whether in society or in solitude. For what we call solitude, if we mean true solitude, is not aloneness, still less aloofness, but *indirect intercourse* with other selves, or with the Supreme Self. It is worth consid-

ering whether thought can possibly be impersonal or occur except with reference to another self or selves. In our most solitary moods we think and feel in the light of our relation to other selves, especially to the Supreme Self.

It is true that the unity of our total selfhood is such that the higher emotion of the True Self cannot exist without affecting also the physical, empirical self, and on the other hand physical feeling, pain, pleasure, affect the True Self. And yet the emotion of the soul sometimes runs deepest and strongest when it runs directly counter to physical feeling, the joy of the spirit meeting and mastering the ill of the body.

The empirical self, clearly enough, is by no means a bad self, an immoral self. It is simply *unmoral*. In themselves, the instincts, appetites, desires, reactions, of the lower self are morally neutral, but capable of becoming moral or immoral according to the action of the will upon them. Our animal nature is not, *per se*, evil. We miss wholly the meaning of good and evil when we adopt the "animal inheritance" theory of evil. The animals are not immoral, except perhaps incipiently, and it is not their nature in us that makes us immoral. We are moral or immoral by virtue of an endowment which they do not possess.

Long ago, ethics, both theoretical and

practical, reached the conclusion that our natural appetites, inclinations, and activities are wrong only through excess or abuse, or as they are allowed to stand in the way of the higher self. To be a person does not involve ceasing to be a man. The True Self becomes regnant, not by trampling upon the sense self, but by ruling it.[1] Into this unmoral, unregulated, purposeless world of sense must be introduced order, harmony, end-serving. It is a realm to be subdued, not devastated, appropriated, not laid waste.[2]

V

We have already alluded to the shifting, chameleon-like nature of the empirical self in its response to mood and surroundings.[3] But the most marked and extraordinary contrast in our human experience is the sharpness of the change within us from the rule of the True Self to that of the empirical self, from prayer, for instance, to pusillanimity, from grace before meat to gossip and gormandizing, from high purpose and resolution to low habit and surrender. It ought

[1] "Is it not then proper that the rational part should govern, as it is wise, and hath the care of the whole soul? and that the irascible part should be obedient and an auxiliary of the other?" Plato, *The Republic*, Book IV (Spen's translation).

[2] Sometimes, it is true, everything should be sacrificed for the sake of the True Self — the right hand itself, even the right eye, *if they offend.*

[3] Pages 57–60.

not to be so, it need not be so — life should not be thus inconsistent and divided — and yet it is bound to be so, to a degree, until we have succeeded in ordering and unifying life in conformity to the higher ideal. That hateful chasm between Sunday and Monday ought not to exist; it is our duty to fill it up speedily and with all our might, and yet it is not so strange a thing that it does exist in the light of the composite character of our selfhood. Let us not be too severe on the man who has not bridged the gulf between the two selves, nor say that because he is inconsistent on Monday therefore he must be hypocritical on Sunday. No, he is not that; he may be quite genuine and sincere on Sunday. When his True Self is in the ascendant, he would do high and noble things, but alas! on Monday the empirical self is in the saddle and the True Self, with his good resolutions, seems far away. It is not an easy task to make the empirical self subservient to the higher self.

It is impossible to interpret clearly the inner conflict of the aspiring life without some such distinction in selfhood as this that we have made. Take, for example, that most vivid and moving expression of self-tumult in the entire literature of the soul, — Paul's description of the struggle of the selves in his letter to the Romans.[1] The

[1] Romans 7: 14–25.

"carnal self" and the spiritual self, the man of the flesh and the "inward man," rise and fall in alternate victory and defeat. For each of the two selves Paul uses the same personal pronoun. "For that which I do I know not: for not what I would, that do I practise, but what I [the True Self] hate that I [the empirical self] do." Thus he goes on with the analysis of the conflict. "But if what I would not, that I do, . . . it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me." Here he penetrates to the center of his evil inclination and finds that it is not strictly himself, but something alien residing within him. He characterizes it as a law in his members bringing him into captivity under the law of sin. And yet he refuses to make this law impersonal on account of its intimate relation to his own lower selfhood. He concludes with a reassertion of the reality of the two selves, yet with a clear recognition of the primacy of the True Self: "So then I of myself with the mind, indeed, serve the law of God, but with the flesh [I serve] the law of sin." This distinction is not peculiar to this passage. It will be found essential to the understanding of Paul's entire psychology of the spiritual life.

That which relates the True Self and the empirical self to one another, determining which shall be dominant and controlling, is the *Will*. The Will is thus the most *Ego-ish*,

our-very-own, thing about us. It is the "very pulse of the machine," the master-builder who determines which of the material at hand shall go into our personality and how, the helmsman at the wheel who determines what port our ship shall make. Of course it is not meant that the Will is a separate and distinct entity or *automaton*. What is meant is that within the complex of the total self there resides the power somehow to choose between its variant impulses and motives and thus constructively fashion its development. Whether the True Self with its insight, its aspiration, its moral worth and spiritual potentiality or the empirical self, with its sensuousness, its limitation, its *tendency* to selfishness and evil is to win and rule, depends upon the Will, upon the man of the man, the self of the self, the power within us which says, "This shall be my way, my choice, *myself*." [1]

VI

Unmoral as the empirical self is in itself, it allies itself if indulged with what we may well call an *anti-self*. The anti-self is no part of our original selfhood; it is a self that each of us constructs *de novo*. When

[1] "The will is, in itself, essentially supernatural, having its true correlatives, not in the sphere of nature and the world of sense, but in those objects that are spiritual." James Marsh, *Memoir*, second ed., p. 384.

the will, yielding to the natural desires of the empirical self — "taking occasion through the flesh," as Paul has it — offends the law of personality, then an act is committed which tends to deform the empirical self and constitute an anti-self whose strength and fixity each succeeding act of the kind increases. Thus there develops a self as unsound and bad and harmful as the True Self is sound and good and salutary.[1]

The anti-self thus arising within one acquires a certain sort of quasi independence and may be said to take possession of one at times, so that he seems a different person, a Mr. Hyde in place of a Dr. Jekyll. Or the anti-self may come so gradually and insidiously to thrust down the better self that at length the whole man becomes a changed and corrupted person, so that his very face and body seem sold to a base and traitorous stranger.

And yet, the True Self, however betrayed and exiled, is never wholly expelled or obliterated. Deep within the most hardened heart, the most abandoned life, there lives a Self that cannot be killed, that cannot be silenced. The salvation message of Christianity, proven so effectual, assumes this truth. It is stated, to be sure, solely in terms

[1] In representing the inner life thus, of course we are not attempting a literal description of what occurs, but striving for the best interpretation of it that can be had.

of the unlimited power of God to save, but it involves an indestructible center of human salvability, a True Self incapable of absolute perversion. Even Augustine, with his intense realization of the strength of evil, held that its utmost power could not entirely destroy the element of goodness in the soul.[1]

The secret of a true, sane, and secure attitude toward moral evil lies in an adequate realization of its reality, its power, its viciousness, as an empirical human force, and a corresponding realization of its impuissance and unreality as a final, eternal existence. Evil is an outrageous Lie, and has the reality, and only the reality, of a lie. The anti-self, brought into being by acts and choices which deny goodness, becomes an actual, enslaving, pseudo-self, far more real than the external world about us, a blatant, braggart bully of a self; and yet, as compared with the True Self, having no genuine reality whatever.

The anti-self, like the True Self, is a social, or pseudo-social, self. It finds other spirits worse than itself and develops in their

[1] "Evil, according to Augustine's fundamental definition of it (wherein he follows Plato) is, 'what is injurious,' it is that which tends to destroy (*consumere*) the existence of the being to whom it cleaves (*tendit ad non esse*); and yet it may never reach this goal, and has never yet reached it, because evil can only exist as it is connected with good — connected with the divinely created nature of the subject who has become evil — so that it would annihilate itself if it annihilated this nature." Müller, *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, second ed., Vol. II, p. 290.

company. There is, as Ritschl holds, a kingdom of evil. We may even say that for practical purposes at least there is a king of evil, an Ahriman, a Satan, a Beelzebub, a personal Devil. Only a Lie is he, yet what is more real for practical purposes than a lie? Evil is a lie that can be put out of existence, not merely by thinking it out, but in the same way as it came into existence, by living it out. This kingdom of anti-selves is the curse, and the only curse, of existence. To break it down, to overcome one's own anti-self, and to overthrow the kingdom of the Anti-self, as it has entrenched itself in human habit and custom, is the commission and task of militant Christianity.

VII. THE PERSON AND THE BRAIN

I

No fact is so immediate, so real, so irrefutable as the fact of personality. Yet, so easily are we dismayed by arguments and appearances that not a few intelligent and open-minded people have been led to fear that we are not real selves at all, but only seeming selves, shadow selves, with but a vaporous and imaginary reality. The most fruitful source of this self-skepticism in recent years has undoubtedly been physiological psychology.

When the physiologists showed us that our every thought, emotion, and volition is attended by molecular changes in the brain-cells, a consumption of brain tissue, it looked, at first, as if selfhood had sunk into the gray matter of the brain and disappeared. But the physiologists did not stop with this discovery. With fine patience and careful scrutiny they proceeded to locate the different forms of mental activity, each in its proper brain center, demonstrating that if one of these centers is atrophied or injured the mind can no longer act normally in that

direction. And this was shown to be true not only of mental but of moral life. Character itself seems to be completely demoralized by the affectation of certain areas of the brain. Not only so, but the mere introduction of certain drugs into the blood seems to alter one's whole moral atmosphere and in time his disposition itself.

The easy and natural inference from such facts is that mind and character are simply brain products, or brain aspects, and instead of being invincibly real and momentous are in reality mere *epiphenomena*, by-products of physical or cosmic activity. But this inference is no sooner made than physiology itself compels its revision. Careful investigations prove that it is not the brain that weighs most or measures largest that exhibits most mental power.[1] The largest percentage of gray matter does not mean the greatest mentality. It is, rather, *complexity of organization* that characterizes the brain of the man of mental power. The brain of the well-trained expert in any line is marvelously intricate in organization. Its involutions and convolutions are numerous and deeply drawn. And yet at birth such a brain, physiology tells us, is only partially organ-

[1] The heaviest healthy brain in a series of measurements was that of a mechanic, seventy ounces. The weight of Webster's brain was fifty-five ounces, that of Helmholtz, forty-five ounces, and that of Döllinger, the historian, only thirty-seven and seven-tenths ounces.

ized. It depends upon exercise and training for its final structure and power of functioning. But *training involves a trainer.*

What, or who, is it that takes this plastic brain matter and organizes it, gives it the training and direction that enable it to act with such celerity, precision, and effectiveness? Does the brain simply develop of itself in response to environment? Why, then, should not two children in the same family be precisely similar? Given two brains of like structure and capacity in the same environment will the two develop exactly alike? No; there is some power that limits development in certain directions and furthers it in others — an unseen self, an ego, a mind behind the machine. The human brain is a steed with an invisible rider, a machine with an invisible operator, a vessel with an invisible helmsman. Dr. Thomson, in his noteworthy book, *Brain and Personality*, has pertinently and clearly drawn this conclusion from the standpoint of a physiologist: "As none of these wonderful mental faculties, including that of speech," he writes, "were connected with brain matter at birth, but were created afterwards, it follows that they were created by the individual himself, anatomically modifying his own brain." [1]

[1] Page 301. "Here surely we come upon a most impressive fact, namely, that by constant repetition of a given stimulus we

II

Another psychophysical fact pointing in the same direction which Dr. Thomson cites is that of the two lobes of the brain only one is used. The other is unemployed, as if held in reserve in case of need. Why should this be, if mind and brain are coincident? Evidently the brain is the instrument of some ulterior agent. Plainly that agent cannot be the organism as a whole, because the brain is part of the organism. The only alternative is a transcending self. To quote Dr. Thomson: "These undoubted facts lead to just as undoubted a conclusion, namely, that everything involved in our conscious personality, while related to gray matter, is only related to, but not originated by gray matter; for if it were originated by gray matter, then both hemispheres would be equally necessary to complete personality."[1]

Strongly supporting this theory of the relation of the brain to personality is the fur-

can effect a permanent anatomical change in our brain stuff, which will give a specific and remarkable cerebral function to that place which it never had before, and which therefore it could not have had either originally or spontaneously" (p. 118).

It is not intended to overlook the factor of inheritance. As Professor Shaler has said: "Even when this independent personality has gone far to give his brain a peculiar stamp, the inherited features must greatly predominate." *The Individual*, p. 87. Yet after all is it not the personality, rather than the inherited features, that predominates?

[1] *Brain and Personality*, p. 69.

ther fact that when the instrument is defective or diseased in parts controlling certain senses, so that those senses are inoperative, the self compels other senses, with their corresponding brain areas, to serve its ends and supply the place of those that are lacking, so far as possible, — thus playing its tunes, when necessary, on one string. This is notably the case with the blind. The instance of Helen Keller, as Dr. Thomson points out, stands out with marked instructiveness. Here is a young woman, totally blind and deaf, and hence also dumb, from nineteen months of age, who by careful and loving training, supplementing a determined and persevering exercise of will, has acquired a mental culture, moral character, and social influence hardly second to that of any educated woman of her time. And yet, of the five avenues by means of which one makes contact with the outer world and with other persons, she has but three, and these the least important. A defective body, a diseased brain, restricted power of communication, and yet a normal, beautiful, forceful, cultured personality! How is it to be explained? How otherwise than as a gifted individuality put to usury by a noble spirit; a strong personality, roused by the sympathy and aid of others, by means of a consecrated purpose and an indomitable energy, making a disabled brain and a defective body

serve its ends, even as a great musician compels a poor instrument to give forth the rich music that pours irresistibly from his soul.

III

The relation of the mind to the brain, then, would seem to be not so much that of interaction or parallelism as that of *instrumentality*. The mind, or rather the self (for we tend to confuse mental processes with the agent who employs them), uses the brain as its instrument or organ.[1] This general conception is very clearly outlined by Professor James in his Ingersoll Lecture, *Human Immortality*. He entitles it the *transmission theory*, as contrasted with the production theory (*i. e.* that thought is a product of the brain), and attributes it, in substance, to Kant. As an illustration of the relation of thought to the brain, he instances the prism as it refracts the light shining through it, or the organ keys as they give directive tone to the air passing through the pipes. As Professor James applies the hypothesis, the brain is represented as serving, not the individual self, but the "One Infinite Thought which is the sole reality

[1] "And if we are led by physical evidence to recognize in the cerebrum a power of directing and controlling the automatism of the axial cord, I do not see on what ground we are to reject the testimony of direct consciousness that the automatism of the cerebrum is itself directed and controlled by some higher power." W. B. Carpenter, *Nature and Man*, p. 283.

refracted into these millions of finite streams of consciousness known to us as our private selves." But there is no apparent reason why each man's brain should not serve as the instrument of *his own selfhood*, just as well as of the *One Infinite Thought*, — thus acting as the interpreter, the connecting link, between the self and the material world.[1]

[1] In the volume *Evolution and Animal Life* by President Jordan and Professor Kellogg the statement is made: "The study of the development of mind in animals and men gives no support to the medieval idea that the mind exists as an entity apart from the organ through which it operates. This 'Klavier theory' of the mind that the ego resides in the brain, playing upon the cells as a musician on the strings of a piano, finds no warrant in fact. So far as the evidence goes we know of no ego, except that which arises from the coordination of the nerve cells. All consciousness is 'colonial consciousness,' the product of cooperation. It stands related to the action of individual cells much as the content of a poem with the words or letters composing it. Its existence is a phenomenon of cooperation. The 'I' in man is the expression of the coworking of the processes and impulses of the brain. The brain is made of individual cells just as England is made of individual men. To say that England wills a certain deed or owns a certain territory or thinks a certain thought is no more a figure of speech than to say that 'I will,' 'I own,' 'I think.' The 'England' is the expression of the union of the individual wills and thoughts and ownerships of Englishmen. Similarly my ego is the aggregate resulting from coordination of the elements which make up my body" (p. 450).

Rev. John C. Kimball, who quotes this passage in an article in *The Christian Register* of Feb. 20, 1908, pertinently replies: "There is no evidence that cells, as such, are egos or have any individual consciousness as Englishmen have; and therefore there is no union of them which can make an aggregate personal ego, or consciousness. If England was made up only of unconscious, impersonal elements and parts, no one would ever say it wills, thinks, and owns.

"As regards the final saving sentence added to the quotation, 'That what we really know of human personality tells the whole story of it no one should maintain,' the question arises, if human personality originates and is constituted, as in the preceding parts of the quotation the writers declare, what more is there to know?

IV

How personality and brain, spirit and matter, the universal and the particular, can possibly come into commerce and cooperation, so that the latter lends itself to the former as the wax to the seal, is a sacramental mystery. But every day the reality of it becomes clearer as "matter" discloses more and more fully its spiritual serviceableness and capacity. This does not mean that matter and mind are identical, — obverse aspects of a single entity different from both. If the two were identical there could be no relations between them. Matter may be real *only through the constitutive grace of mind*, but by that power it is real. "Matter," says Carlyle, "exists only spiritually, and to represent some Idea and body it forth." This matter-existent-for-spirit we shall do well to recognize as integral to the present order and belonging to the dialectic of the development of personality. "There is a natural and there is a spiritual." Duality in some form is essential to knowledge. Bosanquet speaks wisely in saying: "Experience, indeed, rather suggests that what we understand by the spiritual could not exist

If $x = abc$, — that is, if person, ego, I, is the aggregate resulting from coordination of the elements which make up my body, — then one cannot add anything to x without destroying the equation and vitiating all the demonstration by which it has been evolved."

except by some sort of contrast, such as we have in the *material* . . . and in the attempt to dispense with the material world there is great risk of turning the spiritual into the material." [1]

Whatever matter and spirit may be, nowhere, certainly, do the two come into such intimacy and intercommunion as in the brain. In that sacred chamber where two worlds seem to meet, where matter pays its allegiance to spirit, and spirit accepts and commissions matter, are lodged mysteries as luminous as they are inexplicable. "We can show how the bile is produced by chemical processes in the liver; we can show how movement is the result of chemical processes in the muscle; but brain processes give no information of the way thoughts are produced." [2]

After all, the mystery of the relation of thought to the consumption of brain tissue is only the concentrated mystery of that moulding of matter to the purposes of spirit which is the wonder of existence. This is the true magician's touch. Take the familiar, every-day fact of letter-writing, which, if it were not for what Carlyle calls "the mere inertia of Oblivion and Stupidity by which we live at ease in the midst of wonders and terrors," would excite our constant

[1] *Psychology of the Moral Self*, p. 127.
[2] Professor E. W. Scripture, *Thinking, Feeling, Doing*, p. 297.

admiration and amazement. Who can explain it? I wish to communicate a thought to my absent friend and sit down to write him a letter. What are the pen, the ink, the words themselves, that they should be able to interpret my invisible, intangible thoughts to my far-away friend? Why should certain ink marks on a white surface suffice to convey to him thoughts and feelings which never were on land or sea? Is it very much more strange that the gray matter of the brain can be made to serve the behests of the spirit, than that the blue matter of the ink can be made to do so?

V

But the very idea of an instrument suggests possible limitations. An instrument, however delicate, is never quite perfect. As compared with him who uses it, it is necessarily inferior, impermanent, subject to injury and destruction. The brain, admirable, marvelous as it is, shows itself to be thus imperfect. It is subject to accident, injury, disease, disintegration. And far more serious are the consequences of its disturbance than that of any external instrument. The person himself who uses the brain seems to be mutilated by its injury and obliterated in its dissolution. Is it so? We have already found reason to believe otherwise; we have

seen that a strong personality can make a defective brain serve his ends, convey his purposes, express his meanings and ideals. Often, too, we have seen a diseased and dying brain lashed into fresh activity by a determined will. Death is sometimes delayed quite as much, or more, by an effort of the will as by the effect of drugs.

When the control of this instrument, so vitally linked to its possessor, is at length relaxed and the circuit broken, the wrench is violent, the effect apparently fatal. With the brain, the person himself disappears, — if that which was always invisible may be said to disappear, — and we say he is dead. But close observation teaches us that appearances are not to be trusted. The severing of the tie, however intimate, between mind and brain, flesh and spirit, involves only the disruption of the instrument, not the extinction of the agent. The person may find or construct another spiritual instrument that will serve him even better. Or perhaps in a purer form of existence he will need none.

VIII. THE PATHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY

I

Psychology, scientific and otherwise, has of late been arousing the general mind with a somewhat disturbing array of investigations, experiments, and theories in the realm of abnormal personality. Double consciousness, multiple personality, hypnotism, telepathy, spiritism, are rapidly becoming familiar in every-day thinking and speech. How do these phenomena appear in the light of personality?

It is fortunate that the philosophical and ethical study of personality has developed side by side with experimental psychology so as to enable us to interpret these findings of the psychological laboratory, the hospital for nervous disorders, and the reports of the Society for Psychical Research from a higher point of view. Otherwise the confusion and consternation awakened by this unveiling of the aberrations and abnormalities of the human mind might lead to something like a panic. It is far from reassuring to have the workings of one's mental machinery ex-

posed to view, and to be appraised that one's subconsciousness may at any time overflow and submerge his conscious self, or that what he supposes to be his own ideas and emotions may after all be those of alien selves who have gotten over the fence into his mental domain and are playing havoc with all the cherished fruits and flowers of his personal existence.

There is one way, and but one, to remove the misgivings and suspicions aroused by this invasion of psychopathic phenomena, and that is by maintaining the supremacy of the Real Person, the True Self, and interpreting all these *phenomena* as pertaining to the empirical self — in other words, as belonging to individuality rather than to personality. The term personality has become so closely attached to the whole of selfhood that it may be impossible to dissever it, but we should distinguish and set apart the True Self, and refuse to identify it with the rude fellows of a baser sort with whom it often keeps company.

In hypnotism, for instance, is the True Self involved? Only in the initial act of submitting the will to the hypnotizer. All the rest — the servile submission, the stupid acquiescence, the automatic actions — are chargeable to the empirical ego who is now acting almost, if not quite, by himself. In double consciousness or alternating person-

ality, the selves which alternately take possession of the brain, speak through the lips, control the nervous and motor systems, are not real persons but only empirical pseudo-selves, phenomenal and transitory interlopers.

The interesting study of Miss Beauchamp, a victim of *multiple personality*, made by Dr. Morton Prince and described in his volume, *The Dissociation of a Personality*, is pertinent here. Miss Beauchamp, an intelligent, conscientious, refined young woman, living in Boston, became, during a long nervous illness, the apparent subject of five different consciousnesses. One of these was very good-natured and was termed "the saint," another was quite the opposite, a third was so pronounced and individual a selfhood that she was given a name, "Sally." For seven years these several selves continued to haunt and harass Miss Beauchamp, but at length, under the care of Dr. Prince, she recovered. The divided self was restored to unity. The various selves disappeared. Sally went away "to the place she came from." In concluding the study Dr. Prince says: "These different states seem to her largely differences of moods. She regrets them, but does not attempt to excuse them, because, as she says, 'After all, it is always myself.' Of Sally, her life and her doings, she knows nothing, except indirectly." [1]

[1] Page 525.

Strictly speaking, this would seem to be a case of disintegrated individuality, rather than of disintegrated personality. The True Self was in abeyance and the individuality disintegrated into several inharmonious subselves which came and went without the inhibition of the central will. As for Sally, if there is such a thing as the invasion of a personality, which is extremely doubtful, this would seem to be an instance of it. In any event the significant fact is that the Real Self returned and took its place again, and that when this occurred, Sally, as well as the other invaders, was driven out.

II

Every thoughtful person has come to recognize that his physical system and his nervous organism, while intimately associated with himself, are nevertheless as we have pointed out,[1] not identical with himself. To be sure he uses the term *I* of his body, saying, when his hand or his foot or his head is injured, *I am hurt*, and yet he is conscious, even when saying it, that it is an appendage of his and not himself that is affected.

This distinctness of the Real Self from the external, empirical Self is not often felt while one is in the harmony of health. But

[1] See p. 55.

when disease or exhaustion comes, then the disharmony, the failure of the physical nature to respond to the will, makes it clear that the *I* is distinct from the *me*, as Professor James has it, and may be thwarted as well as helped by it. Our physical organism, much as it conditions and affects our selfhood, is, after all, not so closely identified with it as our ordinary life philosophy assumes. There is a certain large degree of automatism about our physical part which shows how remote it really is from the active center of selfhood. Most of our physical functions go on unconsciously or subconsciously, and those that call for conscious direction and control have little significance except as they are related to personal motives and habits.

Over this more or less automatic physical organism the moral self or reason or will presides with a general control that varies from direct supervision to remote and pervasive restraint. When this control is relaxed, as during sleep, or disturbed, as in neurasthenia, the physical organism goes its own way with a considerable degree of independence. Images are formed by the brain repugnant to the moral sense. Nervous reactions and mental processes go on without rational control. Let these conditions become aggravated to an acute disturbance of the nervous system and it is easy to see how

the phenomena of multiple personality may ensue. A secondary self, or perhaps several such, appear and assume control. A divided self, or succession of selves, takes the place of the normal selfhood. "Each of these selves is due to a system of cerebral paths acting by itself."[1] Yet each has the appearance of a distinct self, a separate individual.

This process cannot, of course, go on within the empirical self, the individual, without vitally affecting the True Self, the person. It is true that in so far as these disturbed states are physical, one is not morally responsible for them. And yet their presence necessitates a period of storm and stress for the True Self, out of which it issues either strengthened or weakened, either victor or vanquished. For the rule of the alien selves cannot occur without the consent or the protest of the True Self. Even if the physical conditions are too strong for the will to overcome, it can at least take up the part of uncompromising hostility to anything that shatters the integrity of selfhood. It is the consenting of the will to empirical forces in one's external self when it might at least have refused its consent, which constitutes the reprehensible personal factor in cases of disintegrated individuality. As Miss Beauchamp said,

[1] James, *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 401.

"After all it is always myself," meaning, presumably, that she gave the alien selves permissive right of way when she might have resisted more earnestly their control.

III

The significant and reassuring fact about the otherwise dismal and distressing cases of obsession, alternation of personality, and the like, is that the True Self, the real person, is not lost, however long and dark the period of its eclipse. Sooner or later, as a rule, the True Self reasserts itself and resumes its sway. Such was the case with Miss Beauchamp, with Mary Reynolds, and Lurancy Vennum, related by Professor James, and with many others. Such is the case with innumerable instances of the loss of self-identity related in the daily papers, — persons who have wandered away under fictitious names and engaged in other occupations and, suddenly, one day awakened once more to their true and proper selves. No doubt many such have never recovered their true identity this side of the grave; but that does not necessarily mean that they never will. At all events the significant fact is that the true selfhood, in even the most discouraging cases of self-alienation, has proven recoverable.

What substantial and unimpeachable

grounds for hope does this afford for the ultimate recovery of all cases of mental derangement! In the light of personality we are moving forward, rapidly and surely, to a new and far more hopeful view of *insanity*. In so far as it is a disease of the brain, it can affect only the instrument of personality, not the person himself. Patent as this is, it was not until the new psychology came, with its simultaneous recognition of the analyzableness of brain activity and the reality of the self behind the brain, that the full meaning of the dissociation of brain disease from personality became apparent. Ostensibly selfhood sinks into oblivion in insanity, but there is reason to believe that it is only dragged into temporary darkness by the derangement of its physical medium. It will emerge. It is true that the "hopelessly insane" — how unkind and unwarranted is the term! — for the most part do not recover their true selfhood in this life. But even for such there are often lucid moments which indicate that the old, sane self is still in existence, waiting to renew its normal sway. And there is nothing to disprove the rational assumption that when the diseased, defective brain, through which the self vainly tries to make normal contact with its empirical environment, disintegrates and the conditions of pure personal existence obtain, that then the self may come to its

own again and "make one music as before, but vaster."

If the study of personality, in connection with the new psychology, had done no more than to open to us this insight into the true perdurance of selfhood — this door of hope for the mentally diseased — it would be of inestimable value. Once the reality of personality is grasped, once it is seen that the brain is not the self — its diseases and mutations not to be identified with the character and conditions of the person who is affected by them, yet really independent of them, — then the darkest perplexities and terrors of mental disease are dispelled. The whole dreadful, disheartening horror of insanity is, after all, but a temporary phenomenon, a mutiny of the army, not an overthrow of the government, only a veil of mist across the eternal stars. Like Browning's Paracelsus, the True Self, entering a period of mental darkness and distress, may exclaim:

"If I stoop
Into a dark tremendous sea of cloud,
It is but for a time; I press God's lamp
Close to my breast; its splendor, soon or late,
Will pierce the gloom: I shall emerge one day."

IV

This insight into the pathology of personality points the way to a better understand-

ing of the therapeutics of personality. The relation of the brain and the entire nervous system to the self is so intimate that to be self-conscious in the highest sense, that is, to believe firmly and calmly in one's true, invincible selfhood, not only produces mental sanity and serenity, but also a harmonious and healthful physical state.

When a person comes — not in any egotistical and selfish way, but in a solemn, joyous sense of ultimate realities and values — to a realization of his own puissant and imperishable selfhood, the mastery of the universe, without and within, begins to be his. Reaching this self-security and serenity, he is indeed a Buddha. Nothing can greatly disturb him. He is like a rock in midstream. The changing, transitory world about him, as compared with the world of the selves, is indeed maya, dream, illusion. Not that he thus becomes *isolated* and solitary. He is a self among the selves, a person in the presence of the Supreme Person. He abides under the shadow of the Almighty. There he is secure and victorious. He treads upon the lion and adder, the young lion and the dragon he tramples under foot. He is not afraid of the terror by night, nor for the arrow that flieth by day. Vulnerable though he is physically and outwardly, in his true selfhood he is invulnerable spirit.

In the untutored but not inefficient hands

of Christian Science, the New Thought, and similar schools, this faith in one's true, eternal self — above disease and misfortune and death — is certainly accomplishing marked results for many in self-recovery and the physical healing that follows it. But at what a cost of truth and sanity and mental integrity![1] Psychotherapy is now, happily, coming in to supplant Christian Science with a much sounder and saner psychology and philosophy. But psychotherapy needs a clearer and deeper philosophy of personality. As it is, it gives to the subconscious far too great relative importance and value.

V

To the pathology of personality belongs that whole abnormal horde of *presentiments* which distress so many sensitive souls. It is easy to confound presentiments with the religious spirit, but they have no true connection with it. They belong to the empirical self and its abnormal moods, and should be thrust aside for the moral and spiritual insights of the True Self which

[1] Very crude and ill-coordinated is most of the philosophy and theology of this, which Professor James extravagantly calls "The only decidedly original contribution of the American people to the systematic philosophy of life," but it roots after all in the richest and most potent of all truths — personality. In saying this I do not forget how pantheistic and hazy is its conception of personality, yet its pantheism is spiritual, not materialistic, and it practises personality whether it understands it or not.

have to do, not with the temporal and accidental, but with the spiritual and eternal.

The very closeness of the relation of the brain, and indeed of the whole physical organism, to the self, makes it appear as if the person himself were at the mercy of his physical organism. When it is harmonious the self thinks, feels, acts, normally. When it is disturbed the self is disturbed and all the inner life set ajar. The easy inference is that the self is simply the reflex of the physical organism, or, if not, then its victim. But the True Self is not moved by physical conditions and states, except with its own consent. If, as a consequence of bad blood, a clogged brain, or a fit of indigestion, one feels dull and depressed and impotent; if his thought is obscured, his feeling benumbed or irritated, his will-power weakened, it is not that he as a person is altered. Not *himself*, but his *instrument of expression*, is disabled. It is the window that is darkened, not the eye that looks through it.

The person often permits himself to be deceived by these physical disabilities — that is the tragic side of this experience — and to imagine that he himself is changed. Thus follow dismay, despair, self-disablement. But as soon as the brain revives, or the body recovers, the self recognizes its error. Often in the very midst of its sub-

mission to its physical states the Self suddenly sees its deception, rallies, seizes its supremacy and turns its very disablements into the trophies of victory. Then, especially if physical conditions return to normal, the self passes to an enlarged estate. Its house that had narrowed to a prison cell expands to a palace, wherein it moves freely and finds all things ready and docile to its touch.

To hold to one's integrity through all brain ailments and bodily ills, to say to oneself, *I, the Self, am above sickness, disease, death,* is to win the victory over the world, the flesh, and the devil; and also, as Christian Science has seen, to do the very best thing to bring brain and body back to a normal condition.

Humanity, in spite of Christian teaching to the contrary, has been too long under subjection to a pseudo-philosophy which makes the physical states, the sensations, the positive and determinant factors in life, and selfhood the subordinate, if not the slave, of sense experience. Science, along with all its enlightenments and benefits in the realm of the physical, instead of breaking this bondage, has, if anything, strengthened it. Thus medicine, in spite of all its priceless contribution to the well-being of humanity, has nevertheless fostered an almost abject slavery to the *summum bonum* of health and

subjected generations to the dominion of drugs. Only of late has the medical profession awakened fully to the mind, the self, as a factor in therapeutics.

Life refuses to adjust itself to a working theory that subordinates mind to brain, spirit to matter, personality to animality. Idealism reasserts itself in our universities, Christian Science, New Thought, and Theosophy spring up among the semi-thoughtful classes, and the Church begins to search for a more real and vital gospel. But such efforts of resistance and reaction against the prevailing materialism are not enough. It is time for a sane and well-reasoned Personalism to assert itself and help humanity to reconquer the world in the name of God and man. Against the disposition to put brain before mind, sense before spirit, materialism before personalism, the new age calls for those who believe in the primacy of personality to maintain its inherent and inviolable supremacy as the true creator and measure of human values.

IX. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

I

Having endeavored to define the meaning and nature of personality, let us now try to trace the process of its development and perfection.

Potential personality sleeps in every human being. It can become actual and potent only by an awakening, a rebirth. "Nobody is born a person. Personality is not a primitive possession, it is slowly achieved."[1] Whether with relative suddenness, through some great moral crisis (following, perhaps, a dark period of enslavement to the lower self), or gradually, as if arousing from half-wakefulness, the True Self passes through an awakening, a rebirth, and thus starts upon its great task of self-achievement. In any case it is a coming to oneself. A very pregnant sentence is that in the parable of the prodigal, "He came to himself." Coming to oneself requires *that there be a self to which to come.* In the case of the prodigal it was manifestly not the old self, but

[1] R. M. Jones, *Social Law in the Spiritual World*, p. 52.

a deeper and better self, resident within the old self, but now for the first time become free, active, regnant. Men do thus awake, whether among the swine or elsewhere, to a higher, truer selfhood.

And when they awake, like the prodigal they arise and go to the Father. The coming to self, that is, involves a coming to the Supreme Self. It is true, as has been pointed out by Professor James [1] and others, that the coming to Self does not always include *conscious* coming to God. The moral aspect of the act may be the only one recognized, but there can be no moral renewal without a religious renewal, however hidden and deep-lying it may be. Morality and religion are distinguishable but, when true to themselves, not separable. Twin stalks, they have a common root; and though one may advance almost to the blossoming while as yet the other is scarcely above the ground, their fruits hang side by side.

This awakening of the True Self is by no means a purely solitary, self-originated process. Nor is it simply a social act. It is no mere pious cant that ascribes it to the agency of the Holy Spirit. That is not to say that the divine influence that moves one comes from *without* the self. It may move in the deepest and most hidden recesses of the soul, yet the act of renewal is a *cooperant*

[1] *Varieties of Religious Experience.*

one. Consciousness testifies to the presence and aid of a Spirit other than our own in the awakening of the higher self. In every significant moral decision, though one be a thousand miles from any human person, he is deeply aware that he is acting in the presence of a Moral Person, not indifferent to his decisions, but who approves and furthers him in every way consonant with his own autonomy. Call this Other what we may, it is present with us in our moral and spiritual activity and present as an aid.[1]

The coming to oneself is only the entrance upon a ceaseless task of self-development. It is going through the wicket gate, as Bunyan has it, into the narrow way that leads to life. The Hill Difficulty is ahead, and Giant Despair and Vanity Fair and the Valley of Destruction, as well as the House of the Interpreter and the House Beautiful and the Delectable Mountains.

II

In facing the task of self-development, the first thing to take account of is that diversity

[1] "The deed done in the name of the ideal is then both God's and mine. It cannot be mine only, for it may not express my private interest at all. . . . Nor can it be God's only in any sense of the idea that minimizes the importance of the human 'I.' . . . The activity which meets our own when we fall back upon principle is an activity which gives unity and inward confidence to ours, directs it towards aims that have absolute significance, and in this way saves it from its own weakness and blindness." Boyce Gibson, *Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life*, p. 103.

and confusion of the inner life of which we have already spoken.[1] Until one has gained a steady life principle and purpose, "existence is little more than a series of zigzags, as now one tendency and now another gets the upper hand."[2] But when the True Self has emerged and "become the habitual center of personal energy," this zigzag course is over. The self is no longer a divided self; it has a single, organizing aim. But it is not yet a unified and harmonized self. "In the soul," says Plato, "there is one part better and another worse, and when the part more excellent in its nature is that which governs the inferior part, this is called being superior to self and expresses a commendation."[3] To seat this "part more excellent" upon the throne and maintain it there until a harmonious and admirable selfhood develops, — that is the enterprise that confronts the seeker after selfhood. Self-control lies at the very root of self-development. He who is the sport of his shifting impulses and whims cannot be a true person; he is a disjunct self.

One never feels a keener sense of self-reproach than when he has *let go of himself*, as the phrase is, in surrender to some instinct or caprice of his lower nature. That

[1] See page 58.
[2] *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 109.
[3] *The Republic.*

is why anger, passion, intoxication, are so wrong. They mean a temporary defeat of personality. *Going to pieces* we rightly call it when one loses self-control. It is an explosion of personality; and to put oneself together again, after it, is like restoring the Portland vase. The man who can be himself in the stress of excitement, danger, pain, provocation, is the man whom we admire. He has attained at least one strong, essential trait of personality. Why is it that that line of Shakespeare, "To thine own self be true," has run so wide a course? It is because it embodies the first rule for the achievement of personality. Loyalty to the higher self alone makes manhood.

> "I'd rather be a violet and be blue
> Than be a man, and to myself untrue." [1]

"Win yourselves in patience" is the first great enterprise in self-development. Conquered cities are insignificant compared with this kind of conquest. Well is it named *self-possession*. "To cling to the same, same self," if only it be the true self, is the way to begin to acquire a larger selfhood. It is, as Professor Curtis has said, "like a man who preempts a claim on one of our Western prairies. At first the settler is there with only one point of civilization, — a stake fixed in the ground. Then he clears out the tangle

[1] James Buckham, *The Heart of Life*, p. 57.

for a dooryard; then he builds a cabin large enough for a home; then he enters into a long, weary, unyielding struggle, until the man is master of the wilderness." [1]

Just as coming to oneself means coming to God also, so holding fast to self means holding fast to the Divine Self, — the Ideal. The Ideal is broken into many forms, — Goodness, Truth, Beauty, Love. We do wrong to regard these as *abstractions*. They may, in the process of intellectual refinement, be reduced to such, but as ideals they are not abstractions. No one can love, or pursue, an abstraction. Ideals cannot be less than personal. The highest ideals are aspects of the Supreme Person. And as, in order to be true to himself, one must of necessity pursue the Ideal, so, conversely, in pursuing the Ideal, he is certain to be absolutely true to himself. As the True Self emerges, the lower selves retreat. Before the "expulsive power of a new affection" conflicting and disturbing impulses fall into silent impotence. Yet the rule of the new affection is never without one's active consent. A high ideal does not govern one unless he keeps it before him by a fixed, though not strained, attention. The simple power of attention is, as we are coming to see, the talisman of a changed universe. "The psychology of attention," says Professor Thorndike, "should

[1] Olin A. Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, p. 19.

teach us that in some degree we can literally make the world." [1] But make the world we cannot, in any degree, unless in some measure we can direct our own thought life. For attention without thought would be empty, and ideals are knit up with thoughts.

III

Whence do our thoughts come? Is it from one another — each determining its successor — or from external *stimuli*, — something that the eye catches, or some other sense suggests? Or, are our thoughts, as Professor Shaler held,[2] an inheritance? Doubtless all of these factors enter into that ceaseless current of thought that flows through our minds in all our waking moments. But while it is true that in one aspect thought is thus a function of the empirical self — a part of our individual human mechanism and its environment — still, on the other hand, thought is susceptible in a large degree to the direction and control of a *thinker*, who, out of all the jumble and chaos of spontaneous thoughts and impressions, is able to bring a considerable coherence and order.

So far as thought is awakened, carried on, and colored by physical environment, it

[1] *Elements of Psychology*, p. 33.
[2] N. S. Shaler, *The Individual*, pp. 89–95.

is involuntary and irresponsible. It drifts along, apparently causeless yet, in so far as it comes out of the empirical world, completely determined. But there is also in our thinking a measure of selective control. And this, however limited, is in reality the most important element in our thinking. For thus each of us determines freely the objects and direction of his thinking, and so the lines of his character. This line of suggestion he rejects as impure or unjust; that he cherishes and pursues as worthy or profitable. Here he holds his attention; there he withdraws it. Thus his thought life is docile and amenable, to an extent at least, to his will, and by directing and moulding it he develops a character in the line of his own free choice and purpose. It is this fact alone that gives pertinence to the words of Paul when he speaks of bringing every thought into captivity to Christ; that makes it reasonable for Buddhism to include "right thinking" in its eightfold path; that makes the choice and pursuit of any subject of study possible; and thus makes our thought world something more than a chaos or a fatalism.

IV

But self-organization and self-discipline supply only the substructure of personality. Something ampler and more expansive is

needed for the superstructure. With the sterling and admirable, yet painfully deficient, results of mere self-discipline humanity has long been familiar in the Jewish Nazarite, the Indian Yogi, the Roman Stoic, the Christian ascetic, the New England Puritan. The disciplined character, which is that and nothing more, is pathetically one-sided, unfinished, incomplete.

Strange as it seems, self-development cannot be reached by aiming at it. Jesus flashed this truth far into the heart of humanity when he said, "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." Deepest paradox this of the mystery of personality: what seems to be self-effacement proving in the divine alchemy of love to be self-realization. Throughout the warp and woof of Jesus' own life run these two threads of contrasted color — self-sacrifice and self-realization; the laying down of life to take it again; self-denial, self-attainment; cross, resurrection.

Jesus is never found counseling or practising throwing oneself away. He could never have thought seriously, as Buddha does in the legend, of casting himself down for food before the famished tigress.[1] For him, that would have shown a deficient sense of values, — although he would not have failed

[1] See *The Light of Asia.*

to pity the hungry animal. When it comes to sacrifice for human persons, then he is ready; and yet his great question is, How can the sacrifice be made to count most, to accomplish most? That way he found; and in the cross the true nature and value of self-sacrifice stand forth in perfect splendor. Losing self in others proves self-finding, — self-surrender, victory. The reason for this becomes clear only in the light of the composite nature of selfhood. The self that is sacrificed is the lower, empirical self. *The True Self cannot be sacrificed, except by an act of wrong.* "The greatest of sacrifices can be nothing but the sacrifice of our apparent to our true being." [1]

Here, too, lies the true explanation of self-forgetfulness. The supreme duty and moral greatness of self-forgetfulness no one can question. "Be simply and wholly bereft of self," says the *Theologia Germanica.* "There is but one virtue," writes Fichte, "to forget oneself as a person; one vice, to remember oneself." [2] But is not this the utter denial of personality? Have we not found that self-consciousness is one of the inalienable properties of personality? How, then, can one forget himself and yet retain that self-consciousness which reveals him to himself as a person?

[1] Janet, *Theory of Morals*, p. 86.
[2] Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, p. 106.

Clearly one kind of self-consciousness must be suppressed in order that *another* and *truer self-consciousness* may come to the fore.[1] In every act of intense unselfishness, of sympathy, of service, one form of self-consciousness disappears and another and nobler takes its place — the consciousness of the True Self. Never is one so conscious of his higher self as when he is most self-forgetful. And yet every trace of self-seeking is absent. The empirical *I* vanishes, but the universal *I* emerges and takes its rightful throne and scepter. When Tennyson writes:

"Love took up the harp of Life, and smote on all
the chords with might;
Smote the chord of Self, that, trembling, passed
in music out of sight,"

he means unquestionably the chord of self-ishness, the self-consciousness of the empirical self. That self passes out of sight when Love smites, but the higher chord of true self-consciousness sounds on, deep and full, through all the music which the hand of Love draws from human life. Thus the losing of self means the finding of self; self-forgetfulness, self-attainment; the death of self, the life of self.

[1] Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, p. 106.

V

The struggle for personality, for character, for righteousness, through self-organization, self-discipline, self-sacrifice, is the supreme struggle, the battle royal of the universe. "It is the conflict of eternity against the moment, the whole against the part, a fight for peace through unity."[1] Its outcome as respects individual men and groups and bodies of men forms the tragedy and the glory of human life. Everywhere, where men and women are, the struggle is going on, in all forms and stages, with an import that cannot be described. He who is awake to its significance watches it in himself and in those about him with an intense and unwearying interest. It is written not only in history and in the records of the lives that we know best, but in human faces and attitudes and actions. About us on every hand are those who have but just begun the struggle with a few feeble skirmishes, and other scarred veterans who have won signally. The defeated — temporarily, we can but trust — throng us with defeat expressed in their very tone and bearing, sometimes in conscious depression, again in unconscious sensuality and sordidness. The sun shines more darkly for their presence. The uncrowned

[1] Wilfred Withington; from an unpublished MS.

victors, too, are with us, with a smile upon the lips and a light upon the brow that spells the nameless grace of spiritual victory, and the cheer of their good fellowship carries gladness and courage wherever they go.[1]

In this great human struggle for self-development Christianity has proven at once the greatest aid and the clearest interpreter. In place of the indefinite urgings of conscience and the often vague impulsions of an indistinct ideal, it presents to men a winsome, impelling, concrete, personal Ideal in the man Christ Jesus. To obey him is to fulfil the demands of conscience, to follow him is to pursue the ideal, to win and appropriate him is to reach self-conquest.

Herein lies the harmonization of Christianity and ethics. At first, and on the surface, it might seem as if Christianity were one thing and ethics quite another; as if one might choose either to be an ethical disciple or a follower of Jesus. And indeed one may make that choice, but it is, after all, a choice only between two forms of Idealism, — one general, non-religious or semi-religious, professedly impersonal; the other

[1] I am indebted to Professor W. W. Lovejoy, D.D., for the following list of poems on the Two Selves: Goethe's *Faust;* Tennyson's *The Two Voices;* Clough's *Dipsychus;* Matthew Arnold's *The Scholar Gypsy;* Browning's *Fifine* (19, 23, 27, 34); Whitman's *Song of Myself;* Holmes' *Chambered Nautilus,* and J. T. Trowbridge's *My Comrade and I.*

particular, religious, distinctly personal. For no man can be true to a positive ethical ideal without thereby following Jesus, whether he will or no; nor can any man truly follow Jesus without thereby fulfilling the ethical ideal.

VI

It can but strike the student of Christianity with peculiar force that the devotion to Christ manifested by the early disciples brought out such marked and distinctive personal traits. Men like Peter and James and John and Paul were moulded largely by their relation to Christ, and yet they were very unlike. Take the case of Paul. Here was one who, even before his conversion, was a man of strength and influence, but it was plainly his conversion and the hold that Christ gained upon him that made him what he became, — virile, unique, with an aggressive personality of his own, — yet at the same time a man, who more than any other perhaps in history, identified himself with the personality of another. So ardent and complete was this merging of himself in his Master, that Paul could exclaim with the utmost candor and abandon, "For to me to live is Christ," and, "It is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me." Yet the more he lost himself in Christ, the more

Paul found himself, — found not only freedom and power, but a point of view, a character, a work, a personality splendidly in keeping with that of his Master, and yet uniquely and peculiarly his own.

Nor was this characteristic peculiar to Paul or to the early disciples. It finds continuous and striking illustration in the history of the Christian Church, from the first disciples downward. The result is a series of Christian characters of marvelously varied strength and grace. Athanasius, Augustine, Francis of Assisi, Savonarola, Tauler, St. Theresa, Eckhart, Suso, Luther, Wesley, Knox, Edwards, John Eliot, Cary, Judson, Morrison, Newman, Spurgeon, Florence Nightingale, Robertson, Beecher, Phillips Brooks, — are not such names resplendent with individuality, yet *each linked forever with the name of Christ?* And are there not ten thousand times ten thousand of others, nameless ones, possessing like uniqueness of individual goodness and grace, coupled with a like conscious devotion to Him whom each acknowledged as the source of all the virtue he possessed?

The only explanation of this power of the life of One to transform many, not into mere docile conformity to itself, but into wide and fascinating variety of similitude, is that the Christ of the ages, while most vitally associated with Jesus of Nazareth, is

no less than the Ideal hid in the human heart from the beginning, making men after his own infinitely productive and potent likeness. Impelled by this archetypal Ideal, one finds hidden in Christ his own highest selfhood, and *in laying hold of Christ he lays hold of his own best self, also.*

Paul's Christ was not so much the historic Jesus as the eternal Christ. Having been enabled to recognize this eternal, ever-living Christ through Jesus, Paul found his own self-development in personal communion with and appropriation of this creative, imparting Self. It was so with all the rest of the disciples. He was the same Christ for all, yet each found in him that which enabled him to fulfil his own unique self-development, — just as a group of persons looking at the same landscape takes delight in that which is seen in common, yet each finds in it something for himself that the others do not see. Not that each makes his own Christ. It is rather Christ who makes the disciple, but a Christ ampler than Jesus of Nazareth, though first apprehended through Him, — a Christ so intimate and close to each man's selfhood that He represents each one's own highest self-development.

The best way, therefore, for one to reach self-development — the clearest, straightest, surest, most complete way — is through Jesus Christ. By that Way, freely followed,

many of the noblest personalities of human history have been formed, by Him they will continue to be formed, till we all attain unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.

X. SELF-REALIZATION

I

"ALL the moral aims of life may be summed up in the single word 'self-realization.' Could I fully realize myself, I should have fulfilled all righteousness." Thus writes Professor George H. Palmer.[1] Self-realization is indeed an impelling ideal. There is something in it which appeals to us with undeniable force. What can one do worthier and nobler than to realize himself? And yet, almost immediately, there rises another, apparently conflicting, ideal, *self-sacrifice*, to which the human spirit has always given a place of unsurpassed honor. Is not this, rather than self-realization, the true ideal?[2] Is it not conspicuously the *Christian* ideal, passionately presented, as we have already seen, both in the words and example of the Great Sacrificer?

To add to our perplexity we have still another aim, set forth in the Westminster

[1] *The Nature of Goodness*, p. 146.

[2] In the next chapter on Self-Sacrifice, Professor Palmer convincingly shows how harmonious and consonant with self-realization is self-sacrifice, which he pronounces "the very culmination of the moral life."

Catechism, which has made a strong appeal to many aspiring minds, — *the glory of God.* Here is an aim which appears to subordinate self, and other selves too, to a still higher end.

Inharmonious as these three aims at first appear, is there not something common to them all? Certainly they are all concerned with *personal values.* The first is directed to the enlargement of one's own personality, the second to the recognition and service of other persons. Underneath the third, the idea of enhancing the glory of God, does there not also lie something very closely akin to the purpose of giving more scope and sway to the Divine Personality by increasing the range of his recognized will and rule?

Thus we have, instead of three conflicting aims, a *threefold aim, — Personality, in self, in others, in God.* The aim cannot indeed be other than threefold. For it is quite impossible to advance personality in oneself without advancing it in others as well, and every advance in human personality is also to the "glory of God."

When Jesus gave as a comprehensive and regulating aim for human life, *Seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and his righteousness,* he put personal values first. For the Kingdom of God is a kingdom of persons; it is not concerned primarily with meat and drink, but with righteousness and peace and joy.

Not only so, but Jesus, in presenting the ideal of the Kingdom, refused to recognize that isolated, unsocial self-realization which is not, and cannot be, true self-realization. Only in a society of persons can one realize himself, and only in such a society animated and ruled by the Supreme Person.

II

When, therefore, one asks, Shall I seek my own higher good, or that of others? the answer necessarily is, *Both*. Nor is that a self-contradictory answer. When it comes to specific acts, of course, oneself or another must be preferred. The question *which*, in each instance, must be determined with reference to this same standard of personal values. Shall I give myself, or another, the preference in this particular choice? The decision should depend upon securing the largest personal good from the act. My own value, in the society of persons, is as real as that of another, and I am bound to respect that value in myself as much as in any other, *yet no more*. That is where the rub comes. For commonly we put ourselves *before others* instead of *beside* them in our choices.[1] "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

[1] "The voice of my conscience cries to me, 'Treat . . . these beings as free, independent creatures, . . . existing for them-

In applying this principle it is not necessary that one should coldly calculate every act with reference to its effect upon personality, but that his conduct should be determined, judiciously as well as generously, with reference to personal values. If, for instance, I have a ticket for a concert, and the question arises whether I shall use it for myself or another, it would be unethical as well as senseless for me to assume that I must, as a matter of course, give it away and immediately rush out to find the first person upon whom to thrust it. To decide the matter religiously, as well as sensibly, I must weigh my own need of music and my opportunity of hearing it over against that of the person to whom I am thinking of giving the ticket, and decide the matter intelligently and unselfishly, sensitive to all the personal elements present on both sides. If I then give it away, it will do both of us good. If I keep it, I keep it reasonably and unselfishly.

There is a striking passage in Seneca's treatise *On Benefits* concerning the adaptation of action to personality. "As it is the *will* that designs the benefit and the matter that conveys it, so it is the *judgment* that perfects it, which depends upon so many

selves. Honor their freedom: embrace their aims with enthusiasm as if they were your own.'" Fichte, see *Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, p. 316.

critical niceties that the least error, either in the person, the matter, the manner, the quality, the quantity, the time, or the place, spoils all. The consideration of the *person* is the main point; for we are to give by choice and not by hazard. My inclination bids me oblige one man; I am bound in duty and justice to serve another; here it is a charity, there it is pity, and elsewhere, perhaps, encouragement. There are some that want, to whom I would not give, because, if I did, they would want still. To one man I would barely offer a benefit, but I would press it upon another. . . . But wheresoever there is a man, there is a place and occasion for a benefit."

This fine perception of the place of the personal equation in altruism is worthy of Christianity itself, however far short of it the great moralist himself may have fallen. Just as soon as personality is thus recognized as the end, it becomes evident that one's own personality must needs be placed alongside that of others as of equal consideration. It was thus placed by Jesus, as has been indicated, when he said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor *as* thyself." Pure self-love is of the same order and obligation as love of others. "Self-love accordingly may be said to be the highest law of morals," says Professor Wallace, interpreting Aristotle, "because while such self-love may be under-

stood as the selfishness which gratifies a man's lower nature, it may also be, and is rightly, the love of that higher and rational nature which constitutes each man's true self." [1]

Nothing could be more illuminating than the example as well as the word of Jesus in this respect. Serviceable and sacrificial as was his life throughout, if one imagines that Jesus always gave up his personal claims to others, he has but to read the narrative more carefully to learn his mistake. Always he kept the value of his own personality in view. Otherwise he would have wrecked his purpose at once. Freely he spent himself for others, yet freely he accepted their expenditures for himself. Generously he met every reasonable demand upon him, but firmly he set aside every selfish imposition. No one by his conduct has more plainly said, I have rights to be respected, as well as obligations to meet. Self-obliteration finds no warrant in him, nor indiscriminate self-expenditure. Yet his very life was self-sacrifice.

III

The *summum bonum*, then, is broader than self-realization. It is the realization of a society of persons, a *Kingdom of God*.

[1] *Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle*, p. 108.

This Kingdom can be won, not by each individual person trying to realize himself alone, but as each strives to realize not only himself, but other selves as well.

In this pursuit of personality the service which each performs for others must of necessity be of a different nature from that which he performs for himself. We can help another realize himself; we cannot do it for him. Each for himself, alone, must turn to personal enrichment the experience that comes to him. For, to be personal, it must become his own, pass through the alembic of his intrinsic and unique selfhood. Self-realization, then, has a definite and essential place in the Kingdom of God. However unselfish one may be, if he could by any act of sacrifice slay his own True Selfhood he would commit as wrong and harmful an act as if he smote that of another person. But the real unselfing of self can only be by selfishness, that is, by the exaltation of the lower self at the expense of the True Self.

What, then, are the processes and means of *self-realization*, as distinguished from self-development? The distinction is not an absolute one, but it will prove, I think, to possess validity and value. If by self-development is meant the earlier stages of self-fulfilment, including self-control, self-discipline, self-sacrifice, we may mean by

self-realization the higher and more advanced state, in which the self, having won its right to selfhood, comes to a fuller sense of the expansive and irradiating worth and joy of personal reality.

IV

In the Indian Yoga discipline there are eight stages in the progress toward the goal, which is complete absorption in the Supreme Being, — self-control, religious observance, postures, regulation of breath, restraint of senses, steadying of the mind, meditation, perfect contemplation. Of these the first six are negative and self-disciplinary, and only the last two positive and self-expansive. While two of the essentials of self-realization are present, — self-control and reverence, or contemplation, — the deficiency of the Yoga as an ideal of self-realization is evident. There is in it no recognition of other selves, without whom true self-realization is an utter impossibility, and no place made for love. The final stage is a contemplation so absorbing that both thought and love are lost in it. The lines of distinction are blotted out and personality is swallowed up of impersonality. Whatever else this is, it is not self-realization.

Turning to the Greek ideal of self-realization, we find this passivity replaced by ac-

tivity. Contemplation is still regarded as the ideal, but contemplation of a very different order and color. The object of contemplation is no longer pure Being, in its simplicity, but the *diversity in unity* in which the Good, the True, and the Beautiful manifest themselves. It is contemplation, but of a rational rather than a mystical kind. It has to do with the universal, but with the universal in relation to the particular. "Will it not then be no small defense," says Plato, "if we be able to show that the true lover of learning is naturally made to aspire to the knowledge of real being, and not to rest in the many particular things which are the objects of opinion, but goes on, and is not blunted, nor ceases from his love of truth before he attain to the knowledge of the nature of each particular being, by that part of the soul whose office it is to attain to such knowledge, and it belongs to that principle in the mind which is akin to it; and when he hath approached to this knowledge, and mingled with real being, having generated intelligence and truth, he would then really have true knowledge, and enjoy life and nourishment in the most real manner, and then alone, and no sooner, does he cease from trouble?" [1] Here is the same resort to contemplation by which the Indian found the way to peace and the release from

[1] *Republic*, Book V, Spen's translation.

trouble, but how different is the character of the contemplation!

In the Greek ideal we have the partial recognition of a truth which India did not grasp, — the need of *society* in order to self-realization. Greek philosophy clearly understood and exalted the necessity of the State. In this it fruitfully anticipated modern ethics. And yet the Greek ideal of the State, admirable as it is in many particulars, is far inferior to the modern ideal, in that it entirely fails to recognize *personality* as the basis of social duties and relations. Plato's Republic is not so much for the citizens as a whole as for itself. The philosophers (in the sense in which the philosopher is defined by Plato) are very properly to rule, but their rule is not so much in the interest of the *citizens* as of the State itself. With that intense scorn of the multitude which characterizes him, Plato functions off the citizens into their several divisions of service as if they were mere vassals, with no existence or value of their own apart from the State. As Martineau has succinctly put it, "With that feeble and dilute conception of *personality* which marks every pantheistic philosophy, Plato, in common with all the great Hellenic thinkers, regarded particular persons as mere *organs* of a common social life, which, as the higher and more real unity, was entitled to multiply or sup-

press them, to move and mould them, according to the exigencies of its perfection." [1]

The Hellenic ideal of self-realization is thus too far intellectual and aristocratic, too little moral and social. Deeply sensitive to beauty, both of body and of character, earnestly devoted to the pursuit of truth, it nevertheless falls short of the highest form of self-realization. For it does not rise to the full conception of self-sacrifice. It is a matter of insufficient concern to Plato's philosopher whether other men attain to true selfhood or not, or even if the State itself come to its true ideal, provided he keeps his own integrity and composure. "And even of these few now, such as are tasting, and have tasted how sweet and happy the acquisition of philosophy is, and have withal sufficiently seen the madness of the multitude, and how none of them, to speak in general, doth anything salutary in the affairs of cities, and that there is no ally with whom one might go to the assistance of the just and be safe, but that he is as a man falling among wild beasts, — being neither willing to join them in injustice, nor able, being but one, to oppose the whole savage crew, but, ere he can serve the city or his friends, is destroyed and is unprofitable to himself and to others, — reasoning on all these things, lying quiet and minding his own affairs, as

[1] *Types of Ethical Theory*, second ed., p. 78.

in a tempest, when earth and sea are driven by winds, entering under roof, beholding others overwhelmed in injustice, he is satisfied if he shall himself anyhow pass his life here free from injustice and unholy deeds, and make his exit hence in good hopes, cheerful and composed." [1] One hardly knows whether most to admire or to criticize this striking picture. Conscious of its nobility and greatness, we cannot but be conscious also of its inherent defect as compared with an Ideal which inevitably rises before us, — an Ideal which has come to fulfil and supersede this and throw into full light both its glory and its incompleteness, namely, that given us in Christianity.

V

What, now, is the Christian ideal of self-realization? How is it related to the Indian and Hellenic ideals? Contemplation is retained. Yet Christianity presents still another and higher form of contemplation. Instead of the passive contemplation of the Yoga we have the active contemplation of *prayer;* instead of the intellectual contemplation of Hellenism, the spiritual contemplation of communion. In other words, *contemplation has been personalized.* The impersonalism of the Yoga and the abstrac-

[1] *Republic,* Book VI, Spen's translation.

tion of Hellenism have given place to personal intercourse with the Supreme Person. The communion of prayer is no mere petition for benefits, as in the undeveloped religions, but a spiritual sacrament, the most expansive force in self-realization. On the surface prayer appears as a hindrance to self-realization, a deliberate fostering of tutelage and dependency which arrests progress toward self-realization. Such it might well be if it continued in the stage of mere pruriency and petition. But as the self grows prayer grows too, until, as in the marvelous prayers of the Fourth Gospel and in such as those of Augustine and St. Francis and of Beecher and Phillips Brooks, it becomes an outpouring of soul, a conscious activity of personal communion that strengthens the spirit, as flying strengthens the wings of a bird. Nor is such prayer active only, but receptive as well. Indeed it could not be the one without being the other also. If spiritual outreaching were unmet, it would soon flag and fail; its very persistence is evidence of its mutuality.

The Christian ideal also supplements contemplation with a principle that the Yoga entirely ignores and that Hellenism touches but lightly, — *service*. What would the Yogi have said to the washing of the disciples' feet? What would the Greek have said to the words, "And whosoever would

be first among you shall be your servant"? And yet it is here that Christianity has displayed its most characteristic strength and won its most splendid success. With a courage and consecration unparalleled, it invaded that world of human misery that the Yogi ignored, and sought out that "mad multitude" and "savage crew" of which Plato despaired, and toiled, not without amazing results, to transform it all, — out of moral cripples to make sound men and out of slaves free men. If it had failed, its very failure would have been the noblest achievement the world has witnessed; but it did not fail and its success has remade the world.

Sacrificial service has proven — this is the most wonderful fact — the path to self-realization. The servant of all has become thereby the monarch of himself, and his voluntary serfdom has proven the highest freedom. The reason is not far to seek. Besides the discipline of oneself which service affords, it is a service of *persons*. Not men's bodies the Christian serves, not their whims, not their passions and prejudices, but *themselves*. And this service knits men to him and him to them in personal bonds that, so far from cramping him, enlarge the scope and influence of his personality and thus enable him to realize himself.

Thus, in ever-deepening communion with

the Supreme Self and in ever-widening service of other human selves, the self moves on into the realization of its selfhood, growing more like the Divine Self, and yet fulfilling its own unique personality, becoming more and more the light and inspiration of other lives, yet developing ever its own intrinsic and characteristic endowment of the Universal.

XI. THE PAIN OF IMPERFECTION

I

THERE is no greater testimony to the priority and persistence of personality than the pain which attends the pressure of the Ideal upon the human soul. It is a pain which is felt but slightly in the lower stages of human development, but it deepens and intensifies as the race develops until it becomes a fire that purges humanity of its grossness and impels it to its noblest achievement.

The kindling of this fire of the Ideal may be detected in the crude beginnings of the sense of moral obligation, — where is such a sad confusion as to true moral distinctions, yet such an implacable sense of the binding nature of obligation itself. Take, for example, the almost universal law of *taboo* in savage religion. Why is there so imperative a sense among ignorant, animalized races, that certain things must not be touched, that certain things must not be done? Mere custom will not explain it, nor the instinct for tribal preservation.[1] Or, study the *lex*

[1] See F. B. Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, Chap. VIII.

talionis, as depicted, for instance, in Æschylus' trilogy, — *Agamemnon*, *The Choephoræ*, and *The Eumenides*. Why should blood-guiltiness come to have such an awful stigma attached to it in human life, and not in the life of the animal? Without the sense of the sacredness of life and the binding character of human relationships, what is there to account for the *lex talionis*, or indeed for the growth of human law in general?

When we come to *penitence*, slowly asserting itself amidst the grossness and soddenness of human life, we have a still clearer assertion of personality. Late indeed, and indistinct, are the traces of true penitence in the history of religion. Faint foreshadowings of it may be detected, perhaps, in the hymns of Egypt and Assyria, but it is only in the sensitive spirit of Israel that we find it coming to full expression. Why should a man repent at all, unless he has come to recognize the sacredness of personality and personal relations? Can he have any real sorrow for sin until he has come to feel, in some indefinable way, that he is a person, and thus a center of obligation?

Yet, with all these primitive assertions of the moral imperative and expressions of the spirit of penitence, the contrast between the early racial sluggishness to the moral Ideal and the present growing sensitiveness to its

pressure is little less than astounding. How comes it that now, all over the earth, millions of lives are lived in the light of the Ideal, their deepest passion righteousness, their deepest pain penitence? What a surprising advance, what a startling transformation!

It is true enough that, from the absolute view-point, the response of humanity to the Ideal is disheartening. The general level of life is yet low, the pursuit of the Ideal, even by the best, is halting and distracted. But we should look at human virtue, not from the big end of the telescope, but from the small end. Viewed thus, the significant and prophetic fact is seen to be, not materialism, but idealism, not absorption in the base and worldly, but the upward look and the forward step. Greater, daily, becomes the number and the aspiration of those who in all the world sing:

"Higher yet and higher,
Out of clouds and night,
Nearer yet and nearer
Rising to the light."

II

Those who give us the deepest joy are capable also of inflicting the deepest pain. This is true of persons, it is true also of the Ideal, just because it is personal. If the

joy of beholding it and pursuing it is intense, deep is the pain of losing sight of it and being disloyal to it. If, to find some correspondence to it within oneself lifts him to the stars, so to discover his disharmony with it casts him down to the dust. More real than the pleasure or pain attending the gain or loss of fortune, or any physical well-being or ill-being, are the joy and pain of the spirit in its relation to the Ideal.

The pain of imperfection often lies sorely upon him who, under the sway of the Ideal, seeks to win for himself a true personality. It is a pain as much deeper than the disappointment which attends failure to win outward advancement, as character is dearer than mere success. Many a man pauses in the midst of success and adulation to think with a deep misgiving and longing how little all this amounts to, if only he could be the man that he knows he ought to be. Daily the chasm between the strength and splendor of the man he would be and the weakness and poverty of the man he is, pains and purifies him. The poet's cry finds frequent echo in his heart:

> "And oh, that a man might arise in me,
> That the man that I am may cease to be!"

This craving for ideal manhood haunts us strangely, — a sweet and holy haunting if we cherish it, stern and disquieting if we

try to suppress it. To quench it entirely is in so far to dehumanize a man. The manhood or womanhood that lacks the love of the Ideal is a barren waste, with no springs nor verdure. Not that this longing is always clearly defined; many a man who has it might not be ready to put it under so lofty a category as the pursuit of perfection, and yet it may be essentially that, under some lowlier guise. The workman who has a passion for fine and thorough work, the housekeeper who longs to keep her house in perfect order, much more he who aims at absolute honor in his dealings with his fellow men, still more he who strives to keep his thoughts pure and his motives high, is so animated by the one great Ideal, in one of its many forms, that any failure to realize it gives him acute moral pain. "A mere youthful sentiment," is it said? "a vision of the period of moral idealism, to be abandoned under the stern pressure of the realities of later life." Surely not that. Too many unconquered souls have held to this idealism straight through the dusty ways of middle life and the desert areas of age to permit us to call it a vanishing rainbow of youth.

III

If the pain of one's own imperfection accompanies and attests the struggle for per-

sonality, so also does pain in the imperfection of others. Love is the mother of pain as well as of joy and the two lie very close to one another upon her bosom. He who has an ideal for himself can hardly fail to have such for others also, and as the consciousness of his own imperfection wounds him, so will he feel pain also for the imperfection of others. The keenness of this suffering will be in proportion to the strength of his love. When one who is loved scorns the sacredness of moral law or is dull to a great moral issue, it cuts the lover as if the defect were his own. As love reaches out to embrace humanity as a whole, human apostasy to the Ideal lays an ever greater pain upon the sensitive soul. He who loves his fellow men deeply must often walk with bleeding feet the way of the cross.

Nowhere is the pain of imperfection felt so intimately and intensely as in the home, where love finds its holiest shrine. It is here that the invisible hand of idealism paints in most glowing colors what one should be to another and for another; and when that picture suffers desecration the pain is deep and consuming. Tragedy finds no dearer field than the home. The coming of the child means the advent of a new and immeasurable joy, or a fresh and inconceivable pain — or both. It is just because the possibilities of home happiness and har-

mony are so incomparable, the flashes of its brightness that come now and again in even its most troubled life so passing fair, that the dismal disharmony that characterizes so many homes is so disappointing and heart-wounding. Happy is the home in which the pain of an unfulfilled ideal serves only to make the ideal more potent and pervasive.

It is thus with all the relationships of life. In so far as each center of social relations — the market, the capital, the social circle, the church — is vitiated by wrong and selfishness and corruption, the Ideal dragged in the dust, the hearts of true men and women suffer. It cannot be, to one who loves humanity, a matter of indifference that his fellow men are spurning, defiling, defying Truth and Goodness. The blows that men strike at righteousness tingle and smart in the nerve-centers of his own inner selfhood. Precisely here, as we have seen, lies the reality of that vicarious suffering which is the secret of the Christ life. He, above all men, felt the pain for the evil and imperfection of his brothers which every true man feels, in proportion to the largeness of his humanity. Life is inwrought with this law of suffering for the sin and imperfection of others. Yet such suffering is not fruitless and inconsequential, but productive and atoning. Without it the reign of the Ideal could

never come. It is part of the great redemptive process by which humanity is lifted out of its inertness and evil into the light of the truly and perfectly personal. Not one genuine, unselfish pang for the violated Ideal but counts toward its final coronation. Behooves it not humanity to suffer these things and to enter into its glory? Always the true man of sorrow and acquainted with grief is the man also of joy and victory. It is so written in the moral order. Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the Kingdom of heaven.

IV

The experience of the pain of imperfection, of the reproach of an unfulfilled or rejected Ideal, is an attested fact of the moral consciousness. How far is it incidental to moral evolution, — a mere growing pain, — and how far is it due to wilful and responsible human sin? A man's attitude and conduct will be influenced by his answer to this question.

Unquestionably the modern emphasis upon the law of development — a law prevailing in the realm of the personal as evolution does in the realm of the physical — has largely and rightfully modified the older conception of the nature of moral defect. It is utterly impossible for us to attach the same relative

degree of blameworthiness to the victim of hereditary vice or environment that our fathers did. So much of his moral deficiency as pertains to racial factors, rather than to personality itself, cannot justly be charged to a man's personal account. Nor ought the immaturity of a given stage of personal development to be condemned for its shortness of the absolute standard.

There was a sad lack of perspective in the outlook of much of the older theology upon sin. Its condemnations were inconsiderate and sweeping. It declaimed concerning the infinite guilt of a single finite sin, lumped all sinners in one confused mass and consigned them to perdition indiscriminately, made no allowances, no distinctions. The Augustinian anthropology, to the very last phase of Calvinism — in spite of its deep, true conviction of the heinousness of sin — was an indiscriminate, abnormal exaggeration. It has broken down completely before modern science and ethics, — so completely that even its truer insights have been largely repudiated. It is unethical, not to say unchristian, to judge an incomplete, developing person, caught in the meshes of a defective environment, by a standard of absolute perfection. We look back from this brief space at such a standard — imposed by the Christian Church for more than sixteen hundred years — with an indignant

protest, softened however by the conviction that it served to protect a truth without which Christianity itself might have been swept away, namely, the inherent sinfulness of sin.

There is imperfection, and there is sin as well, in human disparity with the Ideal. In part we fail of the Ideal because it is not yet possible for us to reach it, and in part we fail of it because we deny it and despise it and choose other gods to rule over us. Does one man point to the moral disruption and anarchy of human society and say that it is outright sinfulness, — base, execrable, insufferable; and does another point to the weakness of our human constitution, the power of environment and heredity, and say that wrong-doing is only the imperfection incidental to growth? Each is half right and half wrong. There is an element of imperfection in man — in some degree natural and inevitable — but there is also an element of wilful, needless, rebellious sinfulness, for which he is responsible and must renounce before he can reach his own. And from these two sources come the pain of imperfection and the deeper pain of penitence.

V

How should the seeker for personality treat this pain of imperfection, this hunger

for the Ideal, this penitence that brings him shame and sorrow? Should he suppress it, or cherish it? Should he regard it as normal or abnormal, harmful or helpful? It need not be difficult to answer this question. Let us not shrink from the reproach of the Ideal, or regard it as a mere symptom of morbidness and physical disturbance. It is rather a sign of spiritual health, — when detached from physical conditions which may be morbid.

We are in great danger of resolving all spiritual experiences into physical states, so closely are the two interblended; but a more thorough psychology will prove that, however intimate, they cannot be identified. Until the day that we can learn to untwine them, let one be true to his spiritual experiences, hold fast to his inner intuitions against the physiologist and psychologist who would reduce all his enthusiasms and his penitences to physical and nervous states.

The day of extreme spiritual introspection and self-abasement has indeed passed. It is doubtful if humanity ever will have another Augustine or à Kempis or David Brainerd. But so long as there is an Ideal and failure to attain to it, there must be soul-suffering, pain, penitence. To thrust this sad-eyed guest from the heart's fireside would be to impoverish the soul — whatever gayer guest were summoned to her place.

"It is good to be taught, though with tears," wrote Sophocles. Never does one know himself to be more truly humanized, more at one with himself and the world and God, more fit for service, more open to high impressions, more meet for progress in peace and joy than after the purification of penitence, with its dew still upon his spirit. Old-fashioned spiritual subjectivism this may be; it is the eternal fashion of the human spirit. Lured into the lotus lands of self-indulgence and forgetfulness of the Quest, we are pursued by the Ideal and won back to fresh consecration. Penitence has thus its true place in the furtherance of personality. The pain of imperfection, so far as it is genuine, is a holy and healing sacrament. The chastening of the Ideal accomplishes its own indispensable work. And yet, let it never be forgotten that pain is simply a means to an end and penitence a preparation for fresh endeavor; that the best atmosphere for the development of personality is that of faith and hope and love; and that the end of the Ideal is less to prostrate and humble than to inspire and enhearten.

XII. THE RECOGNITION OF PERSONS

I

If the philosophy of Immanuel Kant were in any wise chargeable with remoteness from life, a single maxim of his would relieve it of the charge. It is this: *Always treat humanity, whether in yourself or another, as an end, never merely as a means.*

Wherever there is humanity, however degraded, there is personality, or at least the germ of it. Such is the implication of this maxim. "A man's a man for a' that." And "a' that" means not only the outer garb and station, but the inner failing and defect. Kant is right — who would question it? — in linking humanity and personality. His maxim is a new rendering of the word of the ancient poet, *Nihil humanum puto alienum.* It is personality that consecrates humanity and makes an "artisan's hand or a peasant's brow" better worth "poring upon," as Mrs. Browning saw, than any wonder or beauty of the world of nature.

This maxim of Kant does not mean, Treat

every one exactly like every other. Personality is of differing degrees and qualities. Men should be treated according to the stage and quality of their character-development — kindness to all, confidence to a limited number, self-revelation to a few. It should indeed be the aim of every true person to give himself to others as freely and fully as possible; but this may best be done, not by lavish and unthinking self-largess, but only by wise and timely self-expenditure. Cast not your pearls before swine. Not in the *degree* of self-giving do we err, but in the method and manner of it. To put self to usury for others requires wisdom as well as willingness, discernment as well as love.

Nothing will produce reverence and incite enthusiasm for humanity except the recognition of this hidden treasure, this concealed but incomparable value, — *personality*. It is this the lover worships, the poet sings, the missionary and the teacher patiently seek. He who can detect it in all men, or failing that, believe it to be there, is happy and rich indeed.

II

It is in the light of its violations that the true significance of Kant's maxim appears. To despise one's True Self, to treat his own personality as a thing to be thrown to the

dogs of appetite and passion or sacrificed to sloth or despair, — that is a temptation that comes to all. Pride on the one hand, self-contempt on the other, reduce personality to impersonality by putting it into the scale of market values, — appraisal by comparison, — something wholly foreign to its nature. Unless one respects his own personality he certainly cannot respect that of others. Jesus recognized this when he said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. The self-love which serves as a standard for true love to others can only be an unselfish love of the True Self within.

If self-disdain is a common violation of personality, what shall we say of that disdain of others, often reaching contempt, which is a prevailing disease of human society? Here is something that cheapens and vitiates the whole tone of our life together. From the prejudices and hatreds and crimes of the lower social *strata* to the disdains and jealousies and cruelties of the upper, there is blind violation of the sacredness of personality.

Even at its best our social life is robbed of much of its grace and goodliness by this habit of disparagement of others, often growing keener with increasing intelligence, stifling appreciation, and thwarting personal development. Disparagement is at bottom a process of depersonalization. It reduces

persons to the rank of merchandise, to be passed upon as one passes upon material goods. Every-day life demands, of course, a practical estimate of men with reference to their ability and value for specific undertakings. But these practical estimates of men should not be allowed, as they so often are, to absorb the total meaning and worth of the man. For that is the sacrilege of depersonalization.

Glibly and mercilessly men size one another down, with an abnormally clever eye for defects and an almost total blindness for excellences. It is like a cheap and superficial novice in a gallery of old masters, smartly pointing out their faults in technique, but pitiably oblivious of their great constructive ideas and meanings. Such attitudes and estimates stunt the growth of selfhood. A characteristic trait of one of the best loved college presidents in America is quite the opposite of this,—a habit of sizing his students up, rather than down, of making every young man feel that he is worth far more than he had ever realized before. Get a young man to feel that and he will do his best.

Another common violation of Kant's maxim is the habit of so *classifying* men that the individual is lost to sight in the class. More and more, as human contacts widen, the habit of classifying men grows.

By race, by nationality, by religion, by occupation, by social standing, by temperament, we classify men. It is a great convenience and a help to understanding them; but the moment we let the class absorb and explain the individual we defraud him of his personality. A man may be a Chinaman and yet unlike every other Chinaman, or a minister and yet a man, or a member of a labor union and yet a good citizen, or a black man and yet have a white soul, or a servant and yet a gentleman. The man above the race, the profession, the trade, the social class, is the real man.

A man cannot be understood by classifying him. He must be understood at the real center of his selfhood, not as a member of a class, but as a person. A Jew is not necessarily a bargain-driver, or a negro a sluggard, or a Japanese a spy, or a Frenchman a fraud, or an Englishman a snob, or an American a boor. A person has a right to a distinct judgment as a separate self. "Probably a crab would be filled with a sense of personal outrage," writes Professor James, "if it could hear us class it, without more ado or apology, as a crustacean, and thus dispose of it. 'I am no such thing,' it would say; 'I am myself, myself alone!'"[1] How much is a man better than a crab!

All forms of impoliteness and discourtesy

[1] *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 9.

get their badness and ban from their offense against personality. In themselves they may be quite harmless, but as indications of insensitiveness to the personal worth of others such acts are ignoble and immoral. Walking in front of another as if he had no eyes, stepping on his toes as if they were insensible, marching past him on the street as if he were a lamp-post, failing to listen to him when he speaks, as though his words were as the idle wind which one respects not, — these and other forms of impoliteness are in social disrepute, not so much for the discomfort they cause, as that they exhibit absence of that respect for other persons which is the basis of true social life. Under the most approved forms of etiquette one may, it is true, strike at the very heart of another person's honor or happiness; and yet, so far as they go, forms of right behavior are a recognition of personality. Unhappy are those for whom the soul has gone out of the form, who exchange "greetings where no kindness is," who have lost, or never found, the true sense of the sacredness of personality.

III

But perhaps the most serious violation of personality in others is using them as means to accomplish our own selfish ends. This is a wrong which has many forms, from the

basest crimes upwards. It is this that constitutes the hatefulness of slavery, the meanness of treachery, that makes the dastard motive of the libertine so damnable, and lurks as the secret poison in the meanest and most despicable acts that men can do. The reason why graft is so abominable is that it is one of the worst forms of making use of another person as a tool, a *thing*, to secure a selfish advantage. It is hard to tell which side of the graft transaction is the worse, — to make a tool of another, or to allow oneself to be made a tool of.

There are all sorts of milder usings and abusings of others which carry more or less depersonalizing and degrading influence with them. Every one can call to mind more than one man in his acquaintance who has formed the fatal habit of making friends, or trying to do so, only for the sake of what they can do for him, whose very approach awakens the disheartening query, "What does he want now?" O wad some power the giftie gie to that man, to see himsel' as ithers see him!

But it is all too easy for even the man with a true reverence for personality to drop into an impersonal treatment of others, to find himself using men instead of either honoring or serving them. The professional man, as well as the business man, is constantly exposed to this temptation, — the lawyer to use his client, the physician

his patient, the minister his parishioner, for selfish ends. When the minister, for example, tries to induce a person to join his church simply to increase the membership and so bring credit to himself, he makes of him simply a unit, a thing that counts, in place of a person, and dishonors personality at its very shrine. "I seek not yours but you," said one so deeply smitten with the worth of human personality that he became all things to all men that he might win some. Not, of course, that one should never seek assistance from others for his own personal advantage. But let him go as a person to a person, with neither flattery nor subterfuge, and with a keen sense of obligation, and there will be no violation of personal honor; for the more he receives the more he will feel himself bound and impelled to give.

Few suffer more from the habit of ignoring their personalities than children. Too often they are treated as means, not as ends, as things, not as persons; and deeply they feel the injustice. President King has pointed out that "it is worth noticing that Paul's single counsel concerning the training of children grows out of this very principle. 'Fathers, provoke not your children to wrath.' Don't trespass on the child's personality. Respect the person." [1]

[1] *Rational Living*, p. 243.

IV

Like an unexpected sunburst, the opening of a new world of fair and friendly benignity, comes true recognition to an imprisoned and unrecognized soul. Unsunned flowers lift up their faces in the garden of the neglected heart at the touch of sympathetic recognition, and a sudden fragrance exhales from crushed and unused faculties. A lady turning a corner in London — so the story goes — ran against a little street ragamuffin. She stopped and, with genuineness and grace, begged his pardon. The little chap took off his cap and said with a smile: "You have my parding, Miss, and you 're welcome to it. And say, the next time you run agin me you can knock me clean down and I won't say a word." Turning to another boy, when she was gone, he added, "I say, Jim, it 's fine having some one asking yer parding, ain't it?"

Generous and yet just recognition of others, clear and discriminating judgment of their defects, yet warm and generous appreciation of their merits and gifts, is a spiritual art, and as rare as it is fine. It is said that some sadly mediocre but earnest verses addressed to his country were read by a would-be poet to a company of whom Emerson was one. At the conclusion a most painful silence ensued. It was broken by Mr.

Emerson with the enthusiastic exclamation, "How patriotic!" It was the one word that could be truthfully and heartily spoken, and saved the company, the host, the would-be poet, and the occasion, from dismal defeat and ignominy.

It is marvelous — and yet in keeping with the very nature and laws of personality — how a single word of true recognition can stir and arouse the soul, dropping into it the seed of a great transformation. At Hofod, on December 16, 1904, Evan Robert told how the revival reached him. One evening, while at Laughor, he walked from his home down to the post-office, and on his way passed a gypsy woman, who saluted him with, "Good evening, sir." Her use of "sir" in addressing a mere miner went straight to his heart, and he asked himself why he had not said, "Good evening, madam," to the gypsy. "From that moment," he says, "I felt that my heart was full of the divine love, and that I could love the whole world, irrespective of color or creed or nationality."[1] This is an instance of a partial and incidental recognition by another arousing a deep soul to self-recognition. Oftener it takes a patient and persistent effort to free a fettered soul. Often an evil spirit must first be driven out — one

[1] From a pamphlet published by *The Western Mail* of Cardiff. See Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, p. 337.

which goeth not forth save by prayer and fasting. But what is better worth while? What is it to save a man, unless it be to help him, in his bondage to selfishness and sense, to win back his true selfhood, and so move on to attain a true personality?

V

When one looks for a perfect example of gracious, discerning, vitalizing recognition of the personality of others he comes inevitably to Jesus. Race, occupation, social exclusion, submerged no man's personality for him. Nor did rank or prestige glorify a man in his eyes. He penetrated the royal robe of Herod as well as the fisherman's frock of John, and saw the real selfhood beneath. To others, Zacchæus was only a common publican, Mary Magdalene a sinful woman, Peter an obscure fisherman; but in Zacchæus Jesus saw a true gentleman, generous and chivalric; in the Magdalene a woman's heart with its wealth of devotion; in Peter, the unstable, a rock, — and each became what Jesus saw within him and helped him to become.

It was characteristic of the spiritual insight of Jesus to say, not only, "Thou ailest here, and here," but "here, and here, thou art rich with an undreamt-of potency." It was not, in his case, — as it has been with

so many others who have had skill in finding men, — the mere keenness to see, "This man or this woman can be useful to me," but the discernment that each had in him something of intrinsic worth to himself, to God, to the world, which should be brought from its hiding into the light of recognition and fruitfulness.

Something of this power and grace of personal recognition Jesus communicated to his followers; something of its life-giving virtue is in the world to-day; but it is far too rare. Blindly we stumble on, seeing men as trees walking, oblivious to the deeper selves beneath stolid faces and unrevealing exteriors, until some unexpected disclosure of hidden worth, or the revealing touch of death, brings into almost startling relief the fine lines of a noble selfhood, where we had seen only mediocrity and insignificance.

To those of us who passed through the great San Francisco disaster, the most memorable experience was not the terror of the quivering earth, or the awfulness of the devouring flames, but the overwhelming tide of faith and courage and brotherhood that rose and ran, in the irresistible might of the human spirit, and met and overcame the opposing tide of ills and triumphed, as only spirit can triumph in its great hours of conscious mastery. In the terrible searching light of that great disaster, under the

stinging blows of mutual misfortune, men looked in each other's faces and saw — where before they had seen nothing but commonplace, uninteresting humanity — resolute, unselfish, exalted souls; and hearts softened, and life greatened, and men rejoiced in one another as they had not in all the days of selfish prosperity. It is true the light faded and men fell back into their old ways of materialism and indifference, but to those who caught it the vision will never quite fail, but will seem to them always a prophetic unveiling of the true joy of universal personal recognition.

XIII. THE PERSONALIZING OF LIFE

I

Not by withdrawing from the world, much less by surrendering to it, does man reach his highest well-being, but by transforming, *personalizing* all things. A long, hard lesson this has been for humanity, but well worth the cost. From indulgence to asceticism, from asceticism to indulgence, men have vacillated, eager to find the true good. And when, baffled by incessant failure, they turned to moderation, temperance, as the only possible solution of the perplexity, it proved but a negative and unsatisfying expedient.

Only as humanity, as a consecrated communion of persons, takes possession of the universe in the name of personality and patiently organizes and transmutes it into a medium of spiritual enrichment and expression, can it be made to fulfil its worthiest end. This is not a task to be accomplished by one generation, or by several, but by a confederate and progressive conquest in which the generations share.

Intrinsically and fundamentally — as we are coming more and more clearly to see — this is the distinctively *Christian* solution of the world-problem. The ancient religions and philosophies, divided between world-absorption and world-rejection, failed to find it. The Son of Man came eating and drinking, yet serving and sacrificing, rejoicing in all that was pure and good, yet giving his life a ransom for many, and humanity has ever since been trying to understand and reconcile the two dispositions, or principles, in him. Slowly, and even yet imperfectly, the truth is dawning upon men that the two motives find their complete explanation and harmony in the very nature of his personality and his relation to the external world. To lay his hand upon life in such a way as to make it, in every part and particular, serve the ends of personality, — that was Jesus' object. Did eating and drinking bring him into closer and warmer relations with his fellows? He would eat and drink. Did the giving up of pleasure, of comfort, of life itself, enable him to do most for them? He would sacrifice all.

Unable to grasp the comprehensiveness and virtue of this principle, the Church turned now toward asceticism, now toward worldliness. Hermit and Churchman, Prelate and Monk, Rigorist and Antinomian,

Puritan and Cavalier, Methodist and Universalist, represented the opposite extremes — though in ever-lessening degree of contrast — under which the advocates of these two life attitudes ranged themselves. At last we are coming steadily and swiftly into the great truth which reconciles and relates them. Shall one take the goods of life, its gifts, prizes, pleasures? Yes, in so far, and only in so far, as he can *personalize* them. Shall he put these joys, any of them, all of them, aside and tread the stony path of sacrifice? Yes, if thereby he can best secure the same great end, serving and enriching personality. Never otherwise, and never for the mere sake of sacrifice.

II

The meaning and value of the universe lies in its capacity for symbolizing and expressing personal ideas and relations. As Sabatier has said, "The world is ruled by symbols, not by science." Our deepest concern with Nature is not how to get from her the best food for our stomachs and the best clothing for our backs, the greatest comfort and the most rapid transportation, but how to get from her the best expression for our thoughts, the best embodiment for our ideals, the best means of self-realization and of personal communion. Did she not serve our

ideas, our affections, our aspirations, her offices were mean indeed.

Long ago the truth came home to thoughtful minds that the sublimity and beauty that we find in Nature are not in her, but in the minds that contemplate her, or the Mind that constituted her, or rather in both. It was to the human heart, not to the flower, that Wordsworth ascribed the emotion he experienced as he looked into its upturned face:

> "Thanks to the human heart by which we live,
> Thanks to its tenderness, its joys, and fears,
> To me the meanest flower that blows can give
> Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears." [1]

Know ye not this parable? and how shall ye know all parables? Behind the scientific aspect of Nature is the parabolic. Each is true in its own way, but he to whom the world is a parable is nearer to the heart of things, and richer withal, than he to whom it is but a complex of scientific laws, or a plunder-box. However far we advance in the scientific understanding and use of the universe, we can never know it intimately until we know it as a parable. Only the meek inherit the earth. Not the outer and perceptible speaks to us, but the inner and spiritual. Not the light charms us, but the *light* of the light; not the star, but the *star* of the star; not the flower, but the *flower* of

[1] *Ode: Intimations of Immortality.*

the flower; not the melody, but the *melody* of the melody. Nature never uncovers her fairest forms save to the soul that already contemplates Eternal Beauty.

Herein lie those subtler "correspondences" which won Swedenborg the scientist to become Swedenborg the seer. The deeper meanings of Nature are not to be grasped, as he saw, save as by a spiritual communion, wider than the human and higher: God enters into converse with us through the mystical, but rational, symbols with which the universe is sown. The mind of God and the mind of man find each other through Nature, — the one originative, the other receptive; the one constitutive, the other comprehending.[1]

"This is the glory, — that in all conceived,
Or felt or known, I recognize a mind
Not mine but like mine, — for the double joy, —
Making all things for me and me for Him." [2]

III

The progressive personalizing of life is the romance of civilization, — a romance yet to be written, when one shall arise with scientific knowledge, historic imagination, and

[1] "Many a thinker brooding over the phenomena of Nature, has felt that they represent the thoughts of a dominating unknown Mind, partially incarnate in all." Sir Oliver Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 108.

[2] Browning, *Hohenstiel-Schwangau*.

human insight sufficient to sweep the outlines of the whole vast achievement into a graphic series of successive pictures. Consider, for instance, how the primal, instinctive functions essential to the maintenance of life have been gradually uplifted and consecrated by the touch of personality. Eating, for example, at first so desperately animal and matter-of-fact, — *sans* table, *sans* dishes, *sans* plates and knives and forks, *sans* manners, *sans* everything, — how it has been personalized! From the helter-skelter, hand-to-mouth gobbling of the unwashed barbarian estate to snowy damask, silver service, French china, and grace before meat, is a transformation that only the persistent demand for an outer comeliness to match that inherent something we call personality could have accomplished. So, too, with the cultivation of the sense of taste, with all its imaginative, poetic suggestion. Has not a cup of tea become almost a spiritual thing? From the savage smack of the lips over a juicy mouthful (one cannot safely say morsel) to Charles Lamb's Dissertation — would that it had been on something worthier than roast pig! — or Henry van Dyke on bacon,[1] is something of an advance in the direction of making even the lower appetites of life worthy of an immortal spirit tabernacling in the flesh.

[1] *Days Off*, p. 37.

Sleep, that, to the unpersonalized man, is only a blinking, boorish relapse into unconsciousness,—how it has become sacramental, through the comely appointments of the bedchamber, the preparation of prayer, and the spiritual significance of evening and morning, until it has come to symbolize a rest that enters through the lowly door of the physical into the inmost recesses of the soul! Who that has caught a glimpse of the spiritual values of life can look upon sleep as less than a charism from heaven?

Still more significant is the spiritualizing of the sexual relation in the sacredness of marriage, with solemn pledge and holy rite and lifelong loyalty,—thus making the home the very shrine and center of personal values and spiritual culture. So completely and beautifully has the true home been personalized that everything within it and about it has a spiritual aspect. Every movement of the daily round, — which is thus no longer merely a round but a circle of symmetry, — every picture on the wall, every rug on the floor, every book on the table, and article in the work-basket, every toy in the nursery, every tree on the lawn and flower in the garden, is touched with the transfiguring light of personality — what is more magical than the effect of a woman's touch? — so that the whole has become a very temple of the human spirit. As such it is less a crea-

tion of hand and eye than of mind and soul, a fabric of beauty and harmony made according to the pattern in the Mount.

Far more difficult for man to personalize is his work; yet to a certain degree even this has been accomplished. The distinctively spiritual tasks and enterprises, all that belong to art and literature and religion, offer open avenues to personal conquest and expression; they are in their very nature personal. So, too, with humbler tasks. All that has to do with carrying on and keeping in order and repair this complex life of ours gains grace and meaning from its relation to human needs and desires. What is that instinct of *order* itself, which more and more masters and organizes all the details of our physical environment, from the nursery to the cemetery, from the grocery to the hall of records, but the outward expression of a spiritual virtue, a personal ideal? But what of common toil? Can that be invested with personal values, translated into the spiritual realm? Not readily, and yet there have been instances enough in which glowing, exceptional spirits have lifted even the meanest task into the light of the eternal, to prove that the transformation of toil is not impossible. There is no honest task that is unrelated to human welfare, that does not bring one into touch at some point with human hearts, immortal persons. And when human-

ity as a whole has reached the high resolve that its very drudgery shall be lifted into the light of the ideal, the crushing, dehumanizing reign of impersonal labor will be over.

This personalizing of environment alters the face of the earth and invests even the landscape, woods, mountains, valleys, with fresh meaning and charm. Without their place in literature, the Alps would lose half their attraction. Who would journey to the Doon save for Robbie Burns, or to Stratford save for Shakespeare, or to Exmoor save for John Ridd? Who can go to the English lake country without feeling the personal spell of Wordsworth, or to the White Mountains without rejoicing in Whittier, or to the Sierras without thanking God for John Muir? Still more transfiguring are the associations of familiar places with the personality of friends whose spirits seem to pervade and beautify every rock and tree and flower. Thus do we see and walk and live in the light of the personal.

To the personalizing of life and its surroundings and implements, simplicity and sincerity are absolutely essential. It is because extravagance and luxury and social pride come in to shatter and despoil this work of the spirit, to *depersonalize* instead of to personalize, choking instead of opening the channels of personal expression and development, that they are so hateful and dismal

and deforming. To enrich one's equipment and possessions beyond the power to personalize them, is to stifle and entomb the spirit in its environment. It is the common and simple things of life that are most instinct and radiant with the life of the spirit.

"Sometimes there comes a taste surpassing sweet
Of common things, — the very breath I take;
A draught of some cool spring amid the brake;
The wheaten crust that I in hunger eat.

"So I have thought that heaven, perhaps, is just
The uttermost perception of all good,
The spiritual rapture of this zest, refined;
An exquisite new taste of friendship, food,
The joys of love, the odors in the wind,
And all that now seems deadened by our dust."[1]

It is the deadening of our dust, and not the poverty of our possessions, that makes life dull and mean. The range of every life, however narrow, touches truth and beauty at a thousand points. Blessed are the apostles of true culture — Ruskin, Matthew Arnold, Emerson, Morris — who have taught us that the paths of truth and nobility, like the lines of beauty, are very simple.

IV

But the power of personality does not stop with its ability to fill the empty vessel, to

[1] James Buckham, *The Heart of Life*, p. 48.

impart meaning to the meaningless and fresh beauty to the beautiful. It can also overcome and personalize opposing forces and turn its very foes to allies. Vain are cold and barrenness and blight and all the forces that thwart and paralyze, to break the spirit of man. By wresting enlivenment and gain out of the very jaws of his ills and baffle-ments, man the person grows strong and triumphs, proving his superiority to all that is impersonal and destructive. To opposing winds and waves he shouts defiance, and all the obstacles that throng his pathway he pushes aside with a strength augmented by the contest. The challenge of many a brave heart sings in the lines of the poet:

"Bite, frost, bite!
The woods are all the searer,
The fuel is all the dearer,
The fires are all the clearer,
My spring is all the nearer,
You have bitten into the heart of the earth,
But not into mine." [1]

"But put forth thy hand now, and touch all that he hath" — not his belongings only, but his kin, his dearest, those whose life is as his own life — and will not man, the person, succumb? Will he not curse God and die? The history of religion, especially of Christianity, is the answer. Wounded, smit-

[1] Tennyson, *The Window;* or, *The Songs of the Wrens,* IV.

ten to the earth, man rises again and looks up into the stars, and with a spiritual daring that lifts him above himself asserts that there is a life beyond this, and conquering his sense of loss goes on his way victorious. The hand of misfortune — not the hand of God — is put forth and touches his bone and flesh, and still man, the person, even on the ash-heap of his hopes and comforts, maintains his integrity and holds fast his selfhood. More than that, he has not seldom forced pain to minister to personality, compelled weakness of body to yield strength of character, and out of bitter experience harvested sweet fruitage. Where were Milton's *Samson Agonistes* and *Sonnet on his Blindness*, save for sightless eyes? Robert Louis Stevenson's finely won victory over illness did as much as his genius to convey his cherished message. Nothing that President McKinley did for his country equaled the patient heroism of his death-chamber. Thus "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" fall harmless or are turned to weapons of spiritual victory.

V

When a person has reached the state in which he can compel opposing forces to serve his own ends he becomes a conqueror and more than a conqueror. He is

"weaving the sublime proportions of a true monarch's soul," as Emerson has it, and weaving them out of whatever material comes to hand. With how serene and untroubled an eye such a person looks out upon life! The long and fearful tyranny of the empirical order is broken. Fear is dead. The gathered instincts of animal terror and human dread, with their haunting horde of foreboding and superstition, made black and appalling by generations of dismay, are scattered like the clouds. His empirical self may still remain largely beyond his control. His body may tremble, but his spirit is secure. There is no more cowering before fate, no more surrender of self-respect to escape the hand of abuse. The soul has awakened to the fact that it is stronger than all its enemies and is at rest.

Perhaps no one has more confidently and convincingly expressed this truth of the victory of the soul over its foes than the superb Stoic — superb though a slave — Epictetus. Here is one of his characteristic words: "Nothing else can conquer will except the will itself. . . . Show me that he who has the inferior principles overpowers him who is superior in principles. You will never show this nor come near showing it; for this is the law of nature and of God that the superior shall always overpower the inferior. In what? In that in which it is

superior. One body is stronger than another; many are stronger than one; the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. This is the reason why I also lost my lamp, because in wakefulness the thief was superior to me. But the man bought the lamp at this price: for a lamp he became a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain. Be it so. But a man seized me by the cloak and is drawing me to the public place; then others bawl out, Philosopher, what has been the use of your opinions? See, you are dragged to prison, you are going to be beheaded. And what system of philosophy could I have made so that, if a stronger man should have laid hold of me and cast me into prison, I should not be cast in? Have I learned nothing else, then? I have learned to see that everything which happens, if it be independent of my will, is nothing to me." [1]

It would be difficult to find a greater emancipation from the tyranny of the external order than this Stoic spirit. And yet there is an even deeper note of victory heard in Christianity. Not only is that which happens "nothing" to the emancipated spirit, it is even turned to spiritual account and works for his furtherance. Thus it was with the cross of Jesus. Thus it was with the adversities of Paul, who boldly claims that

[1] *On Constancy.*

all things work together for good to them that love God.

This is the ultimate personalizing of life, when not only home and task, habit and environment, but all of experience, even the most adverse and hostile, is infused with spiritual meanings and values and becomes food for personal growth.

XIV. THE SOURCE OF PERSONALITY

I

Of all the many inhabitants of the world, man alone reflects, puzzles, wearies, and sometimes wrangles, over the problem of whence and why he came to be, unable to content himself with the fact that he is here. It is somewhat strange and certainly significant that he should so persistently ask this question concerning his origin. Seeing himself as a physical creature, the offshoot of a line of animals whose kin he is, why is man not satisfied with this? If, on the other hand, conscious as he is of freedom and autonomy, he regards himself as a member of a free spiritual order, why does he feel impelled to go further than his own selfhood for an explanation of himself? Why should not each human person regard himself as a *causa sui*, and let that suffice? Such is, in fact, the theory of many idealists, as stated, *e. g.*, by Professor Howison: "The members of this Eternal Republic . . . have no origin but their purely logical one of reference to each other, including thus their

primary reference to God. That is, in the literal sense of the word, they have no origin at all — no source in time whatever. There is nothing at all prior to them, out of which their being arises; they are not 'things' in the chain of efficient causation. They simply *are*, and together constitute the eternal order." [1]

If there were not also another element in consciousness, quite as real as that of selfhood, we might well rest content with this solution of the problem and seek no origin beyond ourselves. But while as persons we are conscious of freedom, we are equally conscious of *dependence*, as Schleiermacher pointed out. Paradox this may be; personality delights in paradox. This consciousness of dependence will not consent to any theory of original and underived human selfhood, but wistfully and insistently asserts its receptive relation to a Higher Self. Nor is this sense of dependence a mere *feeling*, — at whose promptings the mind postulates a Divine Being adequate to account for and satisfy it, — rather is it a *rational* consciousness of dependence which arises in connection with the recognition of a Supreme Person able to arouse as well as satisfy it.

But is this consciousness of dependence anything more than the need, not of an Originating Cause, but only of a Final

[1] *The Limits of Evolution*, Preface, second ed., p. xiv.

Cause, an Ideal, an End? Such a Final Cause, the very constitution of moral self-hood calls for. I cannot understand myself or attain my highest possibility without such a Living Ideal. Yet, unless this Final Cause is my Originating Cause as well, I am left without any adequate understanding of that inherent superiority to myself of the Supreme Self which makes Him my Final Cause. Is He such simply because, with the very same moral constitution and potency as myself, only perhaps under more favorable conditions, He has attained to a perfection which neither I nor any other person has yet reached? Then why, in the process of moral development, may not I, or some other person, overtake, or even surpass Him, and thus another, and not He, become the Final Cause? If it be answered, "This cannot be, because He is already and has ever been perfect," then again I am forced to assume some relation, of a causative sort, between his perfection and my desire for perfection. Given a Perfect Moral Person and imperfect moral persons striving toward perfection, nothing short of derivation of the imperfect from the Perfect is sufficient to account for the relation between them.[1] Augustine voiced an overwhelming human

[1] When asked how morality had come into the world Goethe answered: "Through God Himself, like everything good. It is not a product of human reflection, but a beautiful native gift." Professor Frank Thilly, *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1908, p. 547.

conviction when he wrote, "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and we are not at rest until we rest in Thee." The consciousness of dependence, which roots so deep in the core of our being, is a consciousness of finitude binding us so intimately to God that nothing less than the symbol of Father and child given in the New Testament serves to interpret it. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." A dependence that involves derivation alone explains the full significance and strength of this bond. "We cannot terminate ourselves in ourselves but we lose ourselves," as Benjamin Whichcote had it; "we cannot be ultimate and final to ourselves, who are not Original to ourselves."

II

If we thus give its due interpretation and meaning to the consciousness of *dependence*, must we, then, be left with a hopeless contradiction between dependence and *freedom?* Not if the two are seen in their true meaning and relation. If by freedom is meant, not self-sufficiency — for that we have not — nor stark independence of rational personal influence — for that would leave us dehumanized and destitute — but power of choice, of purpose, of self-determination; and if by dependence is meant, not slavish

servility, but glad receptivity, willing resort to a Fountain whose waters flow for all, then the two are but the complementary and fulfilling consciousnesses of one undivided self. Dependence rightly conceived is the condition of the highest finite freedom.

"Our wills are ours to make them thine."

And until we make them His they do not become free in the fullest measure. This is the kind of dependence, to illustrate, that the acorn has upon the oak, or the fledgling upon the mother bird. The acorn develops freely, but its life is not from itself. The young bird has his own wings and flies whither he will, but he did not fashion his own wings, and he flies as the mother bird flies. Our deeper selfhood is ours, but not by virtue of self-origination. As the bird is free to fly only in the supporting medium of the enfolding atmosphere, so are we free to realize ourselves only in dependence on the All-sustaining Self. "The oneness of supremest freedom and profoundest dependence," as Eucken has said, "is the great mystery and yet sun-clear truth of all fruitful spiritual life." [1]

[1] Boyce Gibson, *Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life*, p. 105.

III

The fact that in religious experience *the more intense the consciousness of God the more intense the consciousness of self* helps to corroborate this harmony between freedom and finitude. This is the universal testimony of Mysticism, at least in its saner forms. Just as in human love and friendship there can be no intimate communion except as the selfhood of each is quickened to its highest, most intense self-consciousness — one is never so conscious of himself in the noblest sense, as when he is most conscious of another — so in the practise of the presence of God. When, "with that obeisance of soul, that in bending upraises it too," one truly worships, it is with a deepened and intensified sense of selfhood.[1] Now, at last, in the presence of the Great Companion, one feels that he has found himself. His insight is quickened, his affections exhale their finest fragrance, his selfhood expands to its utmost capacity.

It is at the very height of this apotheosis of human selfhood in the presence of the Divine Self that the experience of absorption in God occurs which is too often assumed to mean the extinction of the human

[1] "Inner knowledge is the center of Mysticism; through this knowledge man achieves self-mastery, and self-mastery is world-mastery; for the true self, illusions thrown off, is the reality of all that is." Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. II, p. 99.

self in the Divine. There has been a persistent misunderstanding of Mysticism at this point. "Absorption in the Infinite," frequently stands for the perfection of communion. In that experience individuality ceases, all the accidental, extrinsic, separating, self-seeking factors sink into temporary oblivion; but personality survives and expands. Freed from the fetters of the physical, the temporal, the individual, the spiritual self asserts its rightful dominion.

It is true that in Oriental Mysticism, and sometimes in Christian Mysticism, the Supreme Self is conceived, not as a true Person, but pantheistically. Yet in its finer, saner form, as we find it in John, Paul, St. Francis, Luther, Eckhart, Tauler, Mysticism reveals itself as the fountain of service, the highest school of true personality.[1] In Jesus, with his rich, intimate communion with God, we have the norm of true Mysticism, sane, vitalizing, productive.

IV

If it be granted, then, that the consciousness of dependence (which proves upon examination to be neither out of keeping with

[1] "The energies characteristic of a distinctive personality are multiplied and not diminished by that healthy mysticism which belongs to the Evangelical faith and separates it from the blind mysticism of the Orient." Wm. D. Mackenzie, *The New Theology*, in Hartford Seminary Record, July, 1907.

true personality, nor inconsistent with true freedom) bears witness to the Divine origin of human personality, in what manner may we conceive the act of origination as occurring? Manifestly, the old theory of the creation of the soul in time cannot, in the literal form at least, longer maintain itself. The origin of a personality cannot, as Professor Howison says, be purely temporal.[1] Personality is in its very nature *supertemporal*. And that which is above time, though it may be intimately related to the time order, cannot be simply a time product. Ask when a person begins to be, in time, and you at once see the inconsistency of fixing upon any one moment as his beginning. Is it at conception? at birth? at the dawn of consciousness? No; there is no instant of time at which *as a person* one begins to be.

Each of us belongs to two orders of existence, — the eternal order and the time order. Or, rather, he belongs to the first and inhabits the second; somewhat as a man lives in a house, under a roof, yet his mind is not there, but is all abroad, conversing with past ages and with distant persons, and with ideas and ideals which can be domiciled under no roof.

If finite personality be a creation at all,

[1] "There is surely a piece of divinity in us; something that was before the elements, and pays no homage to the sun." Sir Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici*, quoted by Illingworth, *Personality: Human and Divine*, p. 270.

then, it must be an *eternal* creation. By this is not meant merely a *pre-temporal* creation. Nothing is gained by simply pushing the creation of the soul backward to a time before it enters this life. Not such is the meaning of eternal. Eternal means the transcendence of time; not the unlimited extension of time. *Eternal creation means, a Perfect Self so timelessly imparting itself to an imperfect self, and thus so constituting it, that the relation is at least not less than that of Creator and created.* It would be truer and better, perhaps, to call this *Divine impartation* rather than creation. But both terms are, at best, metaphorical. The kernel of meaning which the term creation holds, when rightly understood, is all that is of value, — namely a relation of dependence that involves origin as well as end. Plato, at the very fountainhead of Philosophy, outlined the true relation of the Divine to the human with an insight and conviction which there is no reason to set aside. Edward Caird, in his lectures on *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, thus interprets the Platonic teaching: "Thus in place of a number of independent spiritual beings, each immortal in his own right, we have the idea of a Kingdom of Spirits who all indeed partake of the Divine Nature . . . but who nevertheless have a dependent and derived existence, and are immortal only through

their relation to God." [1] Kantianism follows Platonism in thus ascribing the existence of persons to God.[2]

V

Throughout the cosmos we find the law of development by a twofold process, — receptivity and activity. Purely passive products of external creatorship the universe does not contain. Always there is reciprocity. Creation is cooperative. Creator and creature unite to produce an ever-evolving order. This, we may reasonably assume, is but the counterpart and reflection of a law that obtains in the eternal realm of personality. Personality is a Becoming. Initial forthputtings of the Divine Personality become themselves personalities by a receptive-active process. Each becomes more and more a self as he transmutes the Divine life into a free center of personal activity. If one must attempt the impossible, let this be our interpretation of the origin of human personality. Ever we receive, and in receiving appropriate, energize, institute, an ever-developing personality. Ever, as persons, we are being created, constituted, empowered; yet ever are we creating, organizing, developing ourselves. Systole and diastole, accumulation

[1] Vol. I, p. 218.

[2] "He is the Cause of the existence of acting beings in their character as noumena." *Critique of Practical Reason*, Book I. Watson, *Selections from Kant*, p. 288.

and expenditure, receiving and acting, divine and human, — never can these be disunited. We deceive ourselves if we think that we were made, or could be made *persons*, without our own cooperation. "No moral and spiritual good can ever be conveyed to us passively. In the very passivity of the receiver, so to speak, the element of activity must be present." [1]

Very far does this interpretation of the origin of personality lie from the naturalism of evolution. And yet it is by no means a denial of evolution, but rather transcends it. It accepts evolution as valid in its own realm, recognizing man in his physical nature as the product of an evolutionary series that goes back to the primordial germ. But it is very certain that this process does not by any means fully account for man as he is in his higher selfhood.[2] That higher selfhood is not an evolution from below; it is an impartation from above.

[1] John Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. II, p. 229.

[2] "Unless there is a real man underived from Nature, unless there is a spiritual or rational man independent of the natural man and legislatively sovereign over entire Nature, then the Eternal is not a person, there is no God, and our faith is vain." Howison, *The Limits of Evolution*, p. 53.

XV. THE GOAL OF PERSONALITY

I

PERSONALITY, both as an ethical and spiritual ideal and as a principle of interpretation, has come to its own through Jesus Christ more than through any other. He was, in a sense, its discoverer. Not that he gave it didactic presentation. He advanced no theory of personality. But by a certain illumination of attitude, a certain direction and emphasis of attention, Jesus set in motion a train of thought and motive which, reenforced by other movements, has issued in our modern interest in personality. His own vital personality and his unexampled recognition of other persons, shattering all the standards of his age, left an impression upon men which, gradually deepening and extending, is coming to be the controlling principle of human life and thought.[1]

It is most interesting and suggestive to note how of late this category of personality,

[1] "The one thing in which Jesus absolutely believed with unwavering faith was the value of a person to himself, the worth of this mysterious and elusive something which is myself, its worth to me and its worth to God." Frederick E. Dewhurst, *The Investment of Truth*, p. 198.

which Jesus did so much to illuminate and intensify, has become the chief category in interpreting *himself*. Within the last quarter century it has been adopted, on all sides, as the key to the understanding of Christ and thus of Christianity. It has unlocked new chambers, offered fresh view-points, opened larger insights of his character and mission. The old deadlock of the two natures has disappeared before the emancipating principle of personality. We no longer regard Christ as a bipartite being, in whom two alien natures are miraculously brought together; but as a single divine-human person, in whom the human is so complete as to be no less than divine. At last we have a unified, comprehensible, inspiring Christology. Nor are the disclosures of the wealth of Christ's personality exhausted. It is only as we develop as persons that we can understand progressively his inexhaustible personality.

At the close of this first decade of the twentieth century the most striking and outstanding fact in the religious world is the persistence with which Jesus Christ keeps his peerless place in human interest, the firmness and strength of his hold upon humanity. Neither the fierce heats of historical criticism, nor the more sympathetic study of other religious faiths, nor the increasing multiplicity and complexity of interests other than religious, suffice to weaken his grasp upon the

world's attention and devotion. Like an ancient masterpiece, the colors of his portraiture do not fade. Nay, he is no picture, but continues to influence men as a vitalizing, present person. More and more clearly he stands forth as the *perfect human person*.

In ascribing perfection to Jesus we do not mean *absolute* perfection. Such perfection can belong only to God. "None is good, save One." To the Eternal Word we may ascribe such absolute perfection, but not to the historical Jesus. That would only serve to make him unreal and unhuman. The perfection which characterized and exalted Jesus was that incomparable purity of moral insight and motive, that integrity of moral fiber, that wholeness and harmony of moral quality, that greatness and splendor of moral achievement, that make him transcendent, archetypal, ideal.

II

It is not easy to define the qualities which give Jesus his peculiar place among men, — his unique, pervasive, persistent power. Those who attempt to account for it offer varying explanations. Whatever it be, it is very clear that it does not lie in any claims which he himself made. Long ago, if those were all, he would have moldered in the dust of the forgetting centuries. More than

claims, even of the largest, more than exceptional virtues or unusual gifts, are needed to keep before the ages, in puissance and vitality, one who holds no place in war, statesmanship, literature, science or art. What are the sources of this perduring power, this unrelaxing hold upon humanity? The answer cannot go much farther, perhaps, than the implications of the question. He was such that men cannot but be drawn to him — that is all — human, winsome, compassionate, strong, tender, true, perfect, "whole in himself, a common good." Why does the magnet draw the steel?

Nothing, perhaps, in the personality of Jesus — if one may attempt to paint the rose — is more exceptional than the remarkable union in him of vitality and harmony, of enthusiasm and serenity. Jesus was aflame with zeal, and yet, like the burning bush, he was not consumed; and men have turned aside, will always turn aside, to see such a true miracle. He was the radium of the moral world, constantly irradiating moral and spiritual force, yet with undiminished supply. Virtue went from him in every contact of life, with a healing might that never failed. The effect was primarily spiritual, secondarily physical, — the two cannot be wholly disjoined. That vitalizing of others which Christ effected in the flesh he effects now in the spirit. Results which occurred

in Galilee and Judea two thousand years ago occur to-day in America and Africa and around the world. Among all the vital forces operative in raising men to their true self-hood there is none so great as the dynamic personality of Jesus Christ. Explain it as we may, the fact stands.

And yet with all this dynamic vitality of Jesus' character there was also perfect sanity and equilibrium. In the intense man we expect one-sidedness, ill-balance, narrowness, if not fanaticism. But this is not the case with Jesus. He is catholic as well as earnest, gracious as well as strong, charitable and comprehensive as well as impelling and vitalizing. He can soothe as well as summon, calm as well as command. He has a great mission and men refuse it; a great boon and men decline it. And yet, he neither rages nor falls a-weeping. He does not fume nor denounce; he does not strive nor cry. He is neither revolutionist nor reformer. If he scathes the wicked and proud, he also wins the weak and wayward. The domineering spirit he does not spare, but the smoking flax he does not quench. He is both Puritan and Quaker, aggressive and non-resistant, rebuker of self-righteousness and friend of publicans and sinners.

There is nothing superhuman or separating about these and other incomparable traits and qualities of Jesus. They are

simply, richly, highly human. They make him more human than any other; and that is just the secret of his saviourhood, yes, and of his divinity, too. *We* are but poorly, scantily human; *He* is wholly human. Other men have been noble, good, and wise — Paul, John, St. Francis, Luther, Lincoln, Moody — why is it that we cannot say of any one of them, "Believe in Paul or Luther or Lincoln and thou shalt be saved"? It is because not one of them has enough *humanity*, enough personality, not one is universal enough, simple enough, strong enough in love, deep enough in sympathy, pure enough in heart, great enough in consecration. It is this that brings Jesus close to us. He is the supreme human person, "in his simplicity sublime," and by that token divine.

There is something as magnificent as it is meek in Jesus' use of his personality. No other ever used the pronoun *I* as Jesus used it. There is in his use of it a clear, commanding assertion of the True Self and an absence of all selfish and hindering self-consciousness that has impelled the world to listen to him, for he "speaks with authority" — an authority that derives neither from office nor officialism, but only from pure, true, perfect personality.

III

How may we account to ourselves for this unique moral integrity, this spiritual wholeness of Jesus? If it were only a matter of comparative superiority it would be sufficient to say, "Here is the paragon of the race, the finest flower upon the stem of our humanity, *this is our beloved son, in whom we are well pleased.*" In a sense this is true, but it is not the whole truth, nor is it the deepest truth. Again and again, from Ebionism to Unitarianism, men have tried this explanation and found it inadequate. It is too scrimping. Something ampler, more expansive, less easy and ready-to-hand, is needed to account for so surpassing a personality as Jesus Christ.

We have found reason to regard human personality as a commingled growth and impartation, a simultaneous receptivity and activity. But in ourselves and the men about us, both are hindered and imperfect. The receptivity is extremely limited. The Divine Inflowing into our lives meets with many barriers and obstacles. It flows through a choked and impure channel. This is due partly to our own crooked ways and partly to human nature itself, as we share it in its racial and hereditary defectiveness.

In Jesus this common perversity, this moral and spiritual inaptitude, seems to have been

singularly absent. The openness of his soul to the Divine was strangely, beautifully free. All the channels of his spirit were constantly suffused with the life from Above. This perfect receptivity was matched by a corresponding *activity*. "Our feet how heavily they go," — not only "to reach eternal joys," but to fulfil earthly service. The indolence, the inertia, the spiritual sloth that drags back the ordinary man apparently did not fetter Jesus. His life was replete with the eloquence of perfect action, "noble, sublime, godlike action."

This supremacy of both the active and passive elements of personality in Jesus differentiates him from all other men, not, as has been said, in the way of separation — except separation from that in us which is alien and unworthy — but in the way of fulfilling that which in us is partial and imperfect. "Jesus, in becoming more and more the Son of God, became not less but more perfectly man. As his receptivity for the divine communication was truly human, it was a developing one. The incarnation was, as Dorner has insisted, a progressive one." [1] And yet, though a developing incarnation, it was, at each stage of the process, substantially perfect for that stage. The bud was a perfect bud, the flower a perfect flower, the fruit a perfect fruit.

[1] Prof. A. E. Garvie, *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1907, p. 571.

The absolute *sinlessness* of Jesus, no more than his absolute perfection, can be erected, as some have insisted upon doing, into a criterion of his claim upon human reverence and devotion. If by sinlessness is meant entire freedom from temptation, — that certainly he did not have, as the narratives themselves plainly declare. His temptations were on a very high level — so high a level as to witness conclusively to his moral majesty — but they do not point to pure impeccability. Sinlessness is in fact but a negative and colorless characteristic, when used in the academic and absolute sense. At best, it must be ascribed dogmatically, for in the nature of the case it cannot be proven.

That which is essential to the evangelical evaluation of Jesus is such a unique moral purity, strength, and holiness as put him, definitely and finally, so far in advance of all other men, as to make him the Goal, the Lodestar, of human aspiration and achievement. Such uniqueness even criticism allows to Christ. In view of this moral supremacy it is as legitimate as it is natural and grateful to attach to him — when it is done without dogmatic rigidity — the epithets *sinless* and *perfect*. "Worthy is the Lamb that hath been slain to receive the power, and riches, and wisdom, and might, and honor, and glory, and blessing."

IV

Conceived in terms of the Logos doctrine,[1] this means that the Logos, which in us is so hindered and thwarted by our incapacity and unwillingness, in him was operative, controlling, regnant. The Light that lighteth every man, in us shines dimly and brokenly; in him it shone full and clear. In us the "Divine Seed" grows but slowly and crabbedly; in him it developed in all strength and beauty and fruitfulness. Strictly speaking, the difference may be only one of degree, in effect it is a difference of kind, — a difference so great that the author of the Fourth Gospel but gave it its just and final interpretation when he wrote that in Christ the Logos "became flesh," permeated, transfused, transfigured the human, "and dwelt among us."

The Logos doctrine has come to be very commonly represented, especially by philosophical writers, as an attempt to find a middle term between God and the world. This is a hasty and questionable assumption. Early Christian theology was actuated by a deeper search than this. Gnosticism, with its remote, incomprehensible, superrelational Deity, required a mediating principle; Christianity did not. Its God was too near, too fatherly, too human, to need a

[1] For a fuller treatment of this subject see my *Christ and the Eternal Order*.

demiurge of any sort. The endeavor of Christianity was to construct a doctrine of God that would admit Christ within it, — in other words, that would make room in the Godhead for human qualities and affections without robbing God of his superhuman, transcendent attributes. In effect this was an endeavor to *understand the personality of God as related to the universe.* How can God be infinite, eternal, transcendent, and yet human, loving, communicable? That was the problem.

Half-consciously, perhaps, but none the less soundly, the early Christian theologians solved this problem by interpreting the Divine Personality in the light of human personality. There is in personality, as we know it in ourselves, an abiding, referential *center*, without which one could not be a self at all. There is also an outgoing, immanent, expressive, social principle or *self*, just as essential to personality as the first. By virtue of its *transcendence* the self has aseity, uniqueness, identity, self-existence; by virtue of its *immanence* the self has relationships, recognitions, sociality. Drawing thus upon their own human personality — though without being wholly aware of it — for their interpretation of God, the Alexandrian and Nicene theologians, following the lead of Paul and John, distinguished between God as supreme, transcendent, absolute, and God

as revealing, communicative, human. The former they characterized as the Father, the latter the Son. And since the outgoing, revealing principle in the Godhead, in order to be communicative, must be rational, emphasis was placed upon rationality, and the "Second Person" was identified with the term *Logos*, communicative Reason. Thus the Logos doctrine comes down to us fraught with the values of personality, and so filled with permanent significance and meaning.

V

In a world where sin and sorrow are so overwhelming the Perfect Human Person could not be such without suffering. His very humanity required it. The fountains of an inexhaustible joy were in Him, but the tides of an immeasurable sorrow were in his human environment. It is pitiful that for so long a mechanical, substitutionary theory of Atonement has kept us from seeing its great, warm, human meaning. How true is the suffering of Jesus to the noblest human experience! The old myths of Theseus, Hercules, the Knights of King Arthur, and the rest — a hero who always conquers, with but a scratch at worst — grow fictitious and childish beside the tale of one who is not only sore wounded but slain in the contest, and yet is victorious. How much truer

is this real tale to the actual, brutal strength of evil, crushing its adversary and yet unable to overcome him! Death the pathway to true victory, — to this truth the pagan mind did not rise.

It requires no dogmatic devices to make such suffering as that of Jesus universal in its significance. Give us but a man who suffers purely and deeply and widely enough for others' sin and his suffering cannot but affect humanity as a whole. "Surely *he* hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows; . . . the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed."

VI

This uniqueness of character and uniqueness of mission, this symmetry and fulness of humanity, this vitalizing intensity of personality, this greatness of sympathetic suffering, assure the uncompanioned supremacy of Jesus Christ. If Jesus is "*He that should come,*" then, in the nature of the case, we may not look for Another. A succession of race benefactors there has been and will be, but only one *Christ*. More than one were out of keeping with the solidarity of the race. As an organism, humanity has but one spiritual Head. The longing for the perfect man which burns at the heart of humanity finds its complete fulfilment in him. The search

for perfection so persistently, though often blindly, pursued by many men in many ways, ends in him satisfied. Those who find him never outgrow him. No vagrant, unfed aspiration for the highest and holiest ever turned from him unsatisfied. Altogether noble as well as lovely, altogether strong as well as sympathetic, altogether commanding as well as winsome, Jesus leaves no ideal unfulfilled.

The moral and spiritual progress of humanity lies, not in producing a higher and more ideal character than Jesus — that were an impossible task — but in realizing more completely his perfection, in attaining his likeness, in pursuing this perfect Goal, in freely reproducing in all the varied forms of personal excellence the goodness and glory of the Supreme Man.

XVI. PERSONALITY AND THEISM

I

Among the richest fruits of personalism is the new and firmer basis for theism which it furnishes. For a long time there has been a growing restlessness and dissatisfaction with the older theism, a search for something ampler and more secure. At first monism seemed to offer access to a larger and surer knowledge of God, but upon closer inspection it appears only as a new pathway back to pantheism. Meanwhile emphasis has gradually and surely shifted from nature as the revelation of God to humanity. In human personality, especially as manifested in Christ, is our key to the knowledge of God. Not from the surging of a universal energy, not from the painting of a bird's wing, not from the onward movement of a developing natural order, comes the deepest assurance of the reality and character of God. From persons to a Person, from incomplete personality to Perfect Personality, — this is the path to an incontrovertible theism. "All attempts to find God apart from

and dissevered from personal life have failed, and of course always will fail. . . . The true path is through personality. The search must begin in our own bosom: Who am I? What do I live by? What does personality involve?" [1]

This approach to the Divine Person through the human person is the Newer Theism. Not that it is wholly new. It has been implicit and dumbly potent in human consciousness ever since men began to think of God at all, — and doubtless earlier still. But being deeper, less obvious, and less readily formulated than the arguments for the existence of God drawn from the external world, it has been the last to emerge in the history of theism. So long as the outer world absorbed attention men sought God there, but when the eye of the mind was turned inward, a more intimate knowledge of God was discovered to lie at the base of all those evidences of Him which were found in nature. At first this more direct knowledge of God was termed a *God-consciousness*, and in many respects this comes the nearest to a true account of the nature of our knowledge of God that can be reached. The existence of God has been, not inaptly, described, as a "First Truth," [2] and yet we

[1] Professor R. M. Jones, *Social Law in the Spiritual World*, p. 44.

[2] "A first truth is a knowledge which, though developed upon occasion of observation and reflection, is not derived from observa-

need to know *why* it is a first truth. It is such because it is essential to our personal life. Our knowledge of Him is essentially the same as our knowledge of others, namely, *recognition*. We know God much as we know other persons.

How, then, do we know the existence of other persons, — human persons? Surely not by the mere sight of their bodies, or the sound of their voices. These are simply outward signs of the presence of persons. The person is not the body, nor the voice, nor both. In some subtle manner the body and voice are part of him and become *media* of his self-expression. We "recognize," as we say, a person by his face or his voice, but it is the person whom we recognize, not the face or the voice. Our knowledge of others, that is, is not inferential, but an immediate and direct knowledge. It is not essential to my knowledge of another person that I have seen him or heard his voice. Communication alone is necessary, — a letter, a message, any thread, however slight, along which his personality may run forth to mine. To know another human person I am indeed dependent upon *some sort of a physical medium*, however tenuous. And yet my knowledge is of *him*

tion and reflection, — a knowledge on the contrary which has such logical priority that it must be assumed, or supposed, in order to make any observation or reflection possible." A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, revised ed., Vol. I, p. 54.

rather than of the physical sensation; for that very sensation is not something real in itself, but real only as a message between persons. The characters and words of the written message are not real as characters and words except as he and I, with the aid of our common educational heritage, make them such, in order to come into mutual understanding with one another. There is no real knowledge of things apart from persons, and as conveying personal meanings. The apparent necessity of some sort of empirical concomitant, however slight, in the process of personal recognition is, to be sure, inexplicable. That we should be able, not only to acquaint one another indubitably of our personal existence but to stir one another to the depths by means of a mere scrap of paper with a few marks upon it, and yet be utterly unable to bridge the void without *some* thread of material mediation, is a baffling (and yet perhaps a beneficent) limitation. Nevertheless, the central fact is the communication itself and not the accessories.

II

If human persons are known to us in personal recognition with an immediate and convincing certainty, much more so God. Much more so, that is, if one will exercise his power of spiritual recognition. For just

as it is possible for one to go through life, as so many do, seeing others, hearing them, working with them, living with them, and yet never recognizing them at all as *persons*, so it is possible to go through life in the personal presence of God and yet never recognize him, at least with any degree of assurance. The sudden cry of many a man who had never consciously acknowledged God, in the presence of some swift and terrible crisis, "My God!" is evidence of a conviction of God far deeper and more wide-spread than is commonly conceded. And yet it is quite possible for one, if he chooses to live a merely sensuous life, or if he deliberately distrusts his spiritual intuition, to make God practically non-existent to himself. "God exists for us," wrote Joseph Henry Green, "inasmuch and in as far as we are consciously impressed with his living presence and willingly submit ourselves to his gracious aid and operance."[1] It has been the conviction of devout and discerning souls in all ages that God does not force himself upon men, but that the seekers find him, the pure in heart see him, the men of faith are very sure of him. However limited the number of those who in each generation have felt that they knew God in personal communion, to such as have, no experience has equaled this in intensity and

[1] *The Spiritual Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 171.

in influence. One could easily bring testimonies from all lands and centuries to demonstrate this. None are more impressive and conclusive than those of our own day and race. Professor James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, relates typical instances of persons who have had this immediate recognition of the presence of God in an intense degree. Here is one, in which nature mysticism is prominent:

"I remember the night, and almost the very spot on the hill-top, where my soul opened out, as it were, into the Infinite, and there was a rushing together of the two worlds, the inner and the outer. . . . The perfect stillness of the night was thrilled by a more solemn silence. The darkness held a presence that was all the more felt because it was not seen. I could not any more have doubted that He was there than that I was. Indeed I felt myself to be, if possible, the less real of the two."[1]

Another, a man of forty-nine, writes thus ("Probably thousands of unpretending Christians," adds Professor James, "would write an almost identical account"):

"God is more real to me than any thought or thing or person. I feel his presence positively, and the more as I live in closer harmony with his laws as written in my body and mind. . . . I talk to him as to a companion in prayer and praise,

[1] *The Spiritual Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 66.

and our communion is delightful. . . . That he is mine and I am his never leaves me; it is an abiding joy. Without it life would be a blank, a desert, a shoreless, trackless waste." [1]

A boy of seventeen writes:

"Sometimes as I go to church, I sit down, join in the service, and before I go out I feel as if God was with me, right side of me, singing and reading the Psalms with me." [2]

These instances are typical, not merely of thousands, but one may venture to say of millions, of others. So common are these experiences that Professor James is led to say: "It is as if there were in the human consciousness a *sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception* of what we may call '*something there*,' more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed." [3] And yet Professor James is disposed to regard this sense of the reality of God as temperamental and emotional rather than human and rational. It must be admitted, of course, that the recognition of the Supreme Person by humanity at large is but partial, both in distinctness and in extent. But the question is not

[1] *The Spiritual Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 70.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

whether all have it as a distinct experience, but whether all have it *in possibility and might have it in actuality.*

"Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with
Spirit can meet —
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than
hands and feet."

It is at least an open question whether every man, if he truly desired it, might not come to realize the existence of God as an immediate consciousness, provided he used his rational and spiritual nature to the full to that end.

In one of the ablest contributions to the literature of the religious psychology school, Professor Henry Bissett Pratt presents an interesting study of religion, in which he endeavors to show — and with a considerable degree of success — that current religious faith is based, not on authority, nor on definite rational grounds, but rather on a private experience of a mystical or semi-mystical character. Out of fifty-five respondents to his questionnaire, all of them church people, thirty-two were of the mystic type, "while all but eight of the fifty-five were persuaded that they had experienced God's presence." [1] Upon this rather slight but pertinent basis of generalization, Professor Pratt concludes that "belief in God to-day with a large pro-

[1] *Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 261.

portion of the religious community is based, not on argument nor on authority, but on a private experience springing from that great background region of our consciousness which I have called the feeling mass, and which is so intimately bound up with life and all that life means."[1] Professor Pratt is probably right in finding in the direct consciousness of God the fundamental basis of religious faith, but to explain that experience simply as springing from the racial *feeling mass* in the background of consciousness is like explaining a flower by the riverside by the bank on which it happens to be growing. *This purely empirical study of religious experience is wholly inadequate unless supplemented by a recognition of those transcendent personal relations without which religion can never be explained.*

III

It would be a somewhat singular and gratuitous proceeding if children in the very presence of their father were to set about proving his existence. Doubtless a number of fairly good arguments could be presented. One of them might say: "We must have a father, for how else would we have these clothes we wear and the food we have to eat, and the house we live in?" An-

[1] *Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 261.

other might say: "We must have a father, or how could we come to be at all? There can be no children without a father." Another might say: "The very idea that we have of a father shows that such a father exists, otherwise how could we have the idea?" Still another might say: "We feel that we ought not to do certain things, and that we ought to do others, such as a father would require of us, therefore we must have a father." And then one of them — the youngest, perhaps — might suddenly exclaim: "What is the use of your trying to prove that we have a father when he is right here with us in the room?" And the rest, having formed the habit of arguing and rather priding themselves upon it, might reply: "Yes, to be sure that looks like the man whom we have come to call our father, but let us be sure that we understand precisely what we mean by fatherhood and then inquire whether this person corresponds to that idea, and whether he may not be, after all, simply a guardian, or even no more than a creation of our sense perceptions or our imaginations."

That is not quite a fair characterization of the arguments for the existence of God, and yet it is not entirely a caricature. The world is ringing with the witness of men who have said: "We need no arguments for the existence of God; we are just as sure of Him as

we are of ourselves; we do not have to feel after Him and find Him; He is with us." And if the rest — and they are many — say, "*We* do not see Him, we do not find Him, He is not near us," then there is a deadlock indeed. One of the two parties is deceived. Which is it? There may be a deception on the part of those who are very sure of God as a Personal Presence in that they have taken a creation of their own minds for a real Existence. Or there may be a self-deception on the part of those who do not recognize God because they have "reasoned" themselves out of a fundamental conviction, or have failed to open their eyes to a genuine verity.

If God is a Person the presumption is certainly against reaching the fact of his existence by means of argumentation.[1] It is not thus that we discover persons. They *are*, that is all, and we recognize them as realities.

IV

It is untrue, let us repeat, to say that we know persons simply by seeing or hearing them. We know St. Paul and Martin Luther and Abraham Lincoln and John G. Whittier,

[1] "The existence of a God of reason and love is so certain and fundamental a fact, that it really has to be assumed in all thinking and living — a fact that cannot be proved just because it is the basis of all proof." Henry Churchill King, *The Seeming Unreality of the Spiritual Life*, p. 209.

and a hundred other persons whom we never saw, a thousand times better than we know many a man whom we have passed on the street every day for years. And yet we call them dead, these vital personalities, and the man who creeps about the streets with just enough animal vitality in him to keep his physical functions going, and little more than the shrunken possibility of a personality, we call alive! No one is dead who vitally influences us.

The Supreme Person has no body by which we may recognize Him — unless universal Nature be such, nor any voice, unless all voices be his — and yet we can hardly live a day without being, dimly or distinctly, conscious that He is. We are aware of Him in every deeper inspiration that breathes upon us, we meet Him at every cross-road of our moral progress, we wrestle with his spirit in every great spiritual conflict. He presses in upon us in every great grief and comes to sup with us in every great joy. And yet we treat Him as an abstract question and argue Him into, or out of, existence with our petty proofs and disproofs, as if his very being depended upon our consent.

"But," some one says, "God may be, or seem, very real to you; He does not to me. I have no such conscious recognition of a Supreme Person; to me He is less than the least of all realities and a mere figment

created by that within us which fashions might-be's." If that be the case with any one, it is very doubtful if any argument or proof would be convincing. Not that intuitive knowledge of God is not rational. Personal recognition is the most rational of acts. Yet it is of that immediate and direct sort of rationality that we call insight or *faith*. Faith is not the action of a separate and distinct faculty. It is the fusion of the whole mind in one supreme seizure of truth. This act is not analyzable, because it is not made up of decipherable mental processes. Faith finds truth by spiritual affinity. Who has ever been able to tell just why right is right? The mind simply sees that it is so, — an ultimate verity. So with the existence of God. It is not an inference from something else, even from the moral law, as Kant would have us suppose. It is an immediate, direct recognition, very dim and faint in some minds, but ineradicably there, clearer in others, in some as clear as noonday, — "the pure in heart shall see God," — but in *all* a personal recognition, capable, as all personal conviction is, of ever deeper and fuller realization.

XVII. PERSONALITY AND PROVIDENCE

I

From the view-point of personal theism is any light thrown upon the old, but to many minds tottering, belief in a providential order and guidance of men?

In attempting to meet this problem the first thing to be noted is that the order in which we find ourselves is undeniably adapted to promote and further personality. Wearisome and endless complaint is made that this world does not foster *happiness* as it should. It appears to be made for that purpose and then cheats and disappoints the seeker. It creates a thirst for happiness and then dashes the cup from the lips. Viewed as a pleasure-ground, life, in spite of its ample resources, is a failure. It refuses to be moulded to that end. But as a training-school for personality — in which happiness has a large rôle to play — life on the whole makes good. As Dr. McClure said to Drumsheugh in that interesting conversation before the open fire: "A've watched the Glen for mony a year, an' the maist hertsome sicht a' hae seen is the makin' o' men an' weemen. They 're

juist thochtless bairns tae begin wi', as we were oorsels, but they 're no dune wi' schule aifter they leave Domsie. Wark comes first, and fechtin' awa wi' oor cauld land and wringin' eneuch oot o't tae pay for rent and livin' pits smeddum (spirit) into a man. Syne comes luve tae maist o's, an' teaches some selfish, shallow cratur tae play the man for wumman's sake; an' laist comes sorrow, that gars the loudest o's tae haud his peace. It 's a lang schulin', but it hes dune its wark weel in Drumtochty." [1]

Not everywhere has life done its work so well as in Drumtochty, but everywhere it has moved with more or less result toward these ends, and the fruit of this tutelage is the glory and crown of existence. Whether the sum of human happiness exceeds the sum of human woe or not, whether the tide of human virtue is ever to rise higher than the tide of human iniquity, one thing is sure, namely, that out of the confusions and contentions of this perplexing world there have come tens of thousands of men and women of such intrinsic worth and nobility as to justify, if not to glorify, the whole inscrutable process. Not that these persons are simply the products of the natural and social order, but that in it they have found, not only material and tools, but impetus toward self-development.

[1] Ian Maclaren, *The Days of Auld Lang Syne*, p. 154.

While it is easy to find flaws in this old world of ours and to venture improvements whereby it would better accomplish its purpose, it may well be that just this strange life of contrasts and possibilities, just this barren-fruitful, defective-beautiful, painful-pleasurable, uncertain-reliable, disappointing-rewarding, imperfect-perfect world is the very best sort of a world for the training of personality, — until we reach a better.

II

Yet, even though personality be the prime aim and end of the universe, and even though the dark things in the world, as well as the bright, serve that end, it is difficult to conceive of this as a providential order *so long as these darker instruments and agencies are themselves the direct choice and creation of the Divine Will.* If God directly inflicts pain and sends disaster and death, however productive of personality they may be, our thought of his wisdom and love suffers impairment. If, on the other hand, these are the accompaniments of an empirical order that evolves freely, then God, though He is the Ground of possibility of the evolving order, is not directly responsible for all its by-products and disharmonies.[1]

[1] "Neither then can God, said I, since he is good, be the cause of all things, as the generality say, but he is the cause of a few

There is cause to regard the ills and evils of the world-order as such by-products of an evolution which from the very start has been characterized by an ever-extending range of initiative. For example, increasing sentiency, which means increasing capacity for pleasure, involves increasing suffering; but the actual pain inflicted by one creature upon another need by no means be regarded as the direct will or act of God. The instruments of torture and death with which the animal orders have furnished themselves are their own devices, through generations of development, not divine endowments. Nature blood-stained, preying, parasitical, is not fresh from the hand of God. There may be much in nature that reveals her own self-will, as well as much that reveals the will of God.

Ugliness, deformity, disharmony, as we find them in nature, cannot be directly attributed to God's creative hand. Habits of acquiring food, of propagation, of conformity with environment, of offense and defense, gradually acquired through a limited power of initiative, and transmitted by inheritance, — these, rather than the direct act of God, account for the loathsome and repellent forms in nature. Nor is death necessarily

things to men; but of many things he is not the cause; for our good things are much fewer than our evil, and no other is the cause of our good things; but of our evils we must not make God the cause, but seek for some other." Plato: *The Republic*, Book II.

a device or decree which God instituted and laid upon Nature and man, either as the penalty or the prize of finitude. Death is a product of evolution, a painful and imperfect, though effective, expedient for getting rid of worn-out organisms in preparation for richer life. Nature worked it out of herself, and her seal of imperfection is upon it. From the point of view of perfection, of eternal fitness, death can never seem other than the prime defect, the cardinal catastrophe, of the empirical order. Yet, defective as it is, it is made to serve life.

III

All this involves, of course, a kind of autonomy in nature, a certain power of going its own way and evolving its own forms. But in this case what becomes of the divine immanence? Is not God at work in nature?[1] Is not evolution only another name for creative immanence? Yes, in the large, but not in actual detail. The constructive idea of the evolutionary process is God's; the ultimate power by which evolution proceeds is his; the very freedom to subvert his will is from Him. Ad yet, as we have

[1] "There is an unconscious purpose at work in the world, and the many thousand plant and animal forms are the work of the eternally active creative principle." Professor Frank Thilly, interpreting Goethe. *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1908, p. 542.

said, there may be much in nature contrary to the Divine Will. Many nature species, like many men and nations, seem to have gone astray, to have degenerated. The divine life principle is still in them, but they have misused it.[1] Hence deformity, cruelty, suffering, slaughter.

But now, the striking fact is that these ills and evils, as they exist in the sub-human world and pass over into the human — hostile as they are in themselves — are taken up into the Divine Order and made to work out good, to serve ideal ends, to develop intelligence, individuality, and thus to foster personality. Here, in other words, is the very confirmation and seal of Providence, — that God moulds to his own final purposes the attempted subversions of his subjects, so that "all things work together for good."

With all its imperfection and waywardness, all its failure at various points to express the Divine Will, and even its thwartings of that Will, nature reflects the goodness and love of a bountiful God. Beauty, bounty, harmony, abound. These are the

[1] "'T is Nature's law
That none, the meanest of created things,
Of forms created the most vile and brute,
The dullest or most noxious, should exist
Divorced from good — a spirit and pulse of good,
A life and soul, to every mode of being
Inseparably linked."
Wordsworth, *The Old Cumberland Beggar.*

positive and constructive principles of the universe. Pain and deformity and disharmony there may be, — these are the accidents not the substance, the by-products not the principals, the attendants not the chief characters, in this great order in which we find ourselves.

IV

Yet faith in Providence is something more than belief in a providential order which expresses the Divine Beneficence and moves as a whole toward moral and spiritual ends. It involves a confidence that in some way *God is concerned for each separate self*, each human person. In the obsolescent form of the doctrine of Providence this Divine interest was interpreted as a special and detailed direction of the outward life of each, in all its circumstances and events. The happenings of every life, down to all the details of its complex relation to the cosmos, including the weather itself, were supposed to be minutely ordered in an external fashion by the Ruler of all, who might at will reverse the laws of nature to accomplish a "special providence." The times of this ignorance God winked at, and religion clung to, long after science had shown its irrationality. The reason why men have clung to this idea is because it contains the germ of a far

deeper truth, namely, *the spiritual presence and guidance of the individual by the Supreme Person as unseen Friend and Companion.* Beneath the surface of the common doctrine of Providence lies a deep confidence in the Divine Presence and Love. It is this sense of Presence which sustains the trustful heart and makes one feel at home wherever he may be. The absence of it begets uneasiness and disquiet. "All misery," as George Macdonald said, "is God absent." After all, the great question for every man passing through suffering and sorrow is this: Is there any one that cares?

This is essentially the teaching of Jesus concerning Providence, as given in that profound saying of his concerning the falling sparrow. It is not that God protects the life of the sparrow, for it falls before the hand of its human destroyer, but that its fall is not unmarked uncared for, meaningless, loveless. It is *not without your Father.* It is as if Jesus meant to say to his disciples: "The Providence over you is not a mere life preservation; your lives may be sacrificed to selfishness and cruelty, but your Father is with you through all and will hallow the loss to a good end; not only so, but you will *know* that He is with you, and that sense of his presence and approval will be your strength and joy." The same truth is contained in the saying, "Be not afraid of them

that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." "It is not the physical life," Jesus virtually says, "that God is chiefly concerned about, nor that you need to be, but the true life within, which no physical blow can touch."

Blindly, childishly, men have conceived of Providence — even under the light of Christianity, with the words and cross of Jesus before them — as a mere life-and-accident-insurance-policy, not seeing how much deeper and richer than this it is. The real truth of individual Providence is the truth of the *divine companionship*. Whatever happens, *God is with us*. It is this that gives us good heart and carries us through all ills. "For take an example of a Dogg," remarks Lord Bacon, "and mark what a generosity and courage he will put on, when he finds himself maintained by a Man, who to him is instead of a God, or *Melior Natura*. Which courage is manifestly such, as that Creature without that confidence of a better nature than his own could never attain. So Man, when he resteth and assureth himself upon Divine protection and favour, gathereth a force and faith which human nature in itself could not obtain."

"*For the Lord is mindful of his own*," not necessarily averting the impending disaster, not interfering with the laws of nature or subverting the wills of men, not snatching

them from the jaws of death or stopping the sting of pain, but upholding the martyr with the joy of his presence so that he sings at the stake, sustaining the victim of outward disaster or disease so that he triumphs over adversity, cheering the lonely and outcast so that he feels himself begirt and consoled with a divine companionship. This is not saying that the outward events of our lives have no relation to God's purpose and plan, but that his oversight is witnessed, not by the event itself, but by that which lies hidden within it.

This is not, it is true, the prevailing Old Testament conception of Providence, for the reason that the Hebrew mind had not, except in the loftier prophetic literature,[1] risen to this level. But even in the cruder and more materialistic teachings of the Old Testament this deeper faith is implicit. Reread, in the light of this understanding of Providence, the Book of Psalms regains the reality it had begun to lose. Interpreted, not as promises of external protection and physical welfare, but as hymns of abiding trust in a God in whose companionship all ills become light and all misfortunes terrorless, such priceless psalms as the Twenty-third, the Forty-sixth, the Ninety-first, and the One Hundred and Twenty-first will hold their

[1] A striking expression of the deeper, more personal faith in Providence is found in the prayer of Habakkuk (3: 17–19).

own as the imperishable utterances of the deepest heart of man.

V

This interpretation of Providence as spiritual and personal is the only one that will hold in modern thought. Everywhere the old, childish, unreflecting conception of an over-watching, particular, "peddling Providence," as Huxley called it, is being abandoned. Observation undermines it, science refutes it. Only in its structural principles, its lines of advance, its purer and finer forms, its promise of future perfection, does the natural order adequately represent the mind of Him who is working within it to fulfil his perfect purposes. The world as it now is, is not, and cannot be, a perfect vehicle for the Divine expression.[1] More and more clearly men are seeing this, feeling, with shocks of deepening pain, the disharmony between the outward world and the inner ideal. A universe that so often tramples upon moral values, a world of suffering in-

[1] "It may be that for God's purpose it is best that the outer world should hide rather than reveal him. . . . And so it is that Nature wears the expression of the Sphinx. She refuses to tell us that goodness is behind it all; but she quite as steadfastly refuses to say that our faith in the moral order of the world is vain. She shows us both sides impartially, and leaves us to our choice." Professor George M. Stratton, *Some Scientific Apologies for Evil*, University of California Publications, *Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 71.

nocence, of the survival of the strongest, of pain and strife and death, may be God's world, — because it has in it the very opposites of these wrongs, by contrast with which they are seen to be wrongs, — but at all events it is not a world of consistent and successful particular providences in the older sense.

Realizing this, the modern man has found himself farther and farther from that trust in Providence which so strengthened and upheld the fathers. But there is no reason why in abandoning the old form of the doctrine the substance should be sacrificed. The loss of the true kernel of the doctrine of Providence would mean the unspeakable impoverishment of life. It would mean the loss of the Great Companion, and with that, the veiling of the sun, the paling of the stars, the saddening of the seas, the deflowering of the fields, the disillusioning of life. With belief in Him would vanish the sense of security, of strength, of hope, which keeps men pressing on. It would mean what William Kingdon Clifford and George Romanes have shown, in words that will not soon be forgotten.

The abandonment by humanity of this, its most precious and sustaining conviction, would be as gratuitous as it would be irrational. What is needed is to clear the doctrine of God and his providence over men

of the immature and irrelevant notions that have come down from a less thoughtful time and to set it in the light of the larger understanding of Nature and of personality that has come with recent years.

XVIII. PERSONALITY AND IMMORTALITY

I

PERSONALITY is the evidence and guaranty of immortality. The conviction of the reality and worth of another life will stand or fall with the realization of the worth and reality of personality. If the self is a mere phenomenon, its unity a mere aggregate of perceptions, its consciousness simply the awareness of the *Passing Thought*, its self-direction only instinctive adjustment to an iron mechanism, its virtue nothing but crystallized custom, its unique worth only an inflated currency, then indeed we are neither persons nor immortals, but only such stuff as dreams are made of, and our little life is rounded with a sleep. If, on the other hand, at the heart of our being we are not mere sensation centers, nerve ganglia, cosmic *epiphenomena*, but real selves, free, formative, rational, spiritual, — makers, wielders, worthies, — then we cannot be smitten down by death, we cannot become as though we

were not, nor had ever been.[1] A leap from a bridge, a few grains of arsenic, an electric shock, cannot forever whisk us into nothingness and oblivion. As individuals, once non-existent, we may cease to exist; as beings, persons, we must ever be.[2]

A moment's fire is sufficient to shrivel a canvas of Raphael or a manuscript of Shakespeare, — and yet we call them immortal. And immortal they are, not as canvas and pigment, paper and ink, but as expressions of the immortal human spirit. A friend is stricken by our side, and dies. The pulse ceases, the light of the eye fails. We call him dead. But can the honor, the goodness, the insight, the love of the beautiful, which burned within him to the last, die?[3] Those were not abstract, impersonal qualities. They were *his*, unified, transfused by his personality; they were *himself*. If they are imperishable, then is he. By the deceit of seeming we infer that with the body the self perishes. Is it not more rational to

[1] "But in each way soul is the man himself." Plotinus, *On the Immortality of the Soul.*

[2] "We may all fairly agree, I think, that whatever really, and fundamentally exists must, so far as bare existence is concerned, be independent of time. It may go through many changes, and thus have a history; that is to say, it must have definite time-relations, so far as its changes are concerned, but it can hardly be thought of as either going out of existence or as coming into existence at any given period, though it may completely change its form and accidents." Sir Oliver Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 88.

[3] "A capacity consisting in a self-conscious personality cannot be supposed to pass away." Thomas Hill Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 189.

believe that the True Self persists and goes on its way unconquered?[1]

The story is told of Emerson that he was once approached by an excited person with the startling announcement, "Mr. Emerson, the world is coming to an end on the tenth day of the coming month at midnight." "Oh, well," replied the unruffled sage, "let it come, *we can get along without it.*" When one comes to see that there is such a thing thinkable as getting along without any sense world to live in and without any body to live in a sense world, then he begins to realize the reasonableness of immortality. The native air of the soul is not the atmosphere that girdles a globe in space, but that which invests an unseen, personal world. Ole Bull, so it is said, sitting one evening in the kitchen of a country inn with two peasants, took up his violin and played, as only he could play, while the peasants sat spellbound. As he finished, one of them struck the table at which he was sitting with his fist, exclaiming, "*That's a lie!*" A lie indeed is all this material world about us, compared with that world of truth and beauty into which music, poetry, art, religion, lift us, where the spirit plucks the asphodel beside the stream whose tide

[1] "Does it not all come back to this one realization of 'the abysmal deeps of personality?" Crothers, *The Endless Life*, p. 35.

"unbounded goes
Through flood and sea and firmament;
Through light, through life, it forward flows.

"I see the inundation sweet,
I hear the spending of the stream
Through years, through men, through Nature fleet,
Through love and thought, through power and dream."[1]

II

This sense of the imperishability of personality may well be the real heart and center of the belief in the survival of death which in one form or another has prevailed so widely among men. Implicit and crude this belief has been, asserting itself now in blind outreachings and primitive burial customs, now in speculation and argument, but always arising out of the same inherent consciousness of social selfhood. Even the savage mind, dull and inert to spiritual realities, has felt instinctively the strength of personal character and believed that the king or the brave who had attained to a certain coarse and brutal but commanding personality could not pass out of existence at death; he was too much of a reality, a self.[2] And when the stage of speculation was reached this demand of personality for immortality found

[1] Emerson, *Two Rivers*.

[2] "The basis of the belief is the desire for continued existence. . . . So strong is that desire, so inconceivable is the idea that death ends all, and divorces us forever from those we have loved and lost

expression in all manner of conjecture and argumentation, — good, bad, and indifferent. Men have "cast out every line," as Jeremy Taylor has said, "and turned every stone and tried every argument, and sometimes proved it well, and when they did not, yet they believed strongly; and they were sure of the thing when they were not sure of the argument."

Through all the conjecture and reasoning concerning immortality, the pressure of the one conviction of the perdurance of personality is manifest. It is the real nucleus of the argument, so long staple, of the indestructibility of soul substance. That which this argument materialized and misconstrued was just this truth, that the *person* is not subject to the law of physical disintegration. So, too, with the argument from the moral character of human existence and the need of a future for moral equivalences. It is because personality is moral, possesses virtue and worth, that the assurance of its continuance arises, — not only that each may receive his deserts, but that a society of persons may repair its broken ties and fulfil its arrested developments. For the conception of immortal life is in its very nature social, not individualistic.

awhile, that the lower races of mankind have been pretty generally driven to the conclusion that death is a mistake or due to a mistake." F. B. Jevons, *Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion*, pp. 41, 44.

Nor has this conviction of immortality been any the less a *religious conviction* because it grounds in personality. For, the sense that I am a person, and therefore immortal, is inseparably bound up, as we have seen, with the implicit recognition of the Supreme Person, from whom personality gets its very meaning and existence. Only in defining oneself in relation to this Perfect Person does the imperfect person realize fully his character, his worth, his immortality. Jesus suggested the intimate relation between the existence of God and the continued existence of the soul when he said, "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." The relation which true persons hold to God is an abiding relation. Only in reference to Him do persons live at all; and since He is a Living God, they remain living persons. *Without God there could be no immortality, for it is imparted to men by Him with the impartation of personality itself.*

III

Upon this doctrine of the eternal nature of personality there waits the specter of *preexistence.* Thus persistently does the time conception force itself into our thought of eternity. It is not strange that the mind naturally revolts from the idea of preexistence. It is a disturbing thought, full of questioning and

unrest. Out of it has grown that unhappy fancy, one of the saddest and yet one of the most fascinating that has ever troubled the human mind, — reincarnation. Doubtless reincarnation, in the highest conception of it, symbolizes the truth that personality comes to its own only through long aspiration and striving against evil. In this symbolic sense Plato could make suggestive use of it. But although the self reaches its perfection only by continuous self-conquest, it is not through any literal process of reincarnation or rebirth. Successive plunges into the waters of sensuous existence will not purify the soul. Nature is a school, not a prison-house, of personality.

Eternity does not mean time-extension, either backward or forward. It is a concept of *quality* not of quantity, of *intension* not of extension. Immortality does not mean going on into another time-order after leaving this, differing from this only in that the time-supply is unlimited. There is neither preexistence or postexistence in the eternal realm. Time is at best but a form of existence, not an independent reality. As a necessary concomitant of our empirical lives, the imaginary framework in which are set our states of consciousness as related to one another in differing degrees of intensity, time exists. As such, time is an actuality, but if we imagine that time is therefore real

in itself, apart from ourselves and our relation to experience and to each other, then time becomes an illusion. There is no such independent entity.

IV

In the light of personality, what is the meaning and place of death? An incident, an accident, we have dared to call death. Yes, with respect to its time and manner; yes, as belonging to the empirical order; yes, in contrast with the sure movement of the spirit upon its onward way. And yet, in relation to the progress of personality, the death of the body may have a very real part to play in the development of the soul. It resembles one of the "critical points" in science, such as that at which water passes into the vapor state, or one species into another in the progress of evolution.

"Change and perishability exist," says William T. Harris, interpreting Aristotle, "because the particular is not adequate to the universal."[1] The particular — that is the physical body — is not adequate to the universal, — that is the spirit, the personality. What, then, could be expected but the sundering of the universal from the outgrown particular? Dumbly we look on and imagine that the universal has gone down with the particular, the soul with the body. "Foolish

[1] *Hegel's Logic*, p. 29.

one, that which thou thyself sowest is not quickened except it die."

But why, if death introduces the spirit to its next stage of development, does it come so inopportunely with most men, before the self has reached its full development in this stage of its progress? Because death as an event, a particular occurrence, belongs to the empirical order, — an order which personality can influence and use, but cannot wholly control. Not even the Supreme Person, although these laws arise from his rationality, could subvert them without destroying the integrity and worth of the whole natural order. Are these two orders, then, — the eternal and the empirical, — alien and opposing?

> "Are God and Nature then at strife,
> That Nature lends such evil dreams?
> So careful of the type she seems,
> So careless of the single life?"

Not at strife, but the two orders are on different planes. The relation between them is that which we find epitomized in the relation of the person to the brain. The natural order serves the eternal order, yet it has a relative independence. The person must realize himself by subduing and informing the empirical world. Why this should be the secret of existence, the law of our being — rather than one of static harmony, in which there

is no conflict, no conquest — we cannot fully understand, but we can at least see that it is capable of ineffable good in the issue.

That death, under the high tension of a great spiritual passion, may be not only scorned and subdued but even transformed into an instrument of self-realization and spiritual progress has been signally demonstrated in the history of Christian martyrdom. Here were uneducated men and weak women so meeting death that it not only lost its terror, but became a personal elevation, a gracious sacrament for the strengthening of the spirit. Who can doubt that the spirits of the martyrs emerged from this *sifting*, to use the reputed saying of Ignatius, *finer wheat for the eternal granary?* But even when death means far less than it did to the martyr, even when it comes with no spiritual uplift, there is reason to believe that its discipline serves the ends of personality and sets the spirit forward in its path of self-realization.

Surely there is no sadder deception than so to confound the self with its sense implement as to infer that when the latter yields to physical forces the spirit is assumed to go down with it. The boy Goethe, if the story be true, was wiser than that, for, at the age of seven, having accompanied his father to church and listened to the preacher attempt to reconcile the Lisbon earthquake

with the Divine Providence, afterward, when asked what he thought of the sermon, he replied that the preacher need not have tried so hard to defend the Divine goodness, for Almighty God knows that *no mortal disaster can injure an immortal soul.* It would seem as if so reasonable a truth might have gotten itself firmly fixed in the human mind before this; yet the deceit of appearance bears heavily down at times upon us all. It is with no slight effort that we escape from the bondage of the visible and physical into that atmosphere of pure insight wherein immortality becomes a truth of such self-evidence as appears, for instance, in the pages of the *Phædo.* "And can we suppose that the soul, being on her way to a place, like herself, invisible and noble and pure, a world worthy indeed the name of the Unseen, there to dwell with the good and wise God, whither, if God please, my soul also must soon go — can we suppose, I say, that the soul being such as she is, and of such nature, will, when released from the body, be instantly scattered to the winds and be destroyed, as the mass of men assert? Far from it."

V

Doubtless the question has already arisen within the mind of some reader, whether this

grounding of immortality in personality, toward which modern thought is so strongly setting, is, after all, the Christian doctrine. To this question the answer must be that this explicit and exact teaching is not found in the New Testament. Indeed, there is in the Bible no theoretical, philosophical discussion of the subject of immortality. The treatment of it is concrete and vital. And yet it will be found, I think, that implicitly and fundamentally the New Testament rests the assurance of a life to come just here, upon the nature of personality.

There are two distinctive characteristics of the Christian teaching concerning the future life. The first is its *emphasis upon the quality, the content, of the life to come.* At the time of the advent of Christ there were two contrasted conceptions of the future. One was that of the pagan world, which conceived of the future life as a shadowy realm of flitting, insubstantial shades. This was not only the Greek and Roman notion, but also that of the Babylonians and Egyptians, and indeed the prevailing conception of the prechristian and extrachristian world. Over against this St. Paul set his doctrine, — not of "the resurrection of the body," but of a *resurrection body*, a medium of communication with spiritual realities by means of which the things of the spirit become as vivid and

actual as are the objects of this world to the physical body. Paul has been strangely misconstrued in this teaching. Very clearly he declares that the resurrection body is a *spiritual* body, that it is no more like the present body than the plant is like the seed; and yet his doctrine has been persistently corrupted into a theory of the literal resurrection of the present body. The true Pauline doctrine of the resurrection body was adapted — as nothing else at the time could be — to substitute for the dreary, shadowy abode of the dead of pagan belief the heaven of the Christian, with its vital touch with unseen verities.

The other conception of the future which Christianity found and ultimately supplanted was the common Jewish notion of an *external, materialistic Messianism,* with its cheap pictures of millennial glory and national aggrandizement. For this, Christianity gradually substituted the simple, spiritual, personal conception of eternal life found in the fourteenth chapter of the Fourth Gospel. Heaven is a place of communion, a home. This conception was for a time subordinated to the eschatological, Messianic notion, but it held its place at the center of Christianity and saved it from externalism.

The prevailing characteristic of the Christian doctrine of immortality has been, thus, its *personal character.* It has magnified

personal identity — "and to each seed a body of its own" — and personal reunion.

> "Eternal form shall still divide
> The eternal soul from aught beside
> And I shall know him when we meet."

The idea of the continuation and perfection of the fellowship with Christ and with one another, which had become so intense and absorbing a reality to the early Christians, made their conception of the future life vivid and joyful. This is the secret of all vital interest in the Future. In proportion as personal fellowship here is warm and real and pure — in friendship, in home life, in the church — will be the degree of intelligent faith in the life that is to come.

Everything in Christianity has tended to quicken and confirm this faith in the perdurance of personality, — notably the belief in the *resurrection of Jesus*. That was the message that stirred the blood of the early disciples, that kindled the flame by which Christianity spread throughout the world. And yet — as the modern Church is coming to see more clearly and assuredly every day — the heart of the resurrection message was not the return to life of a dead body, but the *invisible persistence of a divine personality*. "It was not possible that he should be holden of" death. The secret of Christianity lay in its realization

— through contact with a divine-human person — of the reality and love of a Perfect Personality, and the possibilities and potencies of human development and fellowship, too great to be other than immortal.

XIX. CONCLUSION

I

THE study of personality carries its own implications and yields its own values. Yet one can hardly leave the subject without an endeavor to point out more fully some of its bearings upon current needs and current issues. The movement of modern thought in the direction of personality comes as a solvent of many of the gravest problems of our time. It comes, in the first place, as a corrective and complement of modern science. It is only as we emerge gradually from the domination of the era of science that we can realize fully both its values and its limitations. Of the immeasurable benefits of science to humanity, materially and spiritually, there can be no question. Not simply in the domain of comfort and well-being has priceless advantage accrued, but in intellectual and spiritual directions. That patient, judicial, thorough temper and attitude of mind which has crystallized in the phrase *the scientific spirit* is one of the greatest acquisitions in the progress of humanity. By means of it the spirit of credulity and superstition — which, under the guise of an

ally of religion, has ever been one of its chief foes — has been to a large extent banished. The gain is inestimable. Everywhere the spirit of open, honest, unfearing investigation has taken the place of tradition and ignorance. The scientific spirit has penetrated every stratum of society. Commenting to a superstitious brother on the subject of ghosts and Jacob's ladders, Uncle Remus sagely remarks: "Hit's des like I tell you, Brer Ab. I ain't 'sputin' 'bout it, but I ain't seed um, an' I don't take no chances deze days on w'at I don't see, an' dat w'at I sees I got ter 'zamine mighty close." Uncle Remus is the spokesman of the new day. Anything in which the modern man puts confidence he has to "'zamine mighty close."

But after such examination as science is able to give — an examination which disposes of a good many useless and harmful ideas and practices — there remains an irreducible remainder of human experience and idea which natural science is utterly unable to explain. It lies quite beyond the sphere of science, in the domain of philosophy, ethics, theology. Not that the scientific spirit is not needed here also, but it must be supplemented by another spirit, namely, the religious spirit, — the spirit that recognizes realities that cannot be seen with the eye or analyzed by the scientific process.

Science and super-science, — these two must learn rightly to apportion the world of knowledge and action between themselves. There is a natural and there is a spiritual; there are *phenomena* and there are *noumena;* there are facts and there are verities; there is a science and there is an ontology. The universe has a twofold interpretation, — the one empirical, the other eternal. If we ignore the one, we fall into inefficiency, superstition, other-worldliness; if we ignore the other, we fall into skepticism, materialism, worldliness. For many centuries the balance was on the side of ignorance of the world that now is; for the past century it has been increasingly on that of neglect of the world of the eternal. Professor Henry Jones writes of Lotze that he was "filled with distrust of the importunate persuasiveness of modern science." [1] It is this importunate persuasiveness, this tendency of the scientific interest — not of science itself — to absorb all other interests and thus to thrust aside the spiritual, that awakens protest in the minds of those who stand for the larger life of man. Disproportion of emphasis, ill-balance of interest, a one-sided view-point, a distorted life, — this is our great danger. "To depersonalize man," said Amiel, "is the great tendency of our age."

Now personalism stands for just these

[1] See *The New World*, Vol. IV, p. 409.

slighted and suppressed, but really supreme, interests. It alone takes earnest account of

> "those obstinate questionings
> Of sense and outward things,
> Fallings from us, vanishings;
> Blank misgivings of a Creature
> Moving about in worlds not realized."

Ideals, aspirations, convictions, valuations, that come not at all within the purview of science (except in psychology, and there only on the physiological side), nothing is so real and so significant as these, from the point of view of personality. Are these spiritual factors fugitive, variant, hardly perceptible in many men, whereas the interests served by science are definite, insistent, and experienced by all? It signifies not at all from the standpoint of personalism. The deepest needs may be least clamorous, and the greatest realities least obtrusive. The discovery that he is a person may be the last that a man makes, but it is never the least, and when it has been made all other facts concerning himself or the world fade before it.

Science must inevitably lose its relative rank and value in the light of personalism. It ceases at once to be prior and commanding in its appeal. It takes on, it is true, a *new* interest and value, for the very reason that it is now seen in its relation to a higher reality, but it has itself become secondary

and contributive. Man, and man as person, is primary. "Little else besides the development of a soul is worth study," wrote Browning.[1] Rather, may we not say, all else is worth study only as related to the development of the soul; for all else *is* related to this. Yes, every minutest event in natural evolution relates to man as a person. Every slightest feature of man's environment, the whole network and frame of things, in principle and detail, gets that significance which alone gives it real existence from persons and for persons. Back of the old doctrine that man is the lord of the universe lay a great truth, — the truth that man, through God, is the interpreter and organizer of the universe. Science itself is more a reading by man of the contents of his own mind, than a knowledge of an external world. The real marvels disclosed by science are the marvels of the human mind. We have been long wondering at electricity with its power to enable us to communicate with one another, while the real wonder is *ourselves*, who thus find communication with each other.

II

Other misapprehensions and perversions of our time lose their strength and clamor as the truth of personality asserts itself.

[1] See Inge, *Studies of English Mystics*, p. 207.

Materialism, for instance, becomes a wan and pallid impertinence raised against the worth and dignity of manhood. The human spirit scorns *things* as a substitute for *persons*, knows that ideas are the only true fortune, that a single soul is worth more than all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them, and is very sure

"That virtue and the faculties within
Are vital, — and that riches are akin
To fear, to change, to cowardice, and death." [1]

It cannot be repeated too often that it is not things in themselves — wealth, comfort, art, advantages — that are evil. Personality may in fact enrich itself by means of material goods. The trouble is that to get them, or to keep them, one must so often dishonor his higher selfhood, dissever himself from his fellows, weaken those intimate bonds and sacramental services which attach him most closely to others. The deteriorating effect of wealth upon character is no mere prejudice. It has proven itself true from the days of Rome to those of America. Even if social obligations justified colossal fortunes, humanity is not yet strong enough to master wealth in the service of personality.[2] Deci-

[1] Wordsworth, *October*, *1803*.

[2] "On the other hand, experience teaches us that miserly traits develop and strengthen year after year, and that the acquisition of more money deadens lofty and generous aspirations until the miserable, feeble old man becomes centered more and more in self,

sion therefore still lies, as a rule, where Jesus placed it, — between riches and the Kingdom of God, between wealth, held for its own sake, and character.

III

The real test of all social and industrial movements is: Do they recognize and promote personal values? Do they make for manhood and womanhood? Then, sooner or later, they are sure to prevail. The fatal defect of the present industrial system, which, unless it is remedied, will surely work its doom, is its flagrant violation of the claims of personality. Would socialism prove a successful substitute? Not if it continues to be a class and partisan movement rather than a movement in behalf of man as man; not if it continues to lean toward materialistic and unreligious views of life; not if it continues to cherish an ideal of society in which the individual is absorbed; not if it continues to put an economic program in advance of an ethical ideal. So long as it stands for these things it is untrue to personal values, to the spirit and progress of humanity. On the other hand, all that is earnest and human and altruistic in the spirit of socialism, with whatever is just and wise and progressive in its economic principle, is bound to survive

and avarice becomes the vice of his old age." Andrew Carnegie, *The Outlook*, May 16, 1908, p. 107.

and win, although socialism itself be lost in the larger ideal and the broader movement which is already on its way.

Thus personality enters into every practical problem and issue of our time — social, political, industrial — simply because in every one there is an ethical factor which is determinative; and ethical principles ground in personality.

With respect to the religious problems that have arisen and reached such serious proportions within the last half century, it cannot but be evident, to one who shares in any degree the point of view presented in the foregoing pages, that it throws peculiar light upon the issues that confront religious thought. There, for instance, is the blind alley of *Agnosticism*, so easily entered, so hardly escaped. It is true, as Agnosticism affirms, that the mind may search *phenomena* as long as it will and gain no adequate knowledge of the Power that it perceives behind them. But let the glance but be directed inward and the mystery vanishes like a cloud. Let one but start with the recognition of his own selfhood, a reality that underlies all science, including psychology, and he will inevitably come to the knowledge of that Other Self without whom he, as a person, could not be. God is known through man, the Infinite Person through the finite person.

Equally clearly does *Positivism* disclose

its fundamental error, in the light of personalism. There is assuredly something worshipful in humanity, but it is something which we have already found to be human only as it is divine, man's only as it is more than man's. Immediately "Collective Humanity" as such is made an object of worship, its worshipfulness disappears, lost in meanness and sordidness. If the Positivist seeks to escape the difficulty by insisting that it is only the *best* in humanity that he worships, he falls back upon the distinction which we have been urging. He then worships that *in* humanity which he altogether fails to account for, but which personalism recognizes as God in man.

IV.

Before closing the discussion there are two or three objections which demand attention. The first — anticipated at the outset, but recurring at the close with renewed force — is from the point of view of *common sense*. "Why all this excessive introspection," says the common-sense man, "this fine-spun theorizing concerning a supposedly composite selfhood? It is more than likely that it is all vaporizing; we cannot know anything definite regarding our inner life, and if we could what is the value of it all?"

Something is to be said for the man who

takes the common-sense attitude, who stops resolutely where the road begins to look a bit uncertain and refuses to push on any farther. Yet, for all his virtues and advantages, who would that man of common sense be? For he is a shirk. He is like one who owns land on which is an unexplored tract of woodland and mountain, difficult and arduous to penetrate, but whose glens and glades and outlooks may be well worth the exertion required to reach them. To leave them unexplored is craven. A man may indeed live bravely and happily and successfully without ever looking into the deeper mysteries of his personal being. And yet he must feel that there is a problem in his own daily experience, and if he could find light upon it he would be able to live more intelligently and satisfactorily. For no man likes to live in an enclosure when he might move in the open.

Into whatever difficulties introspection leads us — and they are neither slight nor few — it leads us into at least one great truth, — that we are persons. If the common-sense man fails of this discovery, if, as Fichte declares, "most men could be more easily brought to believe themselves a piece of lava in the moon than to regard themselves as a Self," [1] then blessed be — not

[1] *Werke*, Vol. I, p. 175, note. Quoted by Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 148.

common sense — but *super-sense!* For it reveals what flesh and blood fail to discern. But the common-sense man has, as a rule — though he might not admit it — something more than common sense. Dumbly, implicitly, he transcends sense values and knows himself as a person and others as persons. Better for him, however, that he, or some one for him, should go deeper than the implicit assumption and — whatever the difficulties of the inquiry [1] — ask how and why we are persons, and what it means to be a person, and how we may become more truly persons. If in this study something is accomplished, however little, to help on this inquiry, it is well worth while.

V

A more serious objection to the view we have advocated, and one that demands careful consideration, is that which is sure to arise from the *religious man*, at least one type of the religious man. To him it will seem that this conception of personality *tends to restore that exaltation of man* which philosophy has from the first done all in its power to maintain, and which religion has,

[1] "Conflicting elements enter into the very constitution of a person. To trace them even imperfectly one must be patient of refinements accessible to qualifications, and ever ready to admit the opposite of what has been laboriously established." George Herbert Palmer, *The Nature of Goodness*, p. 185.

with equal earnestness, endeavored to overthrow. Human pride, self-sufficiency, the worth and dignity of mankind, the potency of human reason and will, — are not these the hateful heresies with which religion has always had to contend for her very life? Is it not the very heart of religion, and especially of Christianity, to renounce self, to recognize one's utter and complete dependence upon God, to distrust human worth, to abhor self-esteem, and prostrate oneself before the Power that is all in all?

In reply, it should be said that true religion never called for an attitude of abjectness and servility before God. This is one of the chief errors that Christianity refutes, lifting man up to a self-respecting communion with God, such as a child has with a father. It is true that a certain type of Christian theology, starting with Augustinianism and culminating in Calvinism, has perpetuated this attitude and made it seem to be that of Christianity itself, but this is not pure Christianity as revealed in Christ. Fatherhood, sonship, — what have these to do with *sovereignty* and *worm-ship?* Neither is this a true reflection of Paulinism. All-Great and All-Glorious as God is to Paul, man is not his puppet or slave; it is his to glorify God, but to glorify Him by becoming himself godlike.[1]

[1] George Herbert Palmer, *The Nature of Goodness*, p. 140.

No, there is no abjectness in true religion, no denial of one's own personality. But there is, as we have seen, — and here lies the grain of truth which gives to even the extremes of Calvinism and Romanism a half-justification, — *dependence* of the most real and intimate character. Were this dependence of an external character, were it dependence upon an imperfect instead of a perfect Person, it might involve that repressive slavishness, so inconsistent with true personal relations, which Calvinism regards as the soul of true religion. But just because it is not that sort of dependence, but a pure, personal, immanental dependence, — a dependence that grounds in love and issues in constant uplift and enlargement of spirit, — it conserves and promotes personality.

It is necessary, to fully meet this objection, once more to emphasize the distinction in our composite selfhood between the True Self and the empirical self. Thus is found at the very core of selfhood the Divine Self which is so much a part of ourselves that dependence upon him is part of the very process of personal development.[1]

Here, in the Inner Self, the Christ of God within, the Holy Spirit, is the fountain-head of personality, the seat of authority, the center of rational and spiritual life. Because this is virtually the same in all men,

[1] George Herbert Palmer, *The Nature of Goodness*, p. 140.

and thus universal, there results that *consensus* of moral judgment which makes the solidarity of humanity.[1] The man who is loyal to this True Self, this Christ within, needs external authority and instruction only as a means of awakening and calling into activity the Eternal Ideal which ultimately passes upon all codes of authority and judges all things. When habitually and wholly responsive to the True Self, man is, indeed, self-sufficient; but, as Paul recognized, such *sufficiency is from God.*[2] This is not self-sufficiency, but *Self*-sufficiency. And Self-sufficiency means self-renunciation. All that Calvin has said of our human worthlessness would be true, if it were possible to separate ourselves from the Worth or Goodness which lies at the heart of our selfhood and enters, in proportion as we admit Him, into all that we are and do. But when Calvin ignores the Divine within man and removes God to a place wholly outside and above him, having only a sovereign and condescending converse with him, then he proves himself more pagan than Marcus Aurelius, who showed himself more Christian than Calvin when he wrote: "One thing is needful — to

[1] "All who are rational beings are partakers of the Word, *i. e.*, of reason, and by this means have certain seeds implanted within them of wisdom and justice which is Christ." Origen, *De Principiis.*

[2] 2 Cor. 3: 5.

live close to the divine genius within thee, and minister thereto worthily." True, and yet he that is least in the Kingdom of heaven knows — as Marcus Aurelius did not know — that that divine genius within is one with the infinite God Above.

VI

But even if objections disappear, a question remains. Is not personalism a veiled dualism? Does it not give us a *duo-verse*, instead of a universe? The discovery of the personal, the spiritual, the eternal, does indeed open another world, but it is not a world outside of the present world, nor antagonistic to it. The personal world is in closest relation, as we have found, to the empirical world. It is a world within the sense world and at the same time transcending it. "There is a natural and there is a spiritual." In the time order the natural is first. "Howbeit that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But in the eternal order the spiritual is first. The "first shall be last and the last first."

These two realms are related to one another, not as antagonistic — though the human will often thrusts them into antagonism — nor as interchangeable, nor as complementary, for one of these worlds exceeds the other, interprets it, accounts for it. They

are related as form is related to substance, as idea is related to construction.

Such a unity alone gives us a real universe, — not a mechanical unity, but a rational unity; not the unity of a single substance or a single force, but of a sphere, with center and circumference. A true unity can only be a unity of *values*, within which each object and interest takes its place with reference to a supreme value, — personality. Truth in such a universe is above all else an appraisal of values.

Such a unity is *progressive* and belongs to a developing universe. Its fulfilment awaits the complete harmonizing of the empirical and the spiritual, the material and the ideal, the outer and the inner. This, as has been said, is our human task and affords us our opportunity of personal progress. Imperfect personality could not grow except by actively moulding a correspondingly imperfect medium to its ends, making it a means of expression and realization. Imperfect persons in a perfect environment would lack the material out of which, while they remake their world, to make themselves. This process — including the Hegelian synthesis of opposites, but not confined to it — is the secret of the ages. The Universe is a *Becoming*, Nature is the *About-to-be*. Creation waits for its adoption, the advent of the sons of God. Together man and nature advance to

their consummation, as more and more man becomes a person and lifts nature to higher personal uses and spiritual significance.

Thus our world becomes a personalized universe. Central and supreme of all realities is God, the Perfect Person; man is *capax Dei*, the receptive-active, developing person; nature is the realm of symbols for the expression and communion of persons. And in this universe of personal values our task is clear, — to realize our selfhood, to interpret and personalize the external world, and to build up a true society of persons a Kingdom of God.

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